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Abstract 
 
Enforcement seems to be an essential and ubiquitous feature of state societies. My 
thesis explores arguments for the kind of general and exclusive moral permission 
to enforce that states claim, and in particular the role that feasibility 
considerations play in them. I argue that premises about the infeasibility of 
alternatives to a state’s enforcement are essential to the success of any such 
argument. States’ permission to enforce can be justified, if at all, in response to the 
unfortunate circumstances in which we find ourselves. I develop a general 
multivocal account of the concept of feasibility, according to which the concept can 
be made precise in many different ways, no single one of which is obviously 
privileged as uniquely relevant to moral theory. This account has the result of 
casting doubt on the assumption that states’ permission to enforce can be taken 
for granted. Arguments for this permission may succeed when we make their 
feasibility premises precise in some ways, but not others. Understanding this, I 
argue, helps illuminate how we ought to think about and treat the state 
enforcement we face in the real world.  
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Impact Statement 
 
This thesis investigates the moral permissibility of state enforcement. Its 
arguments, if accepted, will have a quite significant impact on both the discipline 
of political philosophy and on the practice of politics. My arguments show that 
states’ claimed general and exclusive moral permission to enforce compliance with 
their commands or directives should not be taken for granted, as it tends to be. 
Firstly, this has an impact on how political philosophers ought to think about 
state legitimacy. While it is fairly common among political philosophers to be 
sceptical about general obligations to obey the state, it is usually assumed that 
states’ general and exclusive moral permission to enforce (which I refer to as 
‘legitimacy’) is on safe ground. My conclusion, then, ought to encourage political 
philosophers to explore further the kinds of arguments that are available for state 
legitimacy in this sense, and to ask whether or not we should in fact consider our 
states to be acting morally permissibly. More specifically, I argue that plausible 
arguments for state legitimacy depend on facts about feasibility, and that it is not 
obvious that the necessary feasibility facts hold. This establishes a need to explore 
exactly what feasibility claims need to be true in order for existing states to be 
legitimate, and whether these feasibility claims in fact are true. More generally, 
my arguments demonstrate the importance of unrealistic political theory to 
thinking about state legitimacy, where previously debates concerning realisticness 
of theory had focused on justice. 
It also follows that it is only insofar as it is not feasible to do better that our states 
can be justified in acting as exclusive enforcers. This has the consequence that we 
should think about our states as legitimate, if at all, only in response to 
unfortunate circumstances, and that a world without these states is in some sense 
ideal. Although this need not mean that we ought to see to abolish our states, it 
does have an impact on how we ought to treat our states’ enforcement here and 
now. We should seek to minimise it where possible, consistently with other 
weighty values or moral requirements, and if and when we ought to accept it, this 
is a tragic fact, not something to be welcomed. 
The thesis also contains a rigorous account of the concept of feasibility, which 
feeds into the argument concerning state legitimacy, but also stands 
independently of it and, if accepted, should have a significant impact on how 
political philosophers think about the relation between feasibility and moral and 
political theory. It tends to be thought that proposals in moral or normative 
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political theory are straightforwardly ruled out if infeasible. My account of this 
concept, though, has the consequence that there is no single straightforward 
feasibility constraint of this sort on moral and political theory (or at least, it 
should not be assumed that there is). Thus, it will not suffice for rejecting a theory 
to declare that what it calls for is infeasible.  
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Introduction 
 
It is sometimes thought that questions about how states and their subjects 
morally relate to each other are the fundamental questions of political philosophy. 
If ‘political society’ is understood as society organised by a state, then the 
motivation for this is obvious: these questions concern the moral status of the 
subject matter of political philosophy. I do not think that this makes these questions 
fundamental in any deep sense. If political philosophy is defined thus, there is no 
reason to suppose that it in turn is particularly fundamental to normative social 
philosophy broadly (the study of the normative principles, ideals and values 
relevant to large-scale questions about how societies ought to be structured and 
organised). Societies need not be structured by states, and so there are other 
questions in normative social philosophy that are not necessarily subsequent to 
those about states.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the moral evaluation of states is of great 
importance for the morally concerned thinker in the world in which we live.1 We 
live on a planet whose habitable surface is entirely within the claimed jurisdiction 
of some state or other. Almost the entirety of this is also under the de facto 
control, the enforcement power, of some state or other. Though there can (and 
perhaps should) be non-state forms of society, they are barely existent in the 
modern world. Given the ubiquity of states, then, and the extent to which they 
shape our lives, it should not be surprising that much philosophical effort has been 
devoted to questions about state and subject. It is important to think about what 
moral attitude we should take to these states that surround us and the demands 
that they make of us. This thesis aims to contribute to this task by addressing one 
particular dimension of the moral evaluation of states. This is, roughly, states’ 
                                                          
1 There is a growing ‘realist’ trend in political theory, some variants of which reject the 
application of moral principles or values to the political realm (for surveys of the realist 
trend see Galston (2010) and Rossi and Sleat (2014) and for criticism see Estlund (2017c)). 
I do not find this view attractive, since the political realm, just like all other social realms, 
is constituted by human activity, about which we can ask moral questions. We ought to be 
able to ask questions, at least, about whether political society is something we should have 
in the first place, or rather should seek to avoid; these, presumably, cannot be settled by 
values or principles internal to the political. In any case, this thesis will not address such 
views. I assume that political society is an appropriate target for moral evaluation, and 
what follows will be an exploration of the moral status of an aspect of states. (Some others 
claim that the kind of moral principles that apply to politics are distinctive and sui generis, 
(see, e.g. Rossi (2012)). It seems likely that there will be certain sorts of moral principle 
that are particular to the political realm, but there seems no ex ante reason to expect that 
general moral principles or considerations will not hold in the political domain, so I will 
not begin by assuming that they do not.) 
10 
 
possession of a general moral permission to enforce compliance with their 
demands, which I will stipulatively refer to as state legitimacy. (I will attempt to 
make this notion more precise shortly.) This thesis hopes to cast some doubt on 
the assumption often made that state legitimacy, in this sense, is on safe ground 
(for at least some actually existing states). It will do this by way of an 
examination of the importance of feasibility considerations to arguments for state 
legitimacy.  
1. Anarchism 
One way to understand this thesis is as a call for the anarchist challenge (or a form 
of anarchist challenge) to be taken seriously. Anarchism is primarily some form of 
rejection of the state, and since the world as we currently know it is entirely 
occupied by states, it is a rejection of the status quo. There are, though, many 
forms of anarchism, and a number of different theses which might be taken as 
definitive of it. Many of these have in common a call for something radically 
different from the status quo, or some form of rejection of something the 
eradication of which would be a radical departure from the status quo.  
It is very common for anarchism of various forms to be rejected on grounds of 
infeasibility.2 What it calls for is infeasible, it is argued, and so a political theory 
recommending it must be wrong. Or, there is no feasible alternative to what it 
claims is impermissible, thus it must be mistaken about this impermissibility. Or, 
it is wrong that a certain aspect of the status quo is morally bad or corrupt, 
because there is no feasible alternative. (In fact, the feasibility critiques made of 
anarchism are not usually so straightforward: it is not usually claimed simply that 
what anarchism calls for is infeasible, nor that there is no feasible alternative to 
what anarchism rejects. Rather, it is usually claimed that there are certain 
particularly weighty values or principles whose realisation in conjunction with 
what anarchism calls for is infeasible. In other words, what anarchism calls for is 
not feasible in a desirable way.)  
Given the radical nature of anarchism, the prevalence of such feasibility critiques 
is not unexpected. However, there is surprisingly little understanding of the 
concept of feasibility, and of the role it plays in constraining moral and political 
theory.3 Thus, it is not clear when the truth of certain feasibility facts warrants 
                                                          
2 These sorts of feasibility critiques can be found in, for example, Miller (1984) and 
Wellman (1996) 232. 
3 There has been a recent increase in interest in the concept, and a few sophisticated 
accounts have emerged. However, I will argue in chapter 5 that none of these is fully 
successful. 
11 
 
the rejection of some moral or political theory. The focus of my thesis, then, will 
be on the role of feasibility considerations in arguments attempting to overcome 
the anarchist challenge. I will argue that arguments which might successfully 
establish state legitimacy (for some existing states) depend on feasibility premises. 
In the final part of the thesis, I will offer an account of the concept of feasibility 
which has the consequence that arguments relying on feasibility premises should 
not be assumed to work. Further consideration is needed of these feasibility 
premises and whether they support the arguments in which they are used.   
What precisely, though, is anarchism? The term is a contested and multifarious 
one. For one thing, the term is claimed by certain political movements, and so is 
sometimes used to refer to an ideology, a collection of claims. It is also sometimes 
used simply to designate political troublemakers or similar. Setting aside these 
uses, the term centrally refers to some form of rejection of the state.4 Since there 
are a number of different dimensions of evaluation of states, there are a number of 
different normative theses that might be labelled ‘anarchist’. 
Let me distinguish three key sorts of question about the moral status of states, 
negative answers to all of which might be labelled ‘the anarchist thesis’. All three 
questions are independent of each other: for any given state, some of the questions 
might receive positive answers while others receive negative answers. The first 
sort of question asks whether the existence of the state in question is, in some sense 
a good thing or morally acceptable. This might be termed the question of whether 
the state is justified. (This is, I think, what A. John Simmons has in mind when he 
famously distinguishes justification from legitimacy, a term which he uses 
differently from me.)5  
The word ‘justification’ is often used in connection with actions, as when we ask 
whether someone is justified in doing something. This is not the way I mean to use 
the term here. Existing is not an action, and entities cannot be justified in existing 
in this sense. It may be that when people talk about justifying the state, or showing 
that a state is justified, they mean to refer elliptically to showing that a state is 
justified in doing certain things (perhaps those things essential to or characteristic 
of states). Since enforcement is often taken (rightly, as I will suggest below) to be 
                                                          
4 When the term is used to refer to a single normative thesis, it does not always describe a 
rejection of the state: sometimes it is used to refer to a rejection of something else, such as 
authority, coercion, power, domination or hierarchy in general, or to a positive call for 
something, such as decentralisation, but let us set aside these uses as well. For these, see 
for example Clark (1978), Kropotkin (1970) 284, Malatesta (quoted in Clark (1978) 5 and 
Berman (1972) 28) and Woodcock (1963). 
5 Simmons (2001) 122-57 
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essential to states, showing that a state is justified in doing things essential to its 
statehood may end up amounting to establishing what I above called its legitimacy 
(which I will turn to below). But I think that talk of states being justified may also 
refer to something different, having to do with the moral status of the state’s 
existence. When I refer to a state’s justification or being justified, I refer exclusively 
to this latter thing.  
As we will see in chapter 2, there are really a number of slightly different 
questions here (a number of different properties of states that we might be asking 
about). But these different questions seem to form a family, having to do with the 
quality of the state and whether it is something whose existence we should accept 
or be glad for. Justification anarchism, then, would be something like the view 
that it would be better if we did not have a state, or that we ought to get rid of 
our states. (Simmons points out that there is a distinction between a priori and a 
posteriori anarchism, and such a distinction can also be made within justification 
anarchism: a priori justification anarchism holds that all states are necessarily 
unjustified, while a posteriori justification anarchism holds only that all currently 
existing states are unjustified.6 An equivalent distinction can be made also for the 
other anarchist views about to be discussed.) 
A second question, which has been granted a great deal of attention by political 
philosophers in recent years, is the question whether the state has obligating 
power over its subjects in the following sense: 
Obligating Power. A state X has obligating power over an individual Y in 
some domain D if and only if X’s commands/directives/laws in D create 
(at least pro tanto) duties/obligations/pre-emptive reasons for Y to act as 
commanded/directed, independent of their content (within some limits).7 
This is, I think, the same question as the traditional question of political 
obligation. To say that subjects of a state (or certain subjects of a state) have a 
general obligation to obey whatever laws or directives that state makes just 
                                                          
6 Simmons (1996) 105 
7 On pre-emptive reasons see Raz (1988) ch. 3 and (1979) 18; a pre-emptive reason to φ is 
a reason that pre-empts, that is, excludes from consideration or replaces certain other 
reasons for or against φ-ing. X’s having obligating power over Y involves (in Hohfeldian 
terms) it having a moral power to change Y’s normative situation, but it is consistent with 
either X’s also having a claim right to Y’s obedience or not. For discussion of this 
distinction see Copp (1999) 10-21. For X’s commands/directives to create a duty (etc.) 
need not require that X’s command be in any sense the ultimate source of the duty. For 
instance, if Y promises to obey whatever commands X makes, and then on some 
subsequent occasion X commands Y to φ, Y now has a duty to φ that she did not have 
before. X has created this duty, even though, in some sense, its ultimate source is Y’s 
promise, not X’s command; Y only has the duty to φ as a part of the more general duty to 
do whatever X commands. 
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because they are laws or directives the state has made, independent of their 
content, is just to say that that state has the power (or capacity) to make its 
subjects (or certain of its subjects) obligated to obey its laws or directives just by 
making one.8 (I introduced this question as the question of obligating power, 
rather than as the question of political obligation because I am interested in the 
moral evaluation of states, rather than that of citizens.) Here, the anarchist view 
(obligating power anarchism) is the denial of states’ obligating power, again either 
a priori or a posteriori: either the claim that no state could possibly have 
obligating power over any (or all) of its subjects, or the claim that no existing 
state in fact has obligating power over all of its subjects.  
The third question I will call, stipulatively, the question of state legitimacy. This is 
the question whether the state in question has a general permission to enforce 
compliance with its commands or directives. (I use ‘enforce’ in a way to be 
explained in more detail below, which may not correspond perfectly with the 
ordinary use: roughly, to enforce is to make another do something whether or not 
they want to.) The anarchist view here is that states lack any general permission 
to enforce compliance with their commands or directives. Again, this could be a 
priori or a posteriori: either the claim that no state could possibly have such a 
general permission, or simply that no existing state has such a permission. It is 
this question in which I will be interested in this thesis, and it is the a posteriori 
anarchist claim that I argue should be taken seriously. I will go on to refine the 
question below. For now, though, let me point out that it is independent, at least 
conceptually, of the other two questions.9 First, it does not immediately follow 
from a state’s being justified in the above sort of sense (roughly, its existence 
being a good thing or morally acceptable) that it is permitted to enforce its 
directives over its subjects. The acceptability or goodness of a state’s existence and 
what it is permitted to do are two separate things. However, it might well be 
thought that legitimacy does follow from justification, even if it is not a 
straightforward conceptual entailment, and I think something like this thought 
may underlie the extent to which legitimacy is sometimes taken for granted. This 
line of thought will be the subject of chapter 2.  
                                                          
8 X’s having content-independent obligating power over Y can be understood as it being 
the case that, for any φ, that X commanded it is sufficient for, and the reason for, Y’s being 
required to φ so long as some conditions are met (and these conditions give the limits 
mentioned in the definition above). 
9 I also think that justification and obligating power are independent of each other, and I 
take this to be the main point Simmons (2001) makes when he distinguishes justification 
from legitimacy. He uses the term ‘legitimacy’ to mean roughly the conjunction of what I 
call obligating power and legitimacy, and I think his arguments primarily address the 
independence of obligating power from justification. 
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Legitimacy (in my sense) is also independent of obligating power:10 if a state’s 
citizens do generally have a content-independent obligation to obey its directives, 
it does not follow from this that it is permissible for the state to enforce their doing 
so; and, on the other hand, if there is no such obligation, it does not follow either 
that the state is not permitted to enforce compliance.11 In other words, neither 
obligating power nor legitimacy follows from the other. In general, it does not 
follow from something’s being obligatory for you that it is permissible for anyone 
to enforce your doing that thing, and it also does not follow from its being 
permissible for someone to force you to do something that it is obligatory for you 
to do that thing. For the first, consider promising: it is usually thought that in 
most cases we have an (at least pro tanto) obligation to keep our promises, but it 
is not standardly thought that it is usually permissible for anyone to enforce 
people’s keeping their promises.12 Or take a requirement of gratitude. It is quite 
plausible that if someone does something to benefit us significantly at some cost 
to themselves (saves us from drowning, advises us on how to achieve some goal, 
for instance), we are under some obligation to show gratitude in some way. It is 
not plausible at all in most such cases that it is permissible for anybody to force us 
to show gratitude. For the second, consider a case where I use force to move you 
out of the way of an oncoming train to which you are oblivious: what I do seems 
permissible, but there it would surely be wrong to say that it was obligatory for 
you to move out of the way of the train you were unaware of.  
While the state case is of course a special one, it seems clear in general that 
questions of the permissibility of enforcement are separable from questions about 
                                                          
10 There is much debate about whether legitimacy is properly analysed such that it entails 
political obligation (see the next paragraph). My claim here does not take a stand on this 
question; I use ‘legitimacy’ here in my stipulative sense and so my claim is the less 
controversial one that the general permission to enforce is independent of obligating power. 
11 Others have noticed that these are separate questions, e.g. Green (1988) 243; Sartorius 
(1999) 144-6 and Wellman (1996) 212. Patrick Durning (2003) argues persuasively that 
obligating power and legitimacy are separable, although he focuses on the entailment 
from legitimacy to obligating power. I think it is just as clear, if not more so, that there is 
no entailment the other way around. (Both Green (2004) and Wellman seem to think that 
political obligation does entail the legitimacy of state coercion; that is, they think that it is 
not possible for a state to have obligating power but no permission to enforce. Neither, 
though, offers any argument for this claim and I can see no reason to think that it must be 
permissible for someone to enforce a set of rules in order for one to have an obligation to 
obey those rules.) There are arguments that legitimacy entails obligating power in e.g. 
Klosko (1992) 38, 45 and Wyckoff (2010) on the basis of a principle that one may only 
force people to do things that they have a duty to do. These arguments are convincingly 
refuted by Durning (2003), and my oncoming train example below also provides a 
counterexample to this principle. 
12 There are views of morality according to which you automatically forfeit certain of your 
rights by acting morally wrongly (see, for instance, Simmons (1991) sec. 4). I do not find 
such views plausible, but even if they are, that some rights are forfeited by morally wrong 
behaviour does not suffice to make enforcement automatically permissible. 
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obligation: answers to one do not automatically entail answers to the other, and it is 
not obvious why the state case should be any different in this respect. It seems 
plausible that it is possible to have an obligation to obey someone’s commands if, 
for example, I promise to obey. (It is unclear whether it is possible for a promise 
to bind content-independently over a whole lifetime, but it at least seems plausible 
that if I promise to obey your commands, this generates a pro tanto, content-
independent obligation or duty to obey you for some period of time.) There is no 
reason to suppose, though, that promising to obey in itself grounds any 
permission to enforce my compliance with your commands.  
I have chosen to refer to the question I am interested in as the question of state 
legitimacy. Before I move on, I want to note that there is a significant segment of 
the literature on state legitimacy that I will set aside. As Patrick Durning points 
out, there is one dispute concerning legitimacy that is linguistic or analytical in 
nature.13 It concerns what it means to call something a legitimate state: which 
Hohfeldian rights a state must have in order to be called legitimate.14 Does a 
state’s having a liberty right to ‘act as a state’ suffice for its being genuinely 
legitimate? Or is it also necessary to have a claim right to non-interference or a 
power to create duties in people residing in a certain territory? This, Durning 
astutely notes, is a debate concerning the proper application of the term 
‘legitimacy’, not a substantive dispute. It is a debate about what the proper 
analysis of our concept of legitimacy is. I do not have any contribution to make to 
this debate (and I am not entirely convinced that ‘legitimacy’ is not too much a 
philosopher’s term of art to admit of a proper conceptual analysis). I mean my 
restrictive use of the term ‘legitimacy’ to be purely stipulative. My using it in this 
way is not wholly idiosyncratic, though: this is a way in which the term is 
sometimes used, and the general moral permission to enforce that I am calling 
‘legitimacy’ is taken by many authors to be at least a part of what is required for 
legitimacy.15 Nevertheless, I do not mean my use of this term as a proposal about 
the nature of legitimacy. If you think that what I am calling ‘legitimacy’ is not 
legitimacy, you can simply substitute some other word. 
                                                          
13 Durning (2003) 374-5 
14 Contributions to this debate can be found in, for example, Applbaum (2010), Copp 
(1999), Edmundson (1998), Greenawalt (1999), Song (2011), Wyckoff (2010) and Zhu 
(2017). There is some discussion of the debate in Peter (2012). 
15 The term seems to be used in my way by, e.g. Estlund (2009) and Wellman (1996) and 
(2001). Green (2004) uses the term in a similar way. 
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2. A common assumption 
There is an assumption that I think is quite commonly implicit in political 
philosophy, if less commonly explicit, which is that legitimacy (in my sense: 
roughly, states’ general permission to enforce compliance with their directives) is 
on safe ground and can be taken for granted. By that I mean not that it is assumed 
that states can be supposed always to be legitimate (that is certainly not a 
common view), but rather that it is assumed that the existence of legitimate states 
(and indeed, the possibility of state legitimacy) can be taken for granted. In other 
words, it is quite often assumed that the legitimacy-anarchist challenge is not a 
serious danger: it is not the case that all existing states fail to be legitimate in this 
sense. Similar assumptions are not made with respect to other anarchist 
challenges: in particular, the obligation-anarchist challenge tends to be taken quite 
seriously. I think it is often supposed, however, that legitimacy is on safer ground 
than obligating power.  
There has been a lot of work done attempting to find stable grounds for political 
obligation. This search has proved difficult and arguments attempting to establish 
such grounds have tended to be subject to forceful objections.16 The view that 
there are no general political obligations (obligations or duties to obey the 
commands/directives/laws of the state just because they are 
commands/directives/laws of that state, i.e., independent of their content) has 
become relatively widespread.17 It is not so commonly thought that legitimacy of 
states (in my sense) is in similar danger. State legitimacy is much discussed in 
political philosophy (and although it is not always, the permission to enforce is 
often taken to be necessary, and sometimes sufficient, for legitimacy). But most 
often what is asked is exactly what conditions a state must fulfil in order to be 
legitimate, rather than whether it is possible for a state to be legitimate.18 These 
accounts do not generally address the legitimacy anarchist (who believes that no 
states are legitimate in my sense).19 It seems to be thought that, even if there is no 
general obligation to obey a state, we need not worry about the general moral 
                                                          
16 See, for example, Simmons (1979) and Green (2004). 
17 See, for example, Smith (1973), Green (1988), (1996) and (2004), Simmons (1979) and 
Wolff (1970). 
18 Of course, these questions are not completely separate: an account of the possibility of 
state legitimacy would have to give the conditions under which a state could be legitimate. 
The thought that there can be (or are) legitimate states is not so commonly challenged, 
though, as the thought that states can (or do) have obligating power. 
19 Rawls (1993), a particularly influential work that places legitimacy centre stage, is, I 
think, best read in this way. He takes the existence of the state as a starting point, and so 
does not seek to show that states’ claims to exclusive enforcement rights are justifiable, 
but rather, given that there are states with exclusive enforcement rights, what conditions 
they must meet to be acceptable (see footnote 90). 
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permission to enforce.20 I do not want to suggest that this is a universal 
assumption, but just one that seems quite often to be implicitly made. At least, 
there is a notable lack of concern about legitimacy anarchism, when compared 
with obligation anarchism. I want to argue that political philosophers have no 
reason to be so confident about legitimacy, when they are so sceptical about 
political obligation.  
A number of thinkers have argued against ‘strong’ conceptions of legitimacy, 
according to which legitimacy is not just the permission to enforce (to which I am 
stipulatively restricting the term) but also entails political obligation.21 A good 
part of the motivation for this seems to be the thought that we do not want to 
have to say that states generally fail to be legitimate, and, since there are good 
reasons to be sceptical about political obligation, strong conceptions force us to do 
so. It seems to be thought that if we do not take obligation to be necessary for 
legitimacy, we will have no (or less) reason to worry about wholesale legitimacy-
scepticism. This is a sensible view to take if we have less reason to worry about 
the other elements of legitimacy, which are generally taken to include the general 
permission to enforce. Some of these thinkers provide their own independent 
arguments for the permission to enforce (which I will come to in chapter 2), but 
some do not. One place where this assumption seems particularly evident is in 
William Edmundson’s argument for a weak conception of legitimacy (which does 
not entail obligating power).22  
Edmundson argues that states can be legitimate in a stronger sense than mine: he 
argues that what he calls the ‘Modest Legitimacy Thesis’ (MLT: ‘Being a 
legitimate authority entails that one’s authoritative directives create in one’s 
subjects an enforceable duty not to interfere with their forceful administration’)23 
can be satisfied. To interfere with the forceful administration of a directive would 
tend to involve direct disobedience of what he calls an ‘administrative 
prerogative’. An administrative prerogative is an official action involved in the 
administration of the law targeted at the immediate conduct of an individual on an 
occasion: for example, the sheriff tells us to be present in court, the judge orders 
us to pay damages. His argument is that direct disobedience of an ‘administrative 
prerogative’ is more presumptuous than simply disobeying a law. He gives a 
                                                          
20 Writers do not always make the distinction between obligating power and legitimacy, 
but where sceptical doubts are raised, they tend to be about obligating power, not 
legitimacy. 
21 For instance, Buchanan (2002), Copp (1999), Edmundson (1998) and Greenawalt 
(1999). 
22 Edmundson (1998).  
23 Ibid. 42 
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number of reasons for this such as its being ‘harder to have an assurance of 
harmlessness when it is a traffic cop, rather than a traffic law, that one is 
disobeying’24; its being hard or impossible to unconsciously disobey an 
administrative prerogative (in contrast to a law) and so on. He then also claims 
that this duty to obey administrative prerogatives is simply the correlative duty of 
the state’s justification right (liberty right/moral permission) to enforce its 
directives: if one has a justification right to φ, this entails a duty on the part of 
others not to interfere with your φ-ing and in this case, Edmundson claims, not 
interfering with the state’s enforcing its directives is just equivalent to obeying its 
administrative prerogatives.25  
Now, it may seem plausible that direct disobedience of an administrative 
prerogative issued by an agent of state S is more problematic than disobeying 
some law made by S if S has a right to enforce its directives (and Edmundson’s 
arguments make a strong case for this conditional claim). However, the 
arguments Edmundson gives seem all to require the state to be morally permitted 
to enforce its laws, commands or directives. If there is no such right, it is hard to 
see why it would be so presumptuous to disobey an administrative prerogative. 
And of course, the fact that this duty is the correlative of the right to enforce is of 
no import if any given state lacks the right to enforce. Edmundson gives no real 
argument to the effect that states do have such a moral permission. Presumably 
the thought is that it is, in some sense, reasonably easy or straightforward to 
establish such a permission. As he says, the most prominent philosophical 
anarchists, Wolff and Simmons, do not deny the possibility of such a general 
permission or ‘justification right’.26  
Now, of course, if, as I have said, legitimacy and obligating power are 
conceptually independent of each other, then a challenge to the latter is not 
automatically a challenge to the former. So, if we reject the latter we do not yet 
have any reason to doubt the existence of the former. So why suppose that 
legitimacy is in any danger? A state’s being legitimate in my sense involves it 
having a general moral permission to do something that seems to be at least 
prima facie morally problematic, as I will suggest in more detail in chapter 1. 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 50 
25 Ibid. 61 
26 Ibid. 40. Simmons (2001) seems to suggest this kind of openness to states’ having such a 
general permission, although his (1991) appears to suggest the converse. Additionally, 
Leslie Green (2004), who is, like Wolff and Simmons, a sceptic about political obligation, 
seems quite clearly to think that, although there are no general and universal obligations 
to obey the law, at least certain existing legal systems are legitimate (permissibly 
enforced).  
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Thus, I think, unless we can find some argument to ground the legitimacy of states 
of a certain kind, we should not suppose that they are legitimate. This thesis will 
question whether there is such an argument available.  
3. The state 
I have said that this thesis is about states and what they are morally permitted to 
do, but I have not said anything yet about what I take a state to be. I will give a 
definition of ‘state’ that I take to be a plausible analysis of our ordinary concept of 
‘state’.27 I do not have space, though, to properly defend this definition as such an 
analysis, and it can simply be taken as a stipulative definition if the analytical claim 
is unconvincing. I propose to understand states as particular kinds of groups of 
people.  
It is natural to think about states as institutions. If institutions ultimately are 
groups of people, then this is not in conflict with my proposal. If institutions are 
groups of people, they will presumably be groups of people structured in 
particular kinds of ways. States, in the sense I use the word, will be institutions 
that meet certain conditions (that is, structured groups of people that meet certain 
conditions). If, on the other hand, institutions are just sets of structures themselves, 
rather than the people organised by these structures, then the state (as I will use 
the term) will not be the institution(s) but the group of people structured by the 
relevant institution(s).28 The state will obviously have to be an agent or group of 
agents (capable of acting)29 for it to make sense to talk about what the state may 
permissibly do, and so cannot simply be a set of structures.  
I define a state as a group of people that claims supreme authority and an exclusive right 
to enforce its commands/directives/laws over a given territory or population, and in fact 
has extensive enforcement power over this territory or population. This definition begins 
with the Weberian idea of the state claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force (that is, claiming the right to use force, and also the moral power to 
determine when use of force by other agents is or is not legitimate).30 However, as 
Nozick points out, just claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is not 
                                                          
27 There are interesting discussions of this analytical question in Nozick (1974) 22-5 and 
Green (1988) ch.3. 
28 Copp (1999) characterises the state as an ‘animated institution’, which is ‘an institution 
or system of offices and roles together with the people who occupy those offices and roles’ 
(6). For him, then, the state is the combination of the structures and the group of people. 
29 A group of agents may be capable of acting without constituting a single collective 
agent; I do not assume that the state is a corporate agent. 
30 Weber (1948) 78 
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sufficient (and the same will apply to claiming a monopoly on authority).31 You or 
I could claim such a monopoly. Doing so would not give us any monopoly, nor 
would it make us a state. It may also not be necessary, since a state could accept 
the legitimacy of certain unauthorised uses of force without ceasing to be a state 
(and the US second amendment might be interpreted in this way). I think it is 
necessary, though, that the state claim the exclusive right to enforce compliance 
with its commands/directives/laws; the state cannot accept the legitimacy of any 
unauthorised agent doing this without ceasing to be a state. I also add that a state 
must claim supreme authority.32 This allows us to distinguish groups of bandits 
from states. I am not certain that groups of bandits do not qualify as states, but 
including this requirement limits our discussion to the most paradigmatic states.  
Finally, Nozick points out that the actual possession of a monopoly on the use of 
force is not necessary for statehood. This is correct, and nor is it even necessary 
for a state actually to have the power to enforce all of its directives. But what I 
think is necessary is some reasonably extensive enforcement power.33 A group that 
merely makes certain claims, but in fact possesses no actual enforcement power 
does not seem to qualify as a state (even if these claims are widely accepted by the 
would-be-state’s claimed subjects). This definition, then, has the consequence that 
this thesis concerns a moral permission that states claim essentially. If you find the 
definition a plausible analysis of the ordinary concept, you will agree that the 
question of legitimacy is bound up with the very existence of states. (This is not 
to say, of course, that there could not be illegitimate states: states may make false 
claims and act impermissibly.) 
4. The generality of the permission to enforce 
I have characterised the question that I am interested in as the question whether 
states have a general permission to enforce. The interesting question is not 
simply whether a given state is ever permitted to enforce compliance with its 
directives. We would not, for example, have shown anything very interesting if 
                                                          
31 Nozick (1974) 22. See also Green (1988) 77ff. 
32 The requirement of supremacy does not imply that there can be no limits to state 
authority (cf. Buchanan (2002) 690). 
33 Nozick also seems to add the requirement that a state must offer protection to all those 
who live in its territory. I see no reason to suppose that states must be territorial; if a body 
existed that claimed an exclusive right to enforce over a non-territorially-defined 
population, why should we not call it a state? I also see no reason to think that a state 
must offer protection to all those over whom it claims an exclusive right to enforce. It 
seems to me that a state that didn’t do this would still be a state, but a bad state. In any 
case, whatever is morally problematic about the claim to and exercise of an exclusive 
enforcement right when made by a body that offers protection to all of its claimed 
subjects, will presumably also be problematic about the claim to and exercise of an 
equivalent right by a body that does not offer protection to all. 
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we showed that it is permissible for the state to push people out of the way of 
oncoming trains. In cases of impending catastrophe that can be averted only 
through the use of force, it seems that force is often permitted. Plausibly, this 
applies to states as well as to individuals. The state’s permission to enforce needs 
to be in some sense general. States take themselves, and present themselves, as 
having a general permission to enforce compliance with all of their laws and 
directives. It seems, though, that to demand a carte blanche permission to enforce 
(a permission to enforce whatever directives the state might make, however evil) is 
to gift the debate to the anarchist unnecessarily. No sensible defender of state 
enforcement will want to defend the claim that there are states that have a 
permission to enforce absolutely any law or directive they might make. What the 
legitimacy anarchist wants to deny, it seems, must be somewhere between the 
claim that a state is sometimes permitted to enforce compliance with its directives 
and the claim that the state is always permitted to do so. The former makes life 
too hard for the anarchist, while the latter makes it too easy. What, then, is the 
generality of the permission to enforce that the anarchist wants to deny to states? 
First, the state’s permission to enforce needs to go beyond a permission to enforce 
compliance with those moral requirements that would exist in a stateless, lawless 
society, independent of the existence of law and the state (what might be called 
the mala in se). It is not inconceivable that a state might lack even this: it does not 
seem plausible to think that all of the state-independent moral requirements are 
permissibly enforceable in general, and so it is at least not obviously the case that 
the state has such a permission. However, states claim a lot more than this, and 
the anarchist would have succeeded in showing something quite significant if she 
were to show that all a state had was a permission to enforce the mala in se (the 
state-independent moral requirements). To defeat this sort of anarchist, we need 
to show that the state has some discretion about what it enforces. It needs to have 
a permission to enforce even some directives compliance with which is not 
morally required independent of its existence. (This is not necessarily to say that 
it needs to be permitted to enforce behaviour that is not morally required at all; 
since it could be that certain things become morally required as a result of the 
state’s demanding them.)  
Let me suggest, then, this minimal requirement for what would count as a defeat 
for the anarchist: the state would need at least a permission to enforce all of its just 
laws or directives. What I mean by ‘just laws or directives’ are laws or directives 
according to which it would be just for the society in question to be structured. I 
assume that there are more than one possible set of just laws or directives (for a 
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given society); a state’s being limited to only enforcing just laws is consistent with 
it having discretion about what laws it enforces. In addition, a law’s being 
permitted by justice does not mean that what it requires would be morally 
required independently of the law’s existence. My suggestion is that, in order to 
defeat the anarchist, it would be necessary to show that the state has at least a 
permission to enforce all of its just laws. Whether or not it is permissible for any 
state to enforce some unjust laws is a further question. I will take it that the 
anarchist has been defeated if it can be shown minimally that a state has a general 
permission to enforce its just laws whatever they may be. If, on the other hand, it 
can be shown that states lack even this, the anarchist has won. 
It could be that it is morally obligatory for the citizens of a certain just state to 
obey all of its laws and directives. This could be because there is a content-
independent and general obligation for all citizens to obey its directives, or it 
could just be because various other considerations happen to sum together to 
make obedience to the good and just laws of the state obligatory in all cases (even 
if it would not be were the laws different, or the circumstances different). If you 
thought that it is generally permissible to enforce all behaviour that is morally 
obligatory, then it would be morally permissible for anyone to enforce compliance 
with all of this state’s just laws and directives, and so, a fortiori, for the state to do 
so. Similarly, if you thought that justice is always permissibly enforceable, then it 
would follow straightforwardly that states are permitted to enforce all of their just 
laws and directives.  
I think it would be wrong to think that it is generally permissible to enforce all 
morally required behaviour or that justice is necessarily enforceable (I will 
elaborate on this below), but setting this aside, I think this scenario would still 
not really be sufficient for the sort of permission to enforce that a state would 
need in order to robustly defeat the anarchist. Here, the state’s permission to 
enforce would be no different to that applying to anyone else. States claim not 
only that their enforcement is legitimate, or permissible, but that only their 
enforcement is legitimate or permissible (or, at least, whatever other enforcement 
is permissible is to be determined by the state, and this determination can in turn 
be enforced coercively). That is, the state claims an exclusive permission to enforce: 
a permission to enforce all of its laws and to exclude others from doing the same.34 
I want to suggest, then, that the state has not fully defeated the legitimacy 
anarchist unless it can show not only that it is permitted to enforce at least all of 
                                                          
34 On the importance of exclusivity see Wellman (2009) 426. 
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its just laws, but also that it is permitted to be an exclusive enforcer over some 
population, that it is permitted to enforce its decisions about who may enforce 
behaviour of any sort.35 Thus, let me suggest the following (stipulative) definition 
of ‘legitimacy’: 
Legitimacy. A state X is legitimate with respect to individual Y if and only if X 
has a general moral permission to enforce Y’s compliance with its 
commands/directives/laws independent of their content (within some limits, 
where content-independence can be limited no more than to just laws) and to 
enforce its decisions about who may or may not enforce Y’s action. 
It is this property (and existing states’ possession of it) that will be the subject of 
my thesis.  
4.a) Justice and enforcement 
Morally obligatory behaviour, I said above, is not always permissibly enforceable. 
What people are morally required to do is, I think, a separate question from the 
question what people can permissibly be forced to do. We saw this in the cases of 
promising and gratitude. Permissible enforcement, then, does not follow from 
moral obligation. There is a popular view, though, that dates back at least as far 
as Kant, according to which justice (a subdomain of moral requirement) is 
necessarily permissibly enforceable, or is necessarily at least a pro tanto ground for 
enforcement.36 On this view, it is part of what it is for something to be a 
requirement of justice that there is at least some pro tanto reason to enforce it. If 
this were the case, any state would be permitted to enforce all of its just laws (or at 
least it would be pro tanto permissible, unless other countervailing considerations 
were to block enforcement in certain cases). They are just, and what this means, 
on this view, is that it is permissible to enforce them. This would not show, as 
noted above, that all states are legitimate in my sense. If it follows from 
something’s being a requirement of justice that it is permissible to enforce 
compliance with it, this is to say nothing about exclusive enforcement. This view of 
justice would do nothing to show that any particular institutions are permitted to 
act as exclusive enforcers, that is, to prevent others from enforcing the requirements 
of justice. (For what it is worth, though, I do not find this view of justice at all 
                                                          
35 The state can obviously pass laws permitting its officials to enforce and forbidding 
others from doing so. Then, if these are just laws, and there is an obligation to obey the 
state’s just laws, and if (counterfactually) it is permissible to enforce all obligations, the 
state will get a permission to be an exclusive enforcer. But the question is what could make 
it permissible for the state to pass such a law. Presumably, if a state is not permitted to be 
an exclusive enforcer, it will not be permissible for it to pass such laws and they will not 
count as just laws. 
36 This view finds expression in, for instance, Kant (1999) 6:231-2; Nardin (2004); 
Valentini (2012a) 597 and Buchanan (2002) 704. 
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plausible: if requirements of justice are roughly those things that people owe to 
each other, there is no obvious reason to think this has anything to do with what 
they can legitimately be forced to do. There seem to be many requirements of 
justice, such as keeping promises, that do not give even a pro tanto ground for 
enforcement.) 
5. The particularity requirement 
Simmons, in his investigation of political obligation, introduces what he calls the 
‘particularity requirement’. That is, he says that he is ‘only interested in those 
moral requirements which bind an individual to one particular political 
community, set of political institutions, etc’.37 Thus, a general duty to support just 
institutions, for instance, would not provide the sort of political obligation that he 
is concerned with. Such a duty applies just as much to other just states as to one’s 
own; it provides no special bond between you and your state. If this were the only 
sort of political obligation we had, then a state’s being your state would add 
nothing to the moral calculus (though of course, its geographical proximity 
might). I think that a similar requirement is just as important, if not more so, for 
legitimacy in my sense. If what the defender of legitimacy wants to show is that at 
least some of our actual, existing states have the kind of general permission to 
enforce that they are standardly taken to have (and not just that it is possible for a 
state to be legitimate), it will be necessary to be able to show for at least some 
actual state that that state has a general permission to enforce. It will not do 
simply to show that it is permissible for some state to enforce its directives. All 
that would show is that it is possible for a state to be legitimate. Legitimacy is 
something that must be shown state by state: for each state where the question 
arises, it must be shown that that particular state is permitted to enforce.  
6. Outline 
We now have an idea of what is at stake for the legitimacy anarchist. The 
legitimacy anarchist denies that any existing states are legitimate with respect to 
their subjects in the sense just given above. The aim of this thesis, as suggested 
above, is to argue that this anarchist view should be taken seriously in a way that 
it often is not. What I hope to do, then, is to cast some doubt on the assumption 
that at least some existing states are legitimate in this sense. In particular, the 
focus of this thesis will be on the role of feasibility considerations in arguments 
purporting to establish state legitimacy. I will argue that all of the arguments that 
                                                          
37 Simmons (1979) 31 
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could plausibly establish legitimacy for some existing states depend on premises 
about feasibility. However, the nature of feasibility is such that this dependence is 
enough to shed some doubt on the success of these arguments: given the account 
of feasibility I will give, the truth of the feasibility premises that would make the 
argument go through should not be taken for granted. 
In the first part of the thesis, I argue for what is also an interesting conclusion in 
its own right: state legitimacy cannot be established a priori (independent of 
empirical considerations) but rather depends on certain feasibility facts. I proceed 
by first arguing that a plausible line of thought that might underlie the belief that 
legitimacy is on safe ground only works with the inclusion of feasibility premises. 
There are some prominent arguments, however, that the legitimacy of a certain 
kind of state can be established a priori (and so a fortiori without feasibility 
premises). I thus turn to showing that these arguments fail.  
In the second part of the thesis I offer a multivocal account of feasibility, 
according to which there are many possible sharpenings of feasibility (ways of 
making the concept precise), no single one of which is obviously privileged over 
the others (for the purposes of political or moral theory or more generally). Since 
the feasibility premises required to establish legitimacy will not come out as true 
on all such sharpenings, some argument will be needed that the sharpenings that 
would allow the arguments in question to go through are ones on which the 
premises are true. Further, I argue that theory constrained only by unrealistic 
feasibility constraints can be worthwhile, and thus that the conclusion that state 
legitimacy cannot be established a priori is itself important and useful. 
Chapter 1 
In the first preliminary chapter I give an account of what I mean by ‘enforcement’ 
and I argue that a common intuition gives us reason to think that there is some 
moral presumption that would need to be overcome to establish legitimacy in the 
above sense. 
Chapter 2 
One plausible line of thought that might underlie the assumption that state 
legitimacy (for at least some actual states) is on safe ground is that it follows from 
a property that at least some states possess reasonably uncontroversially, namely 
justification. I consider the most obvious interpretations of what might be meant 
by the claim that a state is justified, and argue that all of the properties identified 
are such that we are only warranted in assuming both that some states possess the 
property and that legitimacy follows from the property, if certain feasibility 
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premises hold. I also argue that most of the explicit arguments for state 
legitimacy have this underlying form (and that those that do not are unlikely to 
establish the legitimacy of existing states). 
Chapter 3 
In chapters 3 and 4 I address some arguments that claim to show that state 
legitimacy (for states that meet certain conditions) can be established a priori 
(independent of any empirical considerations, and so independent of any feasibility 
considerations). First, I address one interpretation of the Kantian argument in the 
Doctrine of Right, that given by Arthur Ripstein.38 On this interpretation, what 
makes exclusive state enforcement necessary for a condition of right (and so 
permitted by right) is the need for assurance for there to be rights. I argue that this 
argument cannot show that exclusive state enforcement is necessary for assurance 
without the aid of feasibility premises. 
Chapter 4 
I then turn to another a priori argument for the legitimacy of a certain kind of 
state, one version of which is given as an alternative interpretation of Kant by 
Japa Pallikkathayil, and another version of which is given by Philip Pettit.39 On 
this argument, exclusive state enforcement is required for people’s freedom as 
independence (or non-domination) in society (that is, people’s not being dependent 
on or dominated by the will of others). I argue again that this cannot be shown 
without feasibility premises. Thus, the first part of the thesis concludes that state 
legitimacy cannot be established a priori and that plausible lines of argument that 
might ground it depend on feasibility premises. 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter I offer a general account of the concept of feasibility. The account I 
offer is multivocal and possibility-based. There is a whole range of possible (binary) 
sharpenings of the term ‘feasible’, each of which selects a range of facts of the 
world to hold fixed (and feasibility is defined in terms of possibility given this 
range of facts). No single one of these possible sharpenings, though, is obviously 
privileged as giving the appropriate understanding of ‘feasibility’ tout court.  
Chapter 6 
I argue that the upshot of this account of feasibility is that the kind of arguments 
for state legitimacy that make use of feasibility premises only go through if these 
feasibility premises are true on a sharpening of feasibility that also licences 
                                                          
38 Ripstein (2009) and Kant (1999). 
39 Pallikkathayil (2017) and Pettit (2012). 
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something like an ‘“ought” implies “feasible”’ principle (i.e., a sharpening of 
feasibility that is a constraint on the truth of claims about what we ought to do). 
Some argument would be needed to show that this is the case, so we should not 
simply assume that legitimacy is on safe ground. Further, I argue that the 
conclusion that states lack a general and exclusive permission to enforce given 
certain unrealistic sharpenings of feasibility (those on which the necessary 
feasibility premises are not true) is one that it can be useful to learn (for the 
purpose of action guidance). In particular, we learn something about how we 
ought to treat and think about state enforcement.  
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Chapter 1: 
Preliminaries 
 
A. What is enforcement? 
I have defined ‘legitimacy’ as a state’s general and exclusive moral permission to 
enforce compliance with its directives. I have not said, though, much about what I 
mean by ‘enforcement’. The rough idea is intuitive. It is one thing to have the 
right to issue directives or commands and to have the ability to make directives or 
commands that others have a reason, or a duty, to follow. It is quite another thing 
to be permitted to make those others comply with one’s directives or commands, 
to make things such that they have no choice but to comply. For the sake of 
clarity, though, it is worth giving a more precise definition of ‘enforcement’. My 
proposed definition of enforcement is best introduced with the aid of Serena 
Olsaretti’s distinction between voluntariness and freedom.40 She says that ‘a 
choice is voluntary if and only if it is not made because there is no acceptable 
alternative to it’. Freedom, on the other hand, is about the options we face. She 
gives two examples to illustrate this distinction: 
The Desert City. Daisy is the inhabitant of a city, located in the middle of a desert, 
which she is free to leave. However, Daisy, who would wish to leave, knows with 
absolute certainty that if she leaves the city, she will not be able to survive the 
hardship of the desert and she will die. Her choice to remain in the city is not a 
voluntary one. 
The Wired City. Wendy is the inhabitant of a city fenced with electrifying wire, 
which she is unfree to leave. However, her city has all that anyone could ever ask 
for, and Wendy, who is perfectly happy with her life there, has no wish of leaving 
it. She voluntarily remains in her city.41 
Coercion, Olsaretti notes, need not reduce freedom (if coercion is understood as 
pressure on the will by means of a threat or similar), as in the case of a bluff threat 
that successfully coerces A into not doing x, but where, in fact, doing x would 
have no adverse consequences for A. Coercion (in this sense) does, though, always 
undermine voluntariness. Coercion, for Olsaretti, is a form of forcing, where 
forcing is defined along these lines: 
 Forcing. A is forced to φ if and only if A does φ involuntarily. 
                                                          
40 Olsaretti (2004) pp. 138-50 
41 Ibid. 138 
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 B forces A to φ if and only if B makes things such that A does φ 
  involuntarily. 
Coercion, though, she says, is only one form of forcing, one way in which people’s 
choices may be made involuntary. She argues that there is no reason to fetishize 
coercion: a concern with voluntariness should also justify taking seriously cases of 
non-coercive non-voluntariness. Coercion (in the above sense) is a technique for 
forcing. (It is for this reason that I talk about enforcement rather than coercion. 
On what Scott Anderson has called the ‘pressure account’, according to which it 
involves the putting of pressure on the will of another using threats or similar, it 
is only one form of a broader single kind of activity, of which (for instance) the use 
of physical force is also a variety. This seems also to be true on Anderson’s own 
‘power approach’, according to which coercion involves ‘a significant disparity in 
power’.42 I do not have space to go into this in any detail, but there seem to be 
instances of the same kind of phenomenon where there is no non-trivial disparity 
in power.) 
I suggest, then, that ‘enforcement’ can be defined thus: 
Enforcement. Agent A enforces Y’s doing φ (being P) if and only if A intentionally 
makes it the case that either a) Y does φ (is P) involuntarily or b) Y does φ (is P) 
voluntarily but if Y had not done φ (been P) voluntarily Y would have done φ 
(been P) involuntarily. 
Enforcement, as understood here, involves either actual or counterfactual 
instances of forcing. A’s doing φ is enforced just if, were A not to φ voluntarily, A 
would be forced to φ. In both of Olsaretti’s cities, if somebody is responsible for 
making it the case that Daisy and Wendy cannot leave their cities, they will have 
enforced Daisy’s and Wendy’s remaining in the city. Daisy is forced to stay in her 
city; her choice is not a voluntary one. Wendy is not forced to stay, since her 
choice is voluntary, but if she had not stayed voluntarily, she would have been 
forced to stay. Voluntariness for Olsaretti, as I have noted above, requires that an 
action not be done because there are no acceptable alternatives. This, of course, 
leaves some important questions unanswered. For one thing, it necessitates some 
account of what counts as an acceptable alternative. For Olsaretti, the standard is 
an ‘objective standard of well-being’. I will not attempt to give any account of 
acceptability, so my definition of ‘enforcement’ is by no means complete. I will just 
assume (as is intuitive) that there are things that others can do to make certain 
alternatives otherwise open to us ineligible without making those alternatives 
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strictly unavailable.43 This is not supposed to be an account of our ordinary 
language concept of enforcement, but rather a definition of a technical term. The 
phenomenon picked out here is the one with which I will be concerned.  
There is what might seem to be a problem for this definition of enforcement. 
Since my definition of ‘enforcement’ makes it a success term (an agent’s doing φ 
or being P is only enforced if they do do φ or are P), it doesn't seem to allow 
directives to be enforced on those who disobey. If you disobey a directive 
demanding you φ, nobody has enforced your φ-ing, even if they then punish you 
for failing to φ; at best, they have failed to enforce your φ-ing. It might be 
thought, though, that punishment for disobedience is a paradigm case of state 
enforcement, so there is something wrong with the definition. I do not think that 
there is a problem here. Certainly, punishment for disobedience involves 
enforcement, but my definition need not deny this. I think that cases in which 
things are made such that the subject of a directive does do what is demanded, 
whether they like it or not, are the basic cases of enforcement. What my definition 
must say is that punishment for violation of a directive does not strictly speaking 
enforce that directive, even though it might be natural to say that it does. It is 
right that cases of punishment for disobedience are paradigm cases of a state’s 
enforcement of its directives. However, what is being enforced in such a case is 
the part of a directive that says something like ‘if A fails to φ, A will be made to 
do/be, prevented from doing/being ...’. For example, when A is imprisoned for 
murder the state does enforce a directive on A: it makes it the case that A is in 
prison for some term, irrespective of whether A wants to be. What it does not do 
is enforce A’s not murdering. The directive that says, ‘do not murder’ is only 
successfully enforced on those who in fact do not murder and here it is by the 
threat of imprisonment that it does this.44   
1. Enforcement is not necessarily moralised 
My definition of enforcement is non-moralised. The moral wrongness of an act of 
enforcement is not a conceptual necessity (nor even is its being prima facie 
morally problematic). It also seems not to be a necessity of any other sort. 
Enforcement as I have defined it is just too banal a phenomenon to be morally 
                                                          
43 It may well be that eligibility or acceptability comes in degrees. If this is so, it will make 
enforcement a vague term. A will only enforce B’s φ-ing if A makes it the case that if B 
were not to φ voluntarily, she would φ because of the absence of sufficiently eligible 
alternatives.  
44 Similarly, if I make it very costly for you to φ, but not ineligible, I do not enforce your 
φ-ing, but I may well thereby be enforcing something on you: I enforce your not doing 
certain combinations of actions (φ-ing without paying the cost). 
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problematic as such. People have things enforced on them all the time, at least if 
we want to allow (as we do) that one’s not doing something, or one’s being 
something, can be enforced. For instance, I have no acceptable alternative to not 
going to the moon, not speaking to Boris Johnson over breakfast and so on. Thus, 
if I fail to do these things, as I will, we can say that my not doing these things has 
been enforced. This cannot be morally problematic. Perhaps an agent’s 
intentionally enforcing things on others is what raises moral problems. However, 
even this might seem to be too banal. I might intentionally arrange things such 
that you have no acceptable alternative to not talking to me today. I can do this 
quite easily by avoiding being in the same place as you. Is there something 
morally problematic about this? It does seem plausible to think that there is not. 
I do not claim, then, that my concept of enforcement is the only useful concept in 
the area. If there is a similar phenomenon that is necessarily morally wrong or 
problematic, then it will certainly be useful to have a corresponding concept. I am 
not sure, though, what this concept would be. It is not clear that standard 
‘pressure’ accounts of coercion identify phenomena that are always morally 
problematic.45 But even if they do, it seems like they will miss out cases of 
enforcement that are morally problematic in the same way. (It seems plausible 
that the use of direct force can be problematic in the same way as pressure on the 
will.) Thus, identifying the fundamental phenomenon that is necessarily morally 
problematic is another task. Given, then, that we have not identified an activity 
that is always morally problematic, the state’s enforcing a directive it makes is not 
something that must always defeat a presumption of impermissibility. It is not the 
case that enforcement always automatically stands in need of a justification. 
However, as I will now explain, I think there is a presumption that needs to be 
defeated in order to show that a state (or any agent or agency) has a general 
permission to enforce compliance with its directives of the sort I have described.  
B. The presumptive moral complaint 
I find it intuitively hard to doubt that the kind of general and exclusive 
permission to enforce that I have described involves a permission to do something 
that would not ordinarily be permissible for individuals. I have little intuitive 
doubt that there is some pro tanto moral wrong or moral presumption (even 
though it is difficult to say exactly what it is) that must be overcome for a state (or 
any other agent or institution for that matter) to have this kind of general 
                                                          
45 Anderson’s (2010) ‘power approach’ to coercion, mentioned above, does not seem to 
either. 
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permission to enforce. I am here merely reporting my own personal intuition, but 
I do think that this feeling is quite common. The project of my thesis is motivated 
by this assumption that the state’s general permission to enforce stands in need of 
justification.  
The assumption is that there is something morally troubling about at least some 
of the actions of a state that would be permitted by a relevantly general 
permission to enforce, and that this necessitates some argument to show that a 
state can or does have such a permission. If we make such an assumption, then the 
failure to find such an argument would constitute good reason to doubt that 
states have a general permission to enforce. If the reader does not share this 
intuition, they need not be so troubled by such a failure or by the arguments of 
this thesis. They may accept, as this thesis argues, that there is good reason to 
doubt whether there is a successful argument available for the general permission 
to enforce for any existing states, but yet think this of little interest since no such 
argument is needed. I take it, though, that those who have advanced arguments 
for the possibility of a state’s general permission to enforce do share my intuition. 
They consider it necessary to give such an argument, I presume, because they 
think that the state is permitted to do something that stands in need of 
justification, something which is prima facie problematic, and so which needs to 
be defended by argument. I do not think, then, that in making such an 
assumption, I am assuming anything very controversial. 
The intuition that I think is widely shared is not that the general permission to 
enforce involves a permission to do something that is wrong (that would be an 
intuition that there can be no general permission to enforce), nor that it is hard to 
establish. The intuition is merely that there is something pro tanto morally 
problematic about at least a part of what such a general permission would permit. 
One might share this intuition but think that the pro tanto moral objection is 
easily overcome by strong countervailing considerations. I must also make clear 
that the intuition is not that enforcement, or state enforcement, is necessarily pro 
tanto problematic. On the contrary, I noted in the previous section, it seems that 
enforcement as such is not problematic. And I do not suggest that there is 
something necessarily different about enforcement when carried out by states.  
Rather, the intuition is that there is a pro tanto complaint against certain sorts of 
enforcement that a state would need to be permitted to carry out in order for its 
permission to enforce to be sufficiently general (for it to be permitted to enforce at 
least any of its just directives whatever they may be). At least some possible cases 
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of enforcement of just directives are morally problematic. Some of the kinds of 
things that a state might enforce in enforcing compliance with its just directives 
are pro tanto impermissible to enforce. (In fact, my intuition is that most, or at 
least many, of these things are pro tanto problematic to enforce, but this is more 
than is necessary.) A state could have a general permission to enforce without 
being permitted to use any method of enforcement, so the idea is not just that some 
possible instances of enforcement of just directives are presumptively wrong, but 
rather that some possible just directives are presumptively wrong to enforce. 
There is something troubling (not wrong, but in need of justification) about at 
least some subset of states’ enforcement, and there is still something troubling 
about a subset of states’ enforcement even if the only directives they enforce are 
just ones. This is not a problem with enforcement as such, but with some 
significant subset of the enforcement that states do. A general permission to 
enforce is a permission to do things that must include the things that are 
troubling. Thus, in order to defend it, this intuitive moral presumption will need 
to be overcome. 
Although I think I am not alone in feeling the intuitive compulsion to think that 
there is a presumptive moral complaint that states’ general permission to enforce 
must overcome, it is not easy to identify exactly what this complaint is. Niko 
Kolodny, in a fascinating recent piece, has raised this question.46 He suggests 
(rightly, I think) that it is widely thought that there is a general pro tanto 
complaint against ‘relations of rule’ (which, in his use, include the enforcing of 
commands over a group of subjects, and the claim of an exclusive right to do so), 
but asks what this could amount to.47 Though it is an interesting and important 
question, I will not attempt to answer it in this thesis. Instead, I will rely on the 
intuition that there is some such complaint. The difficulty of identifying what it is, 
though, might lead one to wonder whether the common intuition is simply a 
mistake. This appears to be the case for Kolodny himself. (He identifies a possible 
candidate complaint that he thinks most likely to do the job, but expresses doubt 
as to whether there is any complaint of the sort he is looking for at all.) His 
reasons for uncertainty stem from his argument that what seem the most obvious, 
or commonly identified, candidate complaints do not stand up. 
If there in fact is no presumptive complaint against states’ generalised 
enforcement, the general and exclusive permission to enforce will not stand in 
need of argument, and so the success or failure of such arguments will be of little 
                                                          
46 Kolodny (2016).  
47 Ibid. 35 
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importance. For this reason, I think it worth taking a brief detour to look at a 
handful of possible candidate complaints and to suggest that there are a few that 
have some intuitive plausibility and which we have no immediately obvious 
reason to reject. Since in (at least) all but one case, Kolodny denies this, I will 
argue that he does not convincingly show that these candidates could not provide 
the sort of pro tanto complaint needed. My aim is just to suggest that there is 
reason to think that grounds for the common intuition are out there to be found. I 
believe common opinion is on my side, but I think it is worth saying a little more 
to dispel doubts about this, since Kolodny has offered a powerful challenge to the 
standard belief. I do not aim, though, to make a serious attempt to identify the 
grounds for the common intuition in any very satisfying way. I hope merely to 
make my assumption seem like an acceptable one to make. 
1. Deontological complaint 
i) Against forcing 
One possibility Kolodny considers is that there is some sort of deontological 
constraint that is violated by state relations of rule.48 There are certain things 
that we may not do to a person even for the sake of producing a greater good. 
What might the deontological constraint be? It could be that there is a constraint 
against forcing of some kind. Forcing, as I defined it (following Olsaretti), is 
making another do something against their will, involuntarily. It is quite 
intuitively tempting to think that there is some sort of pro tanto deontological 
rule against making others do things against their will. However, just as we saw 
that enforcement is not necessarily morally problematic, it may be that forcing is 
not either. If I sit in a chair that you wanted to sit in, I make it the case that, 
against your will, you do not sit in the chair. It is natural to think that there is 
nothing morally problematic about my doing this, and so, if this counts as forcing 
(and it seems to, given the definition), it is possible for forcing to be 
unproblematic.  
However, even if there is no deontological constraint against forcing as such, it is 
plausible to think that there is some deontological constraint against a wide range 
of forcings. It is natural to think that in more paradigmatic cases of forcing, such 
as where whenever you attempt to sit on your favourite chair I deliberately 
wrestle you away, there is some pro tanto deontological constraint that is being 
violated. It is difficult to say what exactly the principled distinction between these 
kinds of cases is, but that this distinction is difficult to identify does not mean that 
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there is no such distinction. If there is a deontological constraint of this sort, then 
the kind of general permission to enforce that we are looking for would have to 
overcome it. A general permission to enforce must be a permission to make it the 
case that the state’s subjects will comply whether or not they want to, so it will need 
to include a permission to force them to comply when they do not do so willingly. 
If there are unwilling subjects, it certainly is not the case that the only sort of 
forcing the state would have to engage in to enforce compliance with its just 
directives would be like sitting in another person’s desired chair. If there is a 
deontological constraint against some subset of forcings (and it is quite intuitively 
natural to think that there must be), then it will surely be a presumption that the 
general permission to enforce must defeat. 
ii) Against methods of forcing 
It could be that the only way of drawing a distinction between forcing that is 
morally problematic and that which is not is in terms of the method used. Kolodny, 
however, argues that there is no constraint against a method of forcing that is 
necessary to a state’s enforcing its just directives. I will argue that he fails to show 
this and so a deontological constraint against some necessary aspect of the 
methods used for state enforcement remains a possible source for the presumptive 
moral complaint.  
One plausible thought is that there is a deontological constraint against the use of 
violence or physical force. Kolodny suggests a ‘Force Constraint’ as a candidate 
complaint against state enforcement: 
Force Constraint: It is impermissible to use force on someone as a means to, or 
foreseeable side-effect of a means to, a greater good.49 
If the general permission to enforce requires a state to be permitted to use force 
or violence, then this constraint will establish a presumption needing to be 
overcome. However, a state’s having a general permission to enforce does not 
require it to be permitted to use any possible method to enforce its just directives, so 
if it is possible for a state to enforce all of its just directives without the use of force 
or violence, then this constraint will not be what we are looking for. Kolodny 
points out that it is possible for a state to enforce its directives without the use of 
force. He describes a society where this happens, the ‘Omittite Empire’: 
Their emperor, the Guardian of the Ladder, does not put violators of his 
directives in prison or build prisons around them. He doesn’t need to. This is 
because each Omittite, to survive the elements, must descend into his naturally 
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carved hole each night. Every morning, the Guardian drops the ladder into each 
hole to enable its occupant to climb back up. His deterrent is simply to withhold 
the ladder, confining the occupant there for a fixed period. Suppose an Omittite, 
“Holton”, violates some directive, and so the Guardian, as announced, does not 
drop the ladder into Holton’s hole for several months. This isn’t a use of force or 
an “active harming”, it is simply a failure to aid.50 
However, Kolodny says, it is quite plausible that there is also another 
deontological constraint against refusing to aid plus something like the following: 
Non-Aid Constraint: If one is otherwise required to aid someone, it is not sufficient 
to release one from this requirement that by refusing to aid that person, one can 
use or affect that person as a means to a greater good.51 
Kolodny argues, though, that the Guardian’s enforcing deterrents need not 
involve using people as means in this way (and so this is not a constraint that the 
general permission to enforce must overcome). If the aim of the Guardian was to 
make Holton (a violator of some directive) suffer in order to show others that the 
Guardian’s withholding of the ladder is a bad thing, it would be a refusal to aid for 
the sake of using Holton as a means. However, the point of the deterrent is not to 
do this (we can assume that it is obvious to inhabitants of this society that 
withholding the ladder is a bad thing), but rather to make it clear that the 
Guardian’s threat is credible. Thus, Kolodny says, ‘nothing that happens to 
Holton as a result is part of the Guardian’s means to the greater good’.52 Holton’s 
suffering is not caused by the Guardian as a means to a greater good. (The 
Guardian could do without it: if confinement were in fact a benefit to Holton, the 
Guardian’s deterrent aim would not be set back.)  
Presumably, Kolodny’s thought is that in treating Holton as above, one does not 
refuse to aid Holton for the sake of using or affecting him as a means to a greater 
good. What actually happens to Holton is not important to the Guardian’s aims. 
It is not clear, though, what would be wrong with a simpler principle: 
Non-Aid Constraint’: If one is otherwise required to aid someone, it is not 
sufficient to release one from this requirement that the refusal to aid that person 
can be used as a means to a greater good. 
This principle would give Holton a complaint against the above treatment.  
The reason Kolodny suggests the first principle is that he thinks it explains why 
‘we may refuse to give life-saving medications to the one in order to have it to 
give to the five. But we may not refuse to give life-saving medication to the one in 
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order to learn from the progress of his disease how to save the five from it’.53 But 
Non-Aid Constraint’ seems capable of explaining this too. In refusing to give life-
saving medication to the one in order to give it to the five, we do not use the 
refusal to aid the one as a means to a greater good. Our refusing to aid the one is not 
involved in our aim, it is not an essential part of our plan that we refuse aid to the 
one, nor something that we desire. If it were possible to aid the one without giving 
her some of the medicine that we need to save the five, we might well do so (it 
would be consistent with our aims). Thus, though perhaps we might be said to 
aim at refusing medicine to the one (since, given the stock of medicine, it is 
essential to our plan, to saving the greatest number, that we refuse it to the one), 
we cannot be said to aim at refusing aid to the one. In this sense, then, the refusal 
to aid the one in the first case is something like a foreseen but unintended 
consequence of keeping the medicine for the five.54  
On the other hand, in refusing to give medicine to the one in order to learn from 
the progress of his disease, the refusal to aid is a necessary part of our plan; if we 
desire to learn from the one’s disease, we must desire not only that we not give 
our medicine to the one, but also that we not aid the one. It is essential to our 
achieving our aim that we not aid the one, whatever form that aid might take. 
Here, then, unlike the former case, we aim directly at not aiding the one as a means 
to a greater good. The Guardian’s refusal to drop the ladder for Holton is like the 
latter case, not the former. It is not just the refusal to drop the ladder that is 
necessary to the Guardian’s plan, but also the refusal to aid. If it were possible for 
the Guardian to aid Holton to leave his hole without giving him the ladder, the 
Guardian could not do so without defeating the object of refusing the ladder. 
Though Holton’s suffering as a result of being refused aid is not important to the 
Guardian’s aims, his being refused aid is. It is this, his refusing aid to Holton, that 
makes the Guardian’s threats credible. Though the Guardian’s method of 
enforcement does not violate Non-Aid Constraint, then, it does violate Non-Aid 
Constraint’. Thus, contra Kolodny, there seems to be a not implausible 
deontological complaint that is violated even in the case of the Omittites.55  
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54 See Foot (2002) 20 and 24 
55 Kolodny goes on to argue that the deontological complaint against the use of force can 
be met by state enforcement, since, roughly, it is best understood as being lifted when the 
target has had adequate opportunity to avoid the use of force. Adequate opportunity, he 
says, is determined by the costs of requiring consent in different kinds of cases. I do not 
have space to discuss this argument properly, but I do not think it is persuasive. It is quite 
tempting to think that there is a deontological constraint against the use of force that, in 
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Kolodny fails to show, then, that a deontological constraint (or combination of 
deontological constraints) could not be the source of the complaint against state 
enforcement. It seems that making people do things involuntarily will require 
either the use of physical violence (or the active imposition of harms, if this does 
not count under the former), or the refusal to aid, or the threat of one of these 
things. And in order for the threats to function, it will be necessary actually to 
impose deterrent harms (either by violence or by refusal to aid). Thus, given that 
a general permission to enforce needs to include a permission to enforce against 
subjects who are not willing to comply, it needs to include a permission either to 
use physical violence or to refuse aid in some circumstances. And it is not 
implausible to think that there are deontological constraints against these things. 
I have not shown that there are such constraints, but it remains, I think, an open 
possibility. 
2. Non-deontological complaint against loss of freedom 
If you enforce compliance with a command or directive, this necessarily involves 
removing or making ineligible certain options for the person whose compliance is 
enforced. There is a natural conception (or several natural conceptions) of 
freedom according to which the removal of options is a paradigm case of the 
restriction of freedom. A hard-line such conception says that only removing 
options reduces a person’s freedom. On such a view, so long as an option is 
strictly open to an agent, no matter how high the cost, it is something they are 
free to do. However, it is quite natural to think that making an action ineligible, 
or unacceptable, can also be sufficient to remove an agent’s freedom to perform 
that action. It is odd to say, for example, that the victim of a highwayman, 
threatened with death if they refuse to hand over their money, is free to refuse. 
There is some sense in which they are, but there also seems to be a very natural 
sense in which they are not. In this sense, then, enforcement will always restrict 
freedom. 
If we think that freedom of this sort is something that has some value, then an 
agent’s or an institution’s having an extensive capacity to remove or make 
ineligible options of others will be a source of disvalue. I think that this could be 
enough to show that there is a presumption against the permissibility of 
exercising such a capacity. Something’s simply leading to an overall loss of value 
all things considered is not enough to establish a presumption against it (unless 
                                                                                                                                                   
some cases at least, is independent of the interest that others in society have in not 
allowing an individual the opportunity to avoid the use of force.  
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we are consequentialists). However, I think a state’s enforcement leading to a 
significant disvalue may be sufficient. A state’s enforcing a wide range of directives 
covering various domains of life seems likely to cause a significant loss of freedom. 
If freedom is of sufficient importance, this may be enough to establish the sort of 
presumption we are looking for. (Although Kolodny wants a complaint that 
persists even for a state that achieves the best possible distribution of goods, 
which would have to be one where any loss in freedom is outweighed, we do not 
need to follow him in this. If such an ideal state is able to defeat the presumption, 
this does not show that there is no such presumption, nor that other less ideal 
states would be able to overcome it.) 
3. Subordination or domination 
Kolodny suggests that if there is a problem posed by the relations of rule involved 
in the state at all, it will be a problem to do with subordination. The challenge the 
state has to meet, he suggests, is to show that it is compatible with social equality, 
where this is understood as ‘not being subordinated to any individual as an 
inferior to a superior’.56 Subordination for Kolodny involves being subjected to 
the greater power and de facto authority of another individual.57 It is an ideal of 
equality since it is violated when there are asymmetries in power and de facto 
authority between individuals, but it is a relational ideal of equality since it 
concerns equality in how individuals relate to one another, not equality in 
distribution of some good. Because subordination understood in this way involves 
social equality of this sort, it is not a problem for states’ generalised enforcement 
as such. The complaint would not arise for an ideal perfectly democratic state, one 
where everyone has perfectly equal influence over the state’s enforcement 
decisions. Where everyone influences the state in exactly the same way, there is 
no inequality of power or de facto authority. If relations between individuals are 
perfectly symmetrical, there can be no subordination understood in this way. 
Thus, Kolodny’s suggested complaint is not one that would need to be defeated to 
show that it is possible for a state to have a general permission to enforce, since it 
is not a complaint that applies to an ideal perfectly democratic state.  
However, there might be another sort of complaint against state enforcement to 
do with subordination or domination, which does apply to state enforcement as 
such. There does seem to be something troubling, or in need of justification, about 
another agent having control over a wide range of what one will or will not do, 
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when this power is unequalled by your own power over that agent. For a state to 
have a general permission to enforce, it will need to be permitted to have precisely 
this sort of widespread control over what its subjects will and will not do. 
Whatever exactly it is that is troubling about such an asymmetrical power, it is 
not clear that it is any less troubling when the agent that has control over you is a 
group agent. If the only complaint is about inequality between individuals, then 
there is no problem in being controlled by a group if there is no inequality 
between you and any of the individual members of the group. But it is plausible to 
think that that is not the only complaint, that there is something wrong even with 
being controlled in this way by groups. And further, if a group agent’s having such 
control over you is problematic, there again seems no reason to think that it 
should make a difference that one is a member of the group that has control 
(unless you have the same sort of control over the group agent that it has over 
you).  
I am not sure what exactly this complaint is, if there is one. It could be that it is a 
complaint against domination, as understood by republican thinkers, or against 
dependence on the will of another, as in Kantian conceptions of freedom.58 
Domination is usually understood as something like the uncontrolled power to 
interfere in the choices of another, while being dependent on the will of another is 
having one’s ability to pursue one’s own purposes be subject to the choices or 
ends of another. These are both introduced, in the republican literature, and in 
Kant, as conceptions of freedom, so it could be that the subordination or 
domination complaint is another form of complaint against loss of freedom. A 
state’s being able to enforce its just directives whatever they may be involves it 
having a discretionary ability to interfere in the choices of its subjects to enforce 
the directives it chooses. This seems to involve both domination and dependence 
on the will of another. There is no obvious reason why one could not be 
dominated by, or dependent on the will of, a group agent. I am not sure that these 
are the best ways of understanding the complaint, but they are popular ideas, and 
if they are genuine moral concerns, they could explain the moral presumption 
against states’ general permission to enforce. Alternatively, there could be some 
other way of fleshing out the trouble with being subject to the control of another 
agent.  
                                                          
58 On the former, see for instance Pettit (1996), (1997) and (2012). On the latter, see Kant 
(1999) and Ripstein (2009). 
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Conclusion 
I have sketched very briefly some rough kinds of grounds that there could be for 
the intuition that there is a moral presumption that a general permission to 
enforce would need to overcome. The purpose of this was not to provide an 
account of what the true grounds of this intuition are, but just to make it seem 
plausible that there are some grounds to be found. One might still think that a 
state’s general permission to enforce stands in no need of justification at all. If this 
is your view, you will find nothing to trouble you in my thesis. I hope, though, to 
have made it not seem foolhardy to set aside this view and to work from the 
assumption that we should not assume that states have a general and exclusive 
permission to enforce compliance with their directives unless we can find some 
justification for it. 
One final thing that is worth noting before we move on is that none of the 
suggested complaints seem obviously to go away if the agent doing the enforcing 
is a group agent, and if the ‘enforcee’ is a member of that group. First, if there is a 
deontological constraint against certain kinds of forcing, there is no immediate 
reason to think this will not apply equally to group agents (if such things exist). If 
there are group agents, they are agents and so will presumably be subject to 
roughly the same range of deontological constraints as other agents. Further, 
nothing seems to change when the ‘enforcee’ is a member of the group doing the 
enforcing, even a member with equal voting rights in determining what the group 
will do. A group agent is capable of forcing other agents, including its own 
members to do things, and if there is a deontological constraint against certain 
kinds of forcing, there is no reason to suppose this will not apply to groups 
forcing their own members to do things. Second, if the loss of eligible options 
involved in enforcement amounts to a problematic sort of unfreedom, this is 
plausibly no less the case when caused by group agents, or group agents of which 
one is a member. Finally, we have already noted that, whatever exactly the 
subordination complaint is, there is no obvious reason to suppose that it does not 
apply equally when the subordinating agent is a group agent. Further, it seems 
similarly plausible that if one can be subordinated by a group, being a member of 
the group does not rule out the possibility. Being a member of a group does not 
rule out that group having extensive unreciprocated control over your life.  
It seems quite plausible also that, whatever exactly is problematic about state 
enforcement, it will not make any difference that one is an equal member of the 
state. It is perfectly possible for group agents to act impermissibly towards their 
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members, even when their members have an equal say in the group’s decision of 
how to act. (To hold the contrary would be to hold quite a radical, and 
implausible, view about the virtues of majoritarian decision making.) Roughly this 
point is made about democracy by John Stuart Mill at the start of On Liberty: 
The will of the people ... practically means the will of the most numerous or the 
most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making 
themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to 
oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this 
as against any other abuse of power.59 
There may be specific cases where one’s being a member of a group that treats 
you in some way is relevant to showing that the group does not wrong you. But it 
does not generally rule out the group’s being able to wrong you, and there seems 
no reason to assume that it does in the case of state enforcement. If there is a 
presumptive complaint against some of the kinds of enforcement that a general 
permission to enforce must include, there is no immediate reason to suppose that 
this complaint goes away simply because those whose action is enforced are equal 
voting members of the group agent doing the enforcing. 
  
                                                          
59 Mill (2015) 7-8 
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Chapter 2:  
Feasibility and arguments for legitimacy 
 
A. The implicit argument from justification 
I said in the introduction that there is a somewhat widespread assumption that 
state legitimacy (by which I mean, roughly, states’ general and exclusive moral 
permission to enforce compliance with their directives) is on safe ground, that is, 
can be taken for granted (for at least some existing states). It could be that this 
assumption is explained by the belief that there is no moral presumption that state 
legitimacy would have to overcome. If this is the case, my thesis will not have 
much to say about it. I doubt, though, whether this is the explanation. I suspect 
that state legitimacy is taken for granted by many who would not think that there 
is nothing even pro tanto morally problematic about states’ exclusive and 
generalised enforcement. I suspect that the legitimacy of some ‘decent’ existing 
states is often taken for granted rather because it is thought that these decent 
states succeed in overcoming the moral presumption.  
In this chapter I will address a line of thought that I think often underlies this 
implicit assumption. It also seems to underlie one of the primary families of 
explicit arguments for state legitimacy (the family of contractualist and necessity-
based arguments). It is a line of thought that has some plausibility and seems as 
likely as any to warrant taking state legitimacy for granted. My claim will be that 
if this line of thought can warrant the belief that some actual states are legitimate, 
its doing so is dependent on certain premises about feasibility. I will then argue 
that another prominent sort of argument (consent-based arguments) for state 
legitimacy also cannot succeed without the aid of feasibility premises. Thus, the 
conclusion of this chapter will be that the most plausible arguments for state 
legitimacy depend for their success on feasibility premises. However, there will 
remain one group of theorists who think that the legitimacy of a certain sort of 
state can be established a priori (and since feasibility premises are empirical, this 
means without feasibility premises). These arguments will be the subject of the 
next two chapters. 
The thought that I think underlies the common assumption that the legitimacy of 
some states is on safe ground is the thought that legitimacy follows from a 
property that some states are considered relatively uncontroversially to possess. 
In order to explain the fact that legitimacy is taken for granted in a way that 
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obligating power is not, this uncontroversial property would need to be one from 
which obligating power does not also follow. The most plausible such line of 
thought appeals to the property of justification described in the introduction.60 As 
we said before, a state’s being justified in this sense is very roughly a matter of its 
existence being in some sense a good thing or acceptable.  
As I also mentioned when I introduced the notion of justification, I think I am 
using the term ‘justification’ in roughly the same way as A. John Simmons, when 
he famously distinguishes justification from what he calls legitimacy (by which he 
means something different to me).61 What Simmons explicitly says to characterise 
this notion is somewhat vague and it could be that he is in fact talking about 
something different, such as a state’s being justified in doing what it does. But the 
phrases he uses generally seem to suggest that what he is taking to be justified 
when a state is justified is its existence (not its actions). For instance, he says that 
‘in the course of such a justification we will typically argue that certain virtues 
that states may possess or goods they may supply – such as justice or the rule of 
law – make it a good thing to have such states in the world’.62 This seems quite 
clearly to suggest that what we are aiming to show is that such states’ existence 
meets some moral bar, is in some sense morally acceptable.63 
Of course, if we understood a state’s ‘justification’ as its being justified in 
enforcing its directives (generally and exclusively), then justification would just 
become equivalent to legitimacy in my sense. To claim that justification in this 
sense is uncontroversial would just be to claim that legitimacy is uncontroversial, 
and this would not be much good as a defence of the safety of legitimacy. 
However, it might be thought that there is little or no distance between showing 
that a state’s existence is justified (morally good or acceptable) and showing that 
the state is legitimate. Showing that a state is legitimate in my sense involves 
showing that it has a general and exclusive permission to enforce. It is essential, 
though, to something’s being a state that it claim and exercise a general and 
exclusive permission to enforce. If a state ceased to make and exercise such a 
claim it would cease to be a state. So, does not showing that a state is justified in 
                                                          
60 Simmons (2001) suggests sympathy for such a line of thought (131). 
61 Ibid. 122-37. Justification of states is discussed elsewhere and tends to be characterised 
vaguely. For instance, Schmidtz (1990) says that ‘to justify an institution is, in general, to 
show that it is what it should be, or does what it should do’ (90). Anticipating what is to 
come, it will be noticed that a characterisation like this just sidesteps questions about 
whether it should be or whether it should do anything. 
62 Ibid. 126 
63 Not everything he says points in this direction, such as when he talks about justifying a 
state by rebutting arguments that it ‘practices wrongdoing’ (Ibid. 124).  
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existing amount to showing that it has a general and exclusive permission to 
enforce? The answer to this is no. As I will explain in more detail below, it does 
not follow from some institution’s existence being a good thing that it is morally 
permitted to do those things that are essential to it. It might be that the 
institution’s existence is a good thing despite the fact that doing something 
impermissible is necessary to its existence. 
Nevertheless, even if a state’s justification (in my sense) is not simply equivalent to 
its legitimacy, it does have some plausibility as a candidate for a relatively 
uncontroversial property of some existing states (from which legitimacy might be 
thought to follow). It does seem at least relatively uncontroversial that there are 
some current states whose existence is a morally good thing. Why might we think 
this? There are a number of goods that states (or some states) achieve and that we 
should welcome. These include basic security, social coordination, distributive 
justice and more. Whether or not we think that a state or this particular state is 
necessary for the achievement of these goods, some actual states do achieve these 
goods, and it seems this is something we should be glad about. Further, it might 
be thought that for at least some states, the value of the goods that the state 
provides is greater than whatever disvalue it is responsible for (though this might 
be disputed). It might also be true, in many cases, that if we were to get rid of the 
existing state, things would be worse. So, it might be that for some states, on 
balance, their existence is something that is good, that we should be glad about. 
Whether any state’s existence is justified will depend on what more precisely is 
meant by justification, or by a state’s being something we should be glad about, 
and I will suggest below that there are several possible interpretations. But it 
seems plausible at least that some states will be morally good or acceptable in at 
least some sense. My question in this chapter will be what follows from this. 
David Schmidtz distinguishes between teleological and emergent justification.64 A 
teleological justification ‘seeks to justify institutions in terms of what they 
accomplish’, ‘in terms of how they do or will serve [certain] goals’, while 
emergent justification is ‘an emergent property of the process by which 
institutions arise’.65 Simmons’s and my characterisation of justification is 
consistent with both of these. Schmidtz’s two types of justification are different 
ways in which, or different senses in which, an institution might be morally 
acceptable. If a state is teleologically justified, it is morally acceptable in the sense 
that it is good enough in respect of some good it achieves. If it is emergently 
                                                          
64 Schmidtz (1990) 
65 Ibid. 90-1 
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justified, it is morally acceptable in the sense that its coming to be did not violate 
any constraints of some kind.  
Since a state is an exclusive enforcer, a state’s coming to be involves its coming to 
be an exclusive enforcer. Unless a state is morally permitted to be an exclusive 
enforcer, its coming to be must violate some moral constraints. Thus, if a state is 
emergently justified, it will be legitimate. We can only be warranted in assuming 
that a state is emergently justified if we are warranted in supposing that it is 
permitted to be an exclusive enforcer, i.e., that it is legitimate. If a state lacks this 
permission then it cannot be emergently justified now, since by continuing to 
exist (as an exclusive enforcer) it will be violating some moral constraint. In what 
follows, then, I will consider only teleological justification.  
It is common to talk about justifying the state (in general),66 but, whatever exactly 
it means for the state to be justified, it does not obviously make any sense to talk 
about the state (in general) being legitimate. Thus, unless it is possible to argue 
from the state being justified to some particular state being legitimate, we will 
need to start from the claim that a particular state is justified. Simmons says that 
‘if “justifying the state” is to identify any plausible enterprise in political 
philosophy, then it should at least be taken to be accomplished if we can show that 
one or more specific kinds of state are morally defensible (comparatively or 
noncomparatively)’.67 If all it takes to justify the state is to show that some specific 
kind of state is morally defensible, then it will be sufficient that the best possible 
(ideal) state be morally defensible (even if no other kind of state would be morally 
defensible). Simmons says that a justification ‘will provide some comfort to those 
who have chosen to live in a justified state: their choice wasn’t a dumb choice ... 
nor was it a choice to participate in an immoral arrangement’.68 If one’s particular 
state is justified, then it will make sense to feel this way. However, if we learn that 
the state is justified in Simmons’s sense, it is hard to see how this could provide 
any comfort at all to anyone living in states. If all it takes for the state to be 
justified is for some kind of state to be justified, then learning that the state is 
justified will not tell us state-dwellers anything useful except that states are not, 
by virtue of being states, necessarily morally indefensible. What we want to know 
is whether our state is justified. It is hard to see how the legitimacy of this 
particular state could follow from just some state’s being morally defensible. 
                                                          
66 As Simmons (2001) and Schmidtz (1990) do. 
67 Simmons (2001) 125 
68 Ibid. 126 
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Of course, it might be that the kind of state that we show to be morally defensible 
when justifying the state is a broader type than one only tokened by the best 
possible state, and this might be a type of which some actual states are tokens. 
However, if this is the case, we will want to know what it takes to justify a kind of 
state. If it just requires showing that some state of that kind is morally defensible, 
then knowing that a type of state of which ours is a token is justified will not 
necessarily tell us anything interesting about our state. If, on the other hand, it 
involves showing that all states of that kind are justified then it will be sufficient 
to show that our state (which is a token of the type) is morally defensible. 
However, the important thing is not that the state is justified, but that this state is 
justified. Of course, we can show that this state is justified by showing that all 
members of a set that includes this state are justified, but what is of interest to us 
is not the latter fact about the set of states, but the fact about this state that 
follows from it. Thus, I will focus on arguments that start from premises about 
particular states rather than the state. 
What, more precisely, then, might the claim that a particular state is justified 
mean? What we have said already (in line with what Simmons says) is that 
justifying something involves showing it to be morally acceptable. But what, 
exactly, is it for something to be morally acceptable? Simmons provides some 
further characterisation of justification. He says that showing something to be 
justified ‘centrally involves rebutting certain kinds of possible objections to it: 
either comparative objections – that other acts or institutions (etc.) are preferable 
to the one in question – or noncomparative objections – that the act in question is 
unacceptable or wrong or that the institution practices or sanctions wrongdoing 
or vice’.69 He also says that ‘we can justify the state by showing that some 
realisable type of state is on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and that it is 
rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate alternatives’.70 Finally, he says that ‘in 
the course of such a justification we will typically argue that certain virtues that 
states may possess or goods they may supply – such as justice or the rule of law – 
                                                          
69 Ibid. 124. It might be thought that the distinction between justifications that meet 
comparative objections and those that meet noncomparative objections maps onto the 
distinction between teleological and emergent justifications, but I do not think this is the 
case. There may in principle be comparative objections to emergent justifications: it could 
be, for instance, that in order to be emergently justified an institution must have been the 
best available or not significantly worse than other available options when it was created. 
Similarly, there may be noncomparative objections to teleological justifications: it could be 
that if a certain institution does not secure some specific goal it is impossible for it to be 
justified.  
70 Ibid. 125-6  
48 
 
make it a good thing to have such states in the world’.71 I have said already that 
emergent justification could not plausibly be the basis for thinking that legitimacy 
is on safe ground, so I will only consider ways we might understand ‘moral 
acceptability’ in teleological terms. Here are some possible ways we could 
understand the claim that state S is morally acceptable: 
A. State S is not morally bad (or is good enough).  
Suppose that we can evaluate institutions according to their moral 
virtues and vices or the good or bad consequences of their existence. 
There could be an evaluative threshold below which an institution is 
just bad. Anything not bad is acceptable. (This threshold could be 
defined in terms of quantitative levels of goodness or in terms of 
certain specific constraints that must be met.)72 
B. It is better (or at least as good) that state S exist than not. 
C. It is permissible to create state S (or, it would be permissible to create 
state S if state S did not already exist). (Perhaps this goes along with 
the claim that it is permissible to sustain state S when it is in 
existence.) 
D. It is impermissible to destroy or destabilise state S.73 
Claims A to C seem like plausible readings of Simmons’s moral acceptability idea 
and I cannot think of any other. Claim D seems less like a good interpretation of 
Simmons’s notion of justification. However, since our purpose is not Simmons 
exegesis, but to identify a property states may possess that is both relatively 
uncontroversial and from which legitimacy follows, I include D to see if it might 
do this job. Claims C and D are of a different sort to claims A and B, but all 
concern the existence of state S, and could represent senses in which its existence is 
acceptable. Claims C and D, unlike A and B, concern agents’ moral relation to the 
state’s existence. I will argue that all of these interpretations of justification either 
fail to be uncontroversially true of some states, or can only license an argument to 
legitimacy with the aid of certain feasibility premises. 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 126 
72 If the threshold to be met is understood deontologically, as the non-violation of specific 
constraints, it would be natural to understand a state’s not being morally bad as its not 
doing anything morally impermissible. However, given that enforcement is something 
that all states do, and also, arguably, necessary for an institution to count as a state, to 
assume that a state is not morally bad in this sense would be to assume that its 
enforcement is morally permissible, i.e., to assume its legitimacy. Thus, this reading of ‘is 
not bad’ cannot be used in an argument for a state’s legitimacy. The threshold of goodness 
will have to be understood either teleologically, or in terms of its meeting deontological 
constraints excluding the permissibility of its enforcement. 
73 It might seem that C and D here make justification an emergent property, but this would 
be a mistake. That it is permissible to create state S or would be permissible to create it if 
it did not already exist is not a feature of the history of state S. It has nothing to do with 
how state S came about or continues in existence. Rather, it is a non-backwards-looking 
property of a state and so could be a reading of what it is to be teleologically justified. 
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1. The argument 
How, then, might we argue from these claims’ being true of a certain state to that 
state’s possessing a general and excusive moral permission to enforce? As 
mentioned above, we might be tempted to do so on the basis of a conceptual 
premise about states. As we have defined them, it is a conceptual necessity that 
states claim a general and exclusive moral right to enforce compliance with their 
directives, and that they actually have at least a somewhat extensive power of 
enforcement. Thus, it might be thought that an argument like the following can 
be made: 
1. State S is justified (in one of the above senses). 
2. It is an essential feature of state S that it claim and possess general 
and exclusive enforcement power. 
3. Therefore, state S is justified in claiming and possessing general and 
exclusive enforcement power. 
4. Therefore, state S is morally permitted to be an exclusive and 
generalised enforcer, i.e., it has a general and exclusive moral 
permission to enforce. 
For interpretations A to C, however, this argument will not be valid. It does not 
follow from the fact that some entity is morally good, or that its existence is 
morally good (or better than its non-existence), that some necessary feature of it 
is also morally good. Consequently, it also does not follow that it is morally 
permitted to do something that is necessary to its existence. The entity in 
question might be morally good, or its existence might be a good thing, in spite of 
some necessary feature of it. A state might be morally good, or its existence might 
be better than its non-existence despite the fact that it necessarily does something 
impermissible. Similarly, it does not follow from its being permissible to create a 
state, that that state is morally permitted to do something that is a necessary 
feature of its existence. It might be permissible to create the state despite the fact 
that it will do something impermissible.  
For interpretation D, though, it might be that some conceptual argument of this 
form will go through: 
1. It is impermissible to destroy state S. 
2. It is an essential feature of state S that it claim and possess general 
and exclusive enforcement power. 
3. Thus, if state S ceased to claim and possess general and exclusive 
enforcement power, it would cease to exist. 
4. Thus, state S’s abandoning its general and exclusive enforcement 
power would amount to self-destruction. 
50 
 
5. Therefore, it is permissible for state S to exercise general and 
exclusive enforcement power, i.e., it has a general and exclusive moral 
permission to enforce. 
This argument may be valid. I do not think, though, that it will do the job that we 
need of providing a bridge between some (relatively) uncontroversial property of 
some existing states and the legitimacy of these states. I will return to claim D 
and this argument below. 
There is another form of argument, though, that might seem to license the 
inference from the other interpretations of justification to legitimacy. This form of 
argument could be thought to work for any of the suggested interpretations of 
justification. First, then, I will consider the general form such an argument might 
take leaving an interpretation of justification to be filled in, and then, below, I will 
take each interpretation in turn to ask whether such an argument can successfully 
establish legitimacy when justification is interpreted in each way. This more 
promising form of argument relies on the idea that a state’s being an exclusive 
and generalised enforcer is required for it to be justified: 
1. State S is justified. 
2. State S’s being justified requires it to be an exclusive and generalised 
enforcer. 
3. Therefore, state S is justified as an exclusive and generalised enforcer. 
4. Therefore, state S is morally permitted to be an exclusive and 
generalised enforcer, i.e., it has a general and exclusive moral 
permission to enforce. 
Premise 2 should be read as claiming that the qualities of the state in virtue of 
which it is justified are only possible when the state enforces its commands or 
directives. The thought behind this argument could be put in the following way: 
state S is justified because of its exclusive and general enforcement and so its 
enforcement must itself be justified, and so permitted.74 
Why might we think that premise 2 is true? That is, why might we think that a 
state must have general and exclusive enforcement power in order for its 
existence to be a good thing, or better than its non-existence, or for it to be 
permissible to create/impermissible to destroy? There are various roles that 
                                                          
74 We said before that the strength of conclusion we are looking for, the strength that 
would count as a defeat of the anarchist, says that the state has a general and exclusive 
permission to enforce at least all of its just directives, whatever they may be. Thus, we can 
read the conclusion of the above as shorthand for this. Consequently, we will also need to 
read premises 2 and 3 as shorthand for the claims that state S’s being justified requires it 
to have the exclusive and generalised power to enforce at least all of its just directives, and 
that this power is justified. 
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states fulfil, a number of which may seem to make their existence a good thing, or 
permissible to bring about. Some of these roles might be thought to require an 
exclusive enforcer in order to be successfully fulfilled. One of these is a 
coordinative role. States’ establishment of artificial rules plays an important social 
coordinative role and makes possible all sorts of social cooperation that would not 
be possible otherwise. For instance, states establish traffic laws, they regulate 
exchange and so on. Another is a justice-ensuring role. There may need to be 
certain rules established to ensure that, for example, the distribution of benefits 
and burdens is just. This function could be performed by a state. In order for a set 
of directives to play either of these roles, they must in some sense be dominant in 
that society. If there are multiple competing institutions each issuing 
incompatible coordinative directives claiming to be authoritative and aiming to 
solve coordination problems, so long as there is not one whose directives are 
dominant (whose directives are followed in preference to the others), none will be 
able to fulfil the coordinative function. Similarly, if there are multiple competing 
institutions each issuing incompatible justice-ensuring directives (supposing there 
is more than one way in which justice can be achieved), it is likely that none will 
successfully achieve justice. Furthermore, since there are many different sets of 
rules that could play the coordinative and justice-ensuring roles, it might be 
thought that there needs to be a single institution (such as a state) that determines 
what the dominant rules will be. This institution will need to have the power to 
make the rules it chooses dominant, whatever they are. Thus, the thought will go, 
a state’s being justified requires it to have the power to make its laws or directives 
dominant, at least so long as they are just (the power to make unjust rules 
dominant cannot contribute to a state’s being justified).  
Now it is possible (at least conceptually) that there could be one such institution 
that achieves this sort of dominance without the use of enforcement. There could 
be an institution that issues directives that are sufficiently well observed for them 
to play these functions but that makes no attempt to enforce them, and which 
either has no competitors or is generally recognised as dominant over whatever 
competitors it does have. How could an institution achieve this sort of dominance 
without the use of enforcement? This is a difficult sociological question. There is 
no a priori reason, though, why it should not be possible for this to happen. 
However, there is a popular sociological premise that supports the view that a 
state (or other institution) could not play these roles without enforcing its 
commands or directives. The sociological premise is the Hobbesian claim that 
human nature is such that it will not be possible to achieve universal adherence to 
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a set of rules among members of a society unless these rules are enforced.75 It will 
not be rational for people to obey the directives established by some institution 
unless their doing so is enforced.  
Further, it might well be thought that an exclusive enforcer is necessary to achieve 
universal adherence. If there are multiple enforcers, the situation is no different to 
how it would be if there were no enforcers. If it is not possible to achieve universal 
adherence to a single set of rules among members of a society without 
enforcement, then there seems no reason to suppose that it is possible to achieve 
universal adherence to (that is, enforcement of) a single set of rules among 
multiple enforcers. If there are multiple enforcers without any superior agent 
enforcing their compliance with a dominant set of rules, they are in just the same 
situation as the members of a society without any enforcement. Thus, we have an 
argument from justification to legitimacy that goes like this: 
1. State S is justified. 
2. State S’s being justified requires it to determine and to make dominant 
a set of just rules. 
3. It is only possible to establish a dominant set of rules that are 
generally adhered to in a society by exclusive enforcement. 
4. Therefore, state S’s being justified requires it to have the exclusive 
power to enforce all its just laws and directives, whatever they may 
be. 
5. Therefore, state S is justified as an exclusive enforcer of all its just 
laws and directives. 
6. Therefore, state S is morally permitted to be an exclusive enforcer of 
all its just laws and directives, i.e., it has an exclusive moral 
permission to enforce all its just laws and directives. 
Premise 3 is stated as a strict possibility claim. However, it is clearly false on at 
least some readings of possibility. It is not logically or metaphysically impossible 
for there to be a dominant set of rules universally adhered to without there being 
any enforcement. I think that the most plausible reading of this premise is as a 
feasibility claim: that is, as the claim that it is not feasible to establish a dominant 
set of rules in a society without exclusive enforcement. Though it might be 
strictly possible (there is some possible world in which state S establishes a 
dominant set of rules without exclusive enforcement), the claim would go, state S 
                                                          
75 The argument that comes below is a Hobbesian argument in spirit, though it is 
certainly not Hobbes’s argument. I think Hobbes has no argument for state legitimacy 
because he thinks none is needed; the sovereign’s permission to enforce is just left over 
from the unlimited right to all things that all persons have when not subject to a 
sovereign power, as I argue in Guillery (forthcoming). However, the empirical premise 
seems to follow from Hobbes’s arguments about human nature and the reason Hobbes 
takes the state to be justified is that it enforces its commands.  
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has no feasible alternative to being an exclusive enforcer (if it is going to establish 
a dominant set of rules). My aim in this first part of the thesis is to show that 
plausible arguments for state legitimacy depend on feasibility premises and here 
we have found that what seems to be the most plausible line of thought 
underlying the assumption that state legitimacy (for at least some actual states) is 
on safe ground depends on a feasibility premise.  
However, this might be thought too easy. It might be said that, although there are 
some possible worlds in which a dominant set of rules is established without 
exclusive enforcement (it is not logically or metaphysically impossible), there is some 
restricted range of accessible possible worlds in none of which is a dominant set of 
rules established without exclusive enforcement. That is, it might be thought that 
there is a restricted sense of possibility in which it is impossible to establish a 
dominant set of rules without exclusive enforcement. Of course (similarly to what 
I will argue is the case with feasibility) there are a number of different sorts of 
possibility, a number of different ranges of possible worlds (accessibility relations) 
relative to which possibility claims might be made. It is not obvious which of these 
sorts of possibility are constraints on moral requirement (certainly they are not 
all). However, it might be claimed that certain possible worlds are too distant to 
be relevant to moral permissibility; that is, impossibility over a range of worlds 
that excludes these distant worlds straightforwardly rules out moral requirement. 
It could be thought that the only possible worlds in which a dominant set of rules 
is established without exclusive enforcement are this distant, and so that this is 
impossible for all intents and purposes (at least, for the purpose of determining 
moral permissibility). The claim, then, would be that, although it is not clear 
exactly which sorts of possibility (short of logical and metaphysical possibility) 
constrain moral requirement (and so whether premises like 3 above allow 
arguments about permissibility to go through), the possible worlds which make 
premise 3 false are so distant that they cannot be relevant to moral 
permissibility.76  
I think that it is not obvious whether this is the case, but let us suppose for the 
sake of argument that it is. In this chapter, I hope to show that the only plausible 
                                                          
76 In terms of the account of feasibility that I introduce in chapter 5, this thought could be 
construed as the thought that there are certain FCs that are so unrealistic that feasibility 
given these FCs is obviously irrelevant to moral permissibility, and the establishment of a 
set of dominant rules without exclusive enforcement is only feasible on such unrealistic 
(and irrelevant) FCs. (On my account, feasibility is not simply equivalent to possibility, 
but just as there are undoubtedly some possible worlds in which a dominant set of rules is 
established without enforcement, there are also undoubtedly sharpenings of feasibility on 
which it is feasible to do so.) 
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arguments from justification to legitimacy depend on other infeasibility premises 
that cannot plausibly be thought to be of this sort. These infeasibility premises are 
made false by possible worlds that are not so distant that they are obviously 
irrelevant to permissibility. To be clear, I think that the dependence of the above 
argument on premise 3 is already enough to show that its success should not be 
taken for granted without some argument about exactly what role feasibility (and 
possibility) can play in constraining moral permissibility or impermissibility. But 
I aim to show that even if the impossibility claim in premise 3 is thought to be so 
robust that it is obviously a constraint on moral requirement/permissibility, the 
argument from justification to legitimacy can only be successful with the aid of 
other infeasibility premises that are much less robust, and much less obviously a 
constraint on moral requirement/permissibility. 
It could be thought that premise 3 should be read instead as a probability claim, 
that is, as the claim that only through exclusive enforcement is a dominant set of 
rules likely to be established. This will not work, though. Probability is not 
relevant to moral permissibility in the way that feasibility and possibility are 
ordinarily thought to be. The claim that ‘φ-ing is the only feasible way of doing 
something morally required (or, perhaps, morally good, or what is the moral 
best)’ seems, at least on the face of it, to be sufficient for the permissibility of φ-
ing. However, we cannot substitute ‘probable’ for ‘feasible’. That something is the 
only probable way for you to do something morally required or important does not 
show that you are permitted to do it. It could be that it is you that is making other 
possible ways of doing the required thing improbable. That you are unlikely to do 
those alternative things does not excuse you from doing them if there is otherwise 
a requirement to do those things rather than the thing that you are more likely to 
do. What we need to know is not whether it is probable that you will do the 
required thing in any other way, but whether there is any other possible or feasible 
way for you to do so. Perhaps it could be that something’s being the only way of 
doing something required that would be likely to succeed if you tried is sufficient 
to show that it is permissible. On one account (one that I will argue is mistaken) 
this is what feasibility is: probability conditional on trying. My arguments in 
chapter 5 will show that this also is not a constraint on moral requirement and 
permissibility and so does not allow the kind of inference involved in the above 
argument.  
The argument form I have just suggested leaves the precise meaning of 
‘justification’ unspecified. I will now try out the four different interpretations of 
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justification suggested above (page 48) and see if any of them can get us a 
successful argument to legitimacy. 
2. A 
On this interpretation, to say that a state is justified is to say that it is not morally 
bad (or is good enough). Let us grant for the sake of argument that there is some 
plausible threshold of goodness for which this claim is sufficiently 
uncontroversially true of some possible or actual states. This interpretation of 
justification gives us the following argument: 
1. State S is not morally bad (is good enough). 
2. State S’s not being morally bad counterfactually depends on its 
determining and making dominant a set of just rules. 
3. It is only possible to establish a dominant set of artificial rules that 
are generally adhered to in a society by exclusive enforcement. 
4. Therefore, state S’s being not morally bad requires it to have the 
exclusive power to enforce all its just laws and directives, whatever 
they may be. 
5. Therefore, state S’s being an exclusive enforcer of all its just laws and 
directives is not morally bad. 
6. Therefore, state S is morally permitted to be an exclusive enforcer of 
all its just laws and directives, i.e., it has an exclusive moral 
permission to enforce all its just laws and directives. 
Now, if premises 2 and 3 hold, and if state S exists, then there are three possible 
ways state S might be: 
X.   State S is not bad and has and uses an exclusive power of enforcement 
(of its just laws and directives). 
Y.   State S is bad and has and uses an exclusive power of enforcement. 
Z.   State S is bad and lacks or does not use an exclusive power of 
enforcement. 
Now, if state S exists, given 2 and 3, the only possible scenario in which state S 
lacks an exclusive power to enforce is one in which it is bad: it is not possible for it 
to lack this power and not be bad. Thus, if X, Y and Z were the only possibilities, 
it may seem reasonable to conclude that state S has an exclusive permission to 
enforce its just laws and directives. If the only way to avoid there being a morally 
bad state is for state S to φ, then plausibly it is permissible for state S to φ. (Even 
this is not obviously true, since if we are not consequentialists there might very 
well be certain things that we are not morally permitted to do even if they are 
necessary for bringing about certain desirable states of affairs, such as states of 
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affairs in which there is not a bad state; my point is just that we would need at 
least this to make a good argument of this sort for permissibility.)  
However, X, Y and Z are not the only possibilities since state S need not exist. 
Thus, claims (5) and (6) do not follow from 4. The permissibility of enforcement 
for state S seems to follow if we assume that state S must exist, since then the only 
way to avoid there being a morally bad state is for it to be an exclusive enforcer. If 
we do not assume that, though, we allow the possibility that there are ways of not 
having a morally bad state that do not involve state S at all. In other words, it is 
not sufficient that state S’s being an exclusive enforcer is necessary for state S not 
to be morally bad; we would need the claim that state S’s exclusive enforcement is 
necessary for things (in general) not to be morally bad.  
By way of (imperfect) analogy consider the case of a neighbourhood watch group. 
Suppose that a group of neighbours band together to form such a group with the 
aim of protecting their neighbourhood from crime and exacting punitive justice. 
Suppose that the exaction of justice is a good thing, in some sort of teleological 
sense: states of affairs in which justice is exacted are better than states of affairs in 
which it is not. Suppose also that the existence of the neighbourhood watch group 
is a good thing overall, in a similar teleological sense.77 Whether or not its actions 
are permissible, it makes such a contribution to achieving security and justice (and 
perhaps performs other unrelated positive functions) that its existence is all-
things-considered good. Now suppose that when the neighbourhood watch group 
is formed, its members come together to hunt down and exact justice on 
perpetrators of crime in their neighbourhood, but when they are together they 
egg each other on and become hungry for blood, so much so that if they do not 
exact justice on a guilty party (someone who in fact committed a crime), they will 
exact punishment on an innocent person instead (which, suppose, would make the 
group’s existence no longer a good thing overall). Their hunger for blood is so 
strong that the only way for them to avoid hurting an innocent person once they 
are together is to punish a guilty person.78 It does not follow from this that it is 
permissible for the group to exact justice on the guilty (even though we have 
supposed that the exaction of justice is a good thing). The group need not exist, so 
                                                          
77 The existence of the group cannot be assumed to be good in a sense that includes the 
permissibility of its exacting justice, since this is what is about to be at question.  
78 It might be thought that this is inconsistent with the assumption that the existence of 
the group is a good thing. But suppose that the group is in fact very effective at identifying 
perpetrators of crime and there is sufficient crime that the group very rarely needs to 
satisfy its bloodthirstiness by punishing the innocent. We have also supposed that the 
exaction of justice is a good thing, so even in this scenario, the existence of the group 
remains (teleologically) a good thing. 
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it is not the case that their exacting justice on the guilty is the only way to avoid 
their hurting the innocent; they could instead disband.  
Even if the exaction of justice is itself good, it might nevertheless be 
impermissible for the neighbourhood watch group to carry it out because, for 
instance, it is better that some other agent exact justice instead (perhaps the state 
or the community as a whole) or because the group simply has no right to do it. It 
is not plausible, I think, that (in Simmons’s terms) permissibility can always be 
established simply by meeting all noncomparative objections. Actions (including 
creation of institutions) can be impermissible for wholly comparative reasons. On a 
maximising moral theory that only permits optimal action, this is particularly 
clear.79 But even on a non-maximising theory, it seems perfectly plausible that 
actions can be impermissible for comparative reasons. Actions may be 
impermissible even though there are no noncomparative objections, simply 
because of what they make impossible.80  (In the case of institutions, it is perfectly 
plausible that sometimes it will be impermissible to create an institution that is 
subject to no noncomparative objections simply because there are alternative 
institutions whose creation would be so much better and whose creation is made 
impossible by the creation of the first institution.) Thus, I think, the above 
argument is invalid.81 A state’s being an exclusive enforcer may be impermissible 
even though there are no noncomparative objections, simply because of superior 
alternatives that it makes impossible. 
As we saw, though, the argument might seem to work if there is no possibility of 
state S not existing. (The argument then goes through if it follows from the fact 
that X’s φ-ing is the only way to avoid there being a morally bad state that it is 
permissible for X to φ.) It may be, then, that we could make the argument work 
by adding the premise that it is not feasible for state S to stop existing (or that 
there are no feasible morally good worlds in which state S stops existing). This is 
                                                          
79 Unless, of course, the maximising theory is interpreted as saying merely that we ought 
to do what is optimal, but not that we are required to. 
80 I am not here assuming much about what it takes to establish permissibility. I make no 
positive claim about what is necessary to establish permissibility, only about what is not 
sufficient. There seem to be cases where permissibility is ruled out for comparative 
reasons, so just showing that there are no noncomparative objections to something is not 
sufficient to establish that it is permissible or permissible to create. 
81 Note that what I have said here does not depend on whether you have a consequentialist 
or deontological view of permissibility. If you have a deontological view, it still might be 
that φ’s being necessary for avoiding there being a morally bad state is sufficient for its 
permissibility. But, as the above shows, this is not what the argument from A gets us. For 
a consequentialist, on the other hand, presumably the only permissible actions will be 
those that bring about the best consequences, but a state’s existence simply not being bad 
does not show that the best consequence is one in which it exists.  
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certainly not the sort of feasibility premise that is obviously a constraint on moral 
permissibility. Possible worlds in which a particular state stops existing (even 
morally good worlds in which a particular state stops existing) are not that 
distant and, especially since we are considering what is feasible for the state, it is 
not at all obvious that it is infeasible for it to stop existing. Thus, to warrant 
taking the success of this argument for granted, we would at least need to devote 
some attention to the concept of feasibility and when exactly it is a constraint on 
moral argument. 
3. B 
Interpretation B is the claim that it is better (or at least as good) that state S exist 
than not. Here again I will grant for the sake of argument that there can be some 
states for which B is sufficiently uncontroversial. However, it would be a mistake 
to move from B to the claim that state S is legitimate. It might seem that a 
version of the above argument can be made as follows: 
1. It is better (or at least as good) that state S exist than not. 
2. (1) is true because state S determines and makes dominant a set of just 
rules. 
3. It is only possible to establish a dominant set of rules that are 
generally adhered to in a society by exclusive enforcement. 
4. Therefore, state S’s existence being better than not depends on it 
having the exclusive power to enforce all its just laws and directives, 
whatever they may be. 
5. Therefore, it is better that state S be an exclusive enforcer of all its 
just laws and directives than not. 
6. Therefore, state S is morally permitted to be an exclusive enforcer of 
all its just laws and directives, i.e., it has an exclusive moral 
permission to enforce all its just laws and directives. 
I am not at all sure that (5) here follows from (1) and (4), but it is the inference 
from (5) to (6) that I will question here. It might also be thought that there is a 
different route to legitimacy: if B is true, then C is true (it is morally permissible 
to create state S, or sustain it in existence), and this gets us closer to legitimacy 
since at least it is in the realm of permissibility. (We will see below that it is more 
plausibly possible to get from C to legitimacy.) However, I think that the move 
from B to C is illegitimate, for closely analogous reasons to the reasons that 
moving from (5) to (6) is illegitimate. I will here focus on the move from a state’s 
existence being better than not to the permissibility of creation (B to C), but the 
same considerations apply to the move above from a state’s exclusive enforcement 
being better than its not doing so to the permissibility of exclusive enforcement.  
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Claim B says that the actual world in which the state in question exists is better 
than the world would be if that state did not exist (or if the state in question is 
one that does not currently exist, that the world would be better than it actually 
is if the state in question existed). Either way the claim is a counterfactual one: ‘if 
state S did not exist, the world would be less good than it actually is’ (or ‘if state S 
existed, the world would be better than it actually is’). On standard (Lewisian) 
analyses of counterfactuals, this means roughly that the actual world in which the 
state exists is better than the closest possible world in which it does not.82 The 
move that would have to be made goes from the state’s existence being better 
than its non-existence to its being permissible to bring it into existence or sustain 
it in existence (or from the world being better with the state’s exclusive 
enforcement than without to its being permissible for the state to be an exclusive 
enforcer). However, this is an illicit move, since it does not follow from its being 
the case that state of affairs S is better than one other counterfactual possible 
world that it is (or was) permissible to bring about S or sustain S. This is to 
narrow the comparison class too much. If some state of affairs S is better than any 
other possible world then this might plausibly be sufficient to show that it is 
permissible to bring about S.83 But that S is better than some other possible way 
things might be, even if that is the closest possible world in which S does not 
hold, does not show that it is permissible to bring it about.84 Suppose, for instance, 
that in the actual world I slap you in anger. Suppose also that in the closest 
possible world in which I do not slap you I stab you. It is clearly better that I slap 
you than that I stab you. In some sense, then, it is better that I slap you than that 
I do not. This does not mean, though, that it is permissible for me to slap you.85  
                                                          
82 Strictly, on Lewis’s analysis, it means ‘there is a world W, in which the state does not 
exist and which is worse than the actual world, that is closer to the actual world than any 
world X, in which the state does not exist and which is not worse than the actual world’. 
Lewis (1973) 
83 Even this need not be sufficient, since if we are not consequentialists we will not believe 
that it is generally true that it must be permissible to bring about the best possible state of 
affairs, but it does seem plausible that some state of affairs’ being the best possible 
presents a good prima facie case for the permissibility of bringing it about, while a state of 
affairs S simply being better than some other possible world (even the closest one in which 
S does not obtain) does not. 
84 Nozick (1974) makes a similar point, arguing that we cannot justify ‘the state’ by 
comparing it simply to the anarchic situation that would exist if the actual state situation 
did not (4-6). He, however, is interested in justifying the state in general, showing that it is 
desirable to have a state and that the existence of one need not violate anybody’s rights, 
rather than in showing that any particular states are legitimate. 
85 This might recall the debate between actualism and possibilism in moral philosophy. 
Jackson and Pargetter (1986) famously defend ‘actualism’, the view that an agent ought to 
perform an act if and only if what would happen if the agent performed it is better than 
what would happen if she did not. There are strong objections to actualism (see, for 
instance, Wedgwood (2009) and Ross (2012)), but whatever the plausibility of actualism 
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Perhaps things will seem better if we proceed in the other direction, claiming that 
a state that does not currently exist would be better than the actual world. Here 
we simply say that we would improve the world by creating the state in question 
(assuming the costs of changeover are not too high). However, though it may 
sound plausible that any act that improves the world morally is permissible, this 
cannot be true. If, for instance, by improving the world in one way you make it 
impossible to improve the world even more, then it could be impermissible to 
improve the world in the first way. (There may also be rights considerations: if 
the improved world is just better overall, but not necessarily better for everyone, 
the rights of some could be violated in bringing about the better world.) 
Now, maybe we could replace B with the claim that the existence of a particular 
state is in fact better than any possible world in which that state does not exist.  
Note that this must be the claim that for whatever state we are trying to establish 
a permission to enforce, at least some possible world in which it does enforce is 
better than any possible world in which that state does not exist. It must be better 
than any other state. Otherwise we do not have the claim that this state’s 
existence is better than any other way things might be. Thus, such a claim could 
only establish the permissibility of enforcement for the best possible state. 
Furthermore, the claim seems quite plausibly not to be true of any state. Is the 
best possible state world better than the best possible non-state world? This is 
debatable, but the best possible non-state world is presumably one in which 
people live together in society harmoniously without disputes and flourish 
communally and freely and in which there is no state with a generalised power of 
enforcement, while in the best possible state world there is a state with a 
generalised power of enforcement. There is nothing obviously deeply (logically or 
physically) impossible about the former world: at least some argument would be 
needed to show that there is. It seems to me that the former is obviously more 
desirable.  
Note that my claim is not that for some action x to be permissible it is necessary for 
there to be a possible world in which x occurs that is better than all possible 
worlds in which x does not occur. This would be extremely demanding. Rather 
my claim is that the only straightforward way of establishing moral permissibility 
through comparisons of the goodness of alternate states of affairs is by making 
                                                                                                                                                   
as a principle about ‘oughts’, it is surely not plausible as a principle about permissibility. It 
is not the case that it is permissible to φ whenever what would happen if you did not φ is 
worse than what would happen if you did, as illustrated by the above case. 
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this radical claim. Just to point out that a world in which x occurs is better than 
some other possible world(s) is not sufficient. 
The best solution to this problem is perhaps to claim that the existence of a 
particular state is better than any possible world out of some restricted range. We 
could replace B with the claim that the existence of some state is better than any 
feasible world in which that state does not exist. This seems like it might make the 
argument work. (Certainly, it would if there is a straightforward ‘“ought” implies 
“feasibility”’ constraint and if it is always permissible to do the best thing 
available.) Again, though, this argument now depends on a feasibility premise that 
is not obviously of a sort that constrains moral argument. Possible worlds in which 
there are better alternatives to this state’s exclusive enforcement are not that 
distant that they are obviously irrelevant to moral argument. Thus, again, some 
thought about feasibility and its role in moral argument is needed to warrant 
taking the success of this argument for granted. 
Another version of claim B states that the actual world in which state S exists is 
better than things would be if state S were torn down. Then we do not have to 
compare the actual world to all other possible worlds but only to worlds in which 
state S is torn down, all of which would involve a significant amount of upheaval. 
We could then add the premise that exclusive enforcement is necessary to prevent 
the state from being torn down to get the conclusion that it is permissible for 
state S to be an exclusive enforcer of its directives (because if it was not, it would 
be torn down, and this would be worse). This argument could obviously only get 
a permission for existing states, but this is all that is really needed. However, 
again the natural reading of the claim is as a counterfactual, making the 
comparison only to the closest possible world in which the state is torn down. 
Again, this is not enough to establish any sort of permissibility. The claim then 
could be that the actual world is better than all of the possible worlds in which 
state S is torn down, but this seems highly implausible. There are some possible 
worlds in which state S is torn down peacefully and replaced with something 
much better. More plausibly, again, the claim might be that the actual world is 
better than any of the feasible scenarios in which state S is torn down. But again, 
whether this is true will depend on what exactly is meant by ‘feasible’ and so some 
thought will be needed about whether the kind of understanding of ‘feasible’ that 
makes this claim true also allows an argument of this form to go through. 
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4. C and D 
i  
Interpretation C understands the claim that a state is justified as the claim that it 
is permissible to create it, while on interpretation D, it is the claim that it is 
impermissible to destroy or destabilise it. These claims seem to stand a better 
chance of allowing an inference to legitimacy, being already in the domain of 
permissibility. For claim C, we get an argument that goes like this: 
1. It is permissible to create state S (or, it would be permissible to create 
state S if it did not exist). 
2. It is only permissible to create state S if (and because) it establishes 
(would establish) and makes (would make) dominant a set of just 
rules. 
3. It is only possible to establish a dominant set of rules that are 
generally adhered to in a society by exclusive enforcement. 
4. Therefore, it is permissible for state S to be an exclusive enforcer of 
its just laws and directives, i.e., it has an exclusive moral permission 
to enforce all its just laws and directives. 
This argument goes through if we accept the plausible-sounding principle: 
P.   If it is permissible to create an institution N because it does φ, then it is 
permissible for N to do φ. 
Let us accept, then, that we can get from C to legitimacy.  
There is no plausible argument of the above form starting from claim D (the 
claim that it is impermissible to destroy or destabilise state S), on the other hand, 
since it is not plausible that it must be permissible to do what makes the 
destruction of an institution permissible: if destroying an institution is permissible, 
then why should we be concerned about it morally? We saw above, though, that 
there may be a conceptual argument from D available. (A state’s ceasing to be an 
exclusive enforcer would be its ceasing to be a state, and so if it is impermissible 
to destroy it, perhaps it is impermissible for it to cease to be an exclusive 
enforcer.) 
There is also a possible line of argument from D that starts from the following 
premises: 
1. It is impermissible to destroy or destabilise state S. 
2. A state is only stable if it establishes and makes dominant a set of just 
rules. 
3. It is only possible to establish a dominant set of rules that are 
generally adhered to in a society by exclusive enforcement.  
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It may follow from these premises that it is impermissible to prevent state S from 
enforcing its just laws or directives. If obstructing a state’s generalised 
enforcement will make the state unstable, then it is presumably impermissible by 
(1). The permissibility of enforcement for state S does not straightforwardly 
follow. There are all sorts of reasons why it might be impermissible to prevent a 
state from enforcing its directives. Some of them are perfectly consistent with the 
state in question lacking a general permission to enforce compliance with its 
directives. It could be that by enforcing its directives state S is violating a moral 
requirement, but that nevertheless, because preventing it from doing so would do 
more harm than good, prevention is impermissible. Similarly, it could be that 
state S lacks the virtues necessary for it to be permissible to create such a state 
when it does not exist, but now that it exists, preventing it from enforcing would 
do more harm than good, and so is impermissible. 
One might argue, though, that (1) should be interpreted as applying to the state 
itself. If (1) holds, the thought goes, it is impermissible for the state to destabilise 
itself. If being an exclusive enforcer is necessary for stability, then it must be 
impermissible not to be. If it is impermissible not to be an exclusive enforcer 
(obligatory to be one), then it must be permissible to be one. There seems to be 
something odd about this argument. For one thing, it has the unexpected 
consequence that not only is it permissible for the state to be an exclusive 
enforcer, it is obligatory. Nevertheless, I am not sure what exactly, if anything, 
goes wrong with the argument, so let us suppose, if only for the sake of argument, 
that it is successful. Additionally, as we saw above, there is a conceptual form of 
argument from D to legitimacy that might be successful (which was not 
successful for the other interpretations of justification). There is at least a 
plausible case to be made, then, that legitimacy does follow from justification when 
interpreted as either C or D. 
ii  
However, these interpretations of justification fail to fulfil the other role required 
to justify the assumption that legitimacy is on safe ground. Interpretations A and 
B were plausible candidates for claims that are somewhat uncontroversially true 
of at least some existing states, but fail to warrant an inference to legitimacy. 
Interpretations C and D, on the other hand, may successfully get us arguments to 
legitimacy, but are not plausible candidates for claims that are uncontroversially 
true of some existing states. What we need is a claim that is more uncontroversial 
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for some state than the claims that the state is legitimate or has obligating power. 
Claim C, the claim that it is permissible to create a state, seems to be just as 
problematic or difficult to establish as the claim that a state has a generalised and 
exclusive permission to enforce. Creating an institution with a generalised and 
exclusive capacity to enforce raises the same (or similar) moral problems as does 
the possession or use of this generalised capacity.  
It could be that C follows from some other uncontroversial claim. However, I 
have argued above that it does not follow from B. For similar reasons, C does not 
follow from claim A either. The reason C does not follow from B was that state 
S’s existence simply being better than some particular alternative scenario is not 
sufficient to establish that it is permissible to create state S, because there might be 
some other possible scenarios that are so much better that it is in fact 
impermissible to bring about S’s existence. Similarly, that state S is not morally 
bad (meets some evaluative threshold) does not rule out its being impermissible to 
create state S, because there could be alternative better scenarios that creating 
state S would prevent from coming about. That φ-ing prevents something better 
from happening is not in itself sufficient to show that φ-ing is impermissible, but 
it seems plausible that there could be cases where the fact that φ-ing would 
prevent something so much better makes it impermissible. To assume that state 
S’s not being morally bad shows that it is permissible to create it does not allow 
for this. Thus, if it is still thought that C follows from another more 
uncontroversial claim, some plausible other candidate would need to be found.  
One way of interpreting contractarian arguments for the state is as offering just 
such an argument for C. Jean Hampton, for instance, argues that a social contract 
argument (of the sort espoused by, notably, Hobbes, Locke and Kant) is supposed, 
amongst other things, ‘1. to explain the state as an entity whose origination and 
continued existence are the responsibilities of human beings, 2. to show why 
human beings are justified in creating and maintaining a state ...’.86 The use of 
‘justified’ here, if interpreted morally, seems to mean nothing other than 
‘permitted’. The contractarian argument is supposed to show that we need a state, 
and thus that we have some compelling reason to meet that need, i.e., to create or 
maintain a state. This is the point, for instance, of Hobbes’s state of nature 
argument: human nature is such that without a state, human life will be a state of 
war, so for the sake of peace (which we are presumed to want) we need a state. 
For Hobbes the compelling reason to create or maintain a state is self-interested, 
                                                          
86 Hampton (1986) 269 
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for Locke and Kant it is moral. The moral version of this argument will have as 
its conclusion the claim that it is morally permissible to create or maintain a state.  
Interpreted thus, the contractarian argument is essentially an attempt to make the 
argument from B to C that I have argued against above. Instead of simply 
comparing the world with some given state to the closest possible world without 
that state, this argument compares it to (presumably) the closest possible world 
without any state. The problem is that we need to establish legitimacy for some 
specific actual state, so to establish permissibility of creation we would need to 
show that this state is better than all the relevant alternatives to it, not only the 
alternatives to there being any state. Even if a contractarian argument could show 
that the closest possible non-state world is worse than all state worlds, this is not 
sufficient to show that it is permissible to create any particular state. Suppose, for 
instance, S and T are both states that could be equally feasibly created from a 
state of nature, and though better than the state of nature, an S-world would be 
much worse than a T-world. It might well be in such a scenario that it is not 
permissible to create state S if by doing so we make it impossible to create state T. 
This is just the same problem as raised above. Thus, I think, even if legitimacy 
does follow from C, this is not sufficient to warrant the assumption that the 
legitimacy of actual states is on safe ground, for the simple reason that we are not 
warranted in assuming that the truth of C itself is on safe ground. 
The case is similar with claim D, the claim that it is impermissible to destroy or 
destabilise state S. Again, we should ask why it might be thought that this is true 
of some actual state. The only obvious candidate response is some form of the 
thought that it would be worse if the state in question was destroyed or 
destabilised. This amounts to the same as the claim above that the actual world in 
which state S exists is better than things would be if state S were torn down.87 
That the actual world is better than the closest possible world in which the 
existing state is torn down does not seem to be enough to show that it is 
impermissible to tear it down, since there may be another close, but not quite as 
close, yet perfectly accessible world in which the state is torn down that is better 
than the actual world. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that the actual world 
with the existing state is better than all possible worlds in which that state is torn 
down. Thus, the impermissibility of destruction claim stops looking like such an 
                                                          
87 Claim A won’t help either, even more clearly than in the previous case. That something 
is not morally bad, or meets some evaluative threshold, is not sufficient to show that it is 
impermissible to destroy it. Often, it is perfectly permissible to destroy something good in 
order to replace it with something better. 
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uncontroversial starting point. What might support it (as we saw above with 
permissibility of creation) is the claim that the actual state of affairs in which the 
state exists is better than all feasible worlds in which it is torn down. This latter 
claim, though, yet again requires some substantive argumentation and 
consideration of what sort of notion of feasibility is relevant to permissibility.  
B. Explicit arguments for state legitimacy 
The line of thought that I have just been discussing, one that takes legitimacy to 
follow from justification (which might in turn be thought to hold for at least some 
existing states), is one that I think often explains the commonly made implicit 
assumption that the legitimacy of at least some existing states is on safe ground. 
It is a line of reasoning that might seem to warrant not worrying about the 
existence of legitimate states. If you think that an existing state is justified, some 
form of the above line of thought might seem to justify not worrying. Though 
such an argument is not always made explicitly, I think that it is often an implicit 
thought of this nature that leads to the assumption that legitimacy is safe.  
The legitimacy of some existing states is not always taken for granted, however. 
Many writers do attempt to give arguments to support the legitimacy of certain 
kinds of states (often supposed to include some actual ones). There is a very long 
tradition in political philosophy of attempting to find grounds for the justification 
of the state, political obligation and state legitimacy. These questions are not 
always distinguished, and even if the distinction is not missed, it is sometimes 
thought that the answers to them will be the same.88 Nevertheless, there are a 
number of arguments that have been made that do offer grounds for the state’s 
general and exclusive permission to enforce, whether bundled together with 
obligating power and justification or given bespoke treatment. I will now very 
briefly take a look at what I take to be the most prominent families of arguments 
for state legitimacy and I will argue that, just as with the sort of reasoning 
discussed above, they can only successfully establish legitimacy for existing states 
with the aid of feasibility premises. These arguments do not tend to make any 
claim to be independent of feasibility considerations, so this will not be to show 
that they are mistaken. However, the account of feasibility that I will give in 
chapter 5 has the result that arguments that rely on feasibility premises in this 
way cannot be taken for granted. The first family of arguments, contractualist and 
                                                          
88 Some arguments in the literature that describe themselves as being about ‘legitimacy’ 
may not address legitimacy in my sense (for instance, where ‘legitimacy’ is used in a sense 
where obligating power is a necessary or sufficient condition). (This is not a fault of theirs; 
I do not claim that my use of ‘legitimacy’ is in any sense the ‘proper’ or ‘best’ one.) 
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necessity-based arguments, are of broadly the same form as the line of thought 
just discussed. They attempt to argue from the state’s existence being in some 
sense a good thing to the permission to enforce. They depend on feasibility 
premises for the same kind of reasons as above. After discussing this first family, I 
briefly turn to arguments that focus on democracy, which, I argue, either fall into 
the first family, or are not really arguments that address the legitimacy sceptic 
(they defend a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for legitimacy). The second 
family of arguments, based on consent, is no good to establish the legitimacy of 
actually existing states, I will argue. 
1. Contractualist and necessity-based arguments 
There is a family of arguments for state legitimacy that, like the line of thought 
considered above, attempt to argue from justification to legitimacy. These 
arguments are all of roughly the same form as those discussed above. They all 
argue that the state provides something good, or that its existence is in some way 
good or necessary, and that the state’s exclusive enforcement is necessary for the 
state’s providing the good, or being good, and conclude that the state has a 
general and exclusive permission to enforce. These arguments offer various ways 
to bridge the gap between the state’s exclusive enforcement being necessary for 
something good, to the state’s being permitted to be an exclusive enforcer. The 
arguments I looked at above argued from some particular state’s enforcement 
being necessary for that state’s being good. I argued that we cannot get straight 
from this to the permissibility of that state’s being an exclusive enforcer, because 
there might be alternatives to that state that are also good. I did not question, 
however, the validity of a possible inference from a state’s exclusive enforcement 
being necessary for the world’s being good to its legitimacy. I suggested that, since 
such a strict necessity claim is unlikely to be true of any particular existing state, 
the argument requires a feasibility premise (this state’s exclusive enforcement is 
the only feasible way for the world to be good) to go through.  
Even the inference from something (this particular state’s exclusive enforcement) 
being necessary for the world to be good, or the best way it might be, to its 
permissibility, however, is questionable. There are various different arguments 
that provide possible ways to bridge this gap. However, since my arguments in 
this chapter did not rely on questioning this inference, finding a way to bridge this 
gap will not change what I said above. For the same reasons as the arguments 
examined above, contractualist and necessity-based arguments that attempt to 
bridge the gap between necessity and permissibility will only be successful with 
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the aid of certain feasibility premises. This is not as such an objection to these 
arguments, since they do not generally claim to be a priori, or independent of 
feasibility considerations, and indeed, some make their reliance on feasibility 
premises quite explicit.89 However, it does raise the question, as with the 
arguments above, whether we can understand the notion of feasibility in a way 
that licences the necessary inferences. 
Arguments of this form are quite various and account for a good proportion of the 
explicit arguments for state legitimacy that have been made. Contractualist 
arguments which defend state legitimacy on the grounds that a principle 
permitting the state’s exclusive enforcement could not reasonably be rejected, or 
would be agreed to in certain idealised conditions, are of this sort.90 The reason 
that such a principle is reached through contractualist reasoning is that the state’s 
exclusive enforcement is good, or necessary for some good, and the contractualist 
framework provides a way to bridge the gap between this and permissibility. 
David Copp’s Humean argument offers another way to do the same.91 He argues 
that those standards that ‘actually function as well as can be to make things go 
well in society’ are justified, and state exclusive enforcement makes things go 
better.92 Rolf Sartorius’s Anscombe-inspired argument claims that positive rights 
(based in customary morality) become moral rights ‘when they involve what is 
necessary for the successful carrying out of a task that must be performed for the 
benefit of those on whose behalf authority is exercised’.93 Christopher Wellman 
argues, on the basis of a Samaritan duty to aid others, that since the state’s 
exclusive enforcement is necessary for peace and security, we have a duty to 
support (or establish) state enforcement, and so we have no right against state 
                                                          
89 See, for instance, Wellman (1996) 217. 
90 Ladenson (1980) suggests a contractualist argument for state legitimacy (140). Rawls in 
Political Liberalism (1993) might appear to be making an argument of this sort: state 
enforcement is acceptable if citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse it (see pp. 136-
7). If this is what he is saying, there is no reason to think that citizens of a state can 
reasonably be expected to endorse its claim to exclusive enforcement rights unless there is 
no feasible better alternative. However, I think Rawls is better read as taking the 
existence of the state as a starting point, and asking what is the most acceptable way for 
its exclusive enforcement power to be exercised. His answer to this question is that it 
must be exercised according to principles that reasonable citizens could reasonably be 
expected to endorse (136-7, 217). If we take state enforcement for granted in this way, 
though, we will not be able to show that state enforcement is justifiable, again, unless we 
think there is no, or no good, feasible alternative.  
91 Copp (1999). Hume’s (1994, Essay 23) own argument is focused on political obligation 
and ‘the virtue of allegiance’, but can easily be extended to legitimacy. 
92 Copp (1999) 37 
93 Sartorius (1999) 148. Anscombe’s (1978) argument seems to be roughly the same; 
Sartorius’s differences with her seem to concern political obligation, not legitimacy, but 
her paper is difficult to interpret and so I am not confident that this is exactly her 
argument. 
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enforcement.94 Allen Buchanan argues, similarly, that a state’s exclusive 
enforcement does not violate any rights since we all are under a ‘robust natural 
duty of justice’, the fulfilment of which requires the existence of an exclusive 
enforcer.95 This latter claim seems best understood as a feasibility claim. Finally, 
Massimo Renzo offers a similar argument from the necessity of the state for order 
and security, only basing legitimacy in a right of self-defence, rather than positive 
Samaritan duties or duties of justice.96 
As already noted, all of these arguments are of roughly the same form as the 
arguments discussed above. Consequently, they too all depend on feasibility 
premises. Their claims that state enforcement is necessary for some good, or for the 
world to be good, or for some moral requirement to be met will depend on the 
premise that there is no feasible way of achieving the good or making the world 
good or meeting the moral requirement without state enforcement. Additionally, 
to successfully establish the legitimacy of any actual existing states, these 
arguments will need to not only show that the state is necessary for fulfilling some 
task, but also that some particular state is too. In order to do this, they will need 
something like the premise that this particular state’s exclusive enforcement is the 
only feasible way for the good in question to be provided (for the task to be 
fulfilled, in Anscombe’s terms). Feasibility premises seem needed both to show 
that the state (some state) is necessary and to show that a particular state is 
necessary. (The feasibility premises required for the latter are less plausibly strict 
constraints on moral argument.)  
2. Democracy 
There is a large literature on the justification of democracy. This is sometimes, 
though not always, presented as involving, at least in part, showing that 
democratic states (states that are sufficiently democratic in the right respects) are 
legitimate in my sense.97 It is worth noting, though, that justifying democracy need 
not involve this at all. There are at least two other sorts of questions, answers to 
which might be thought to amount to justifications of democracy. First, we might 
simply ask why, or whether, we should have democratic institutions or why we 
should use democratic procedures for making collective decisions. Second, we 
                                                          
94 Wellman (1996) and (2009) 
95 Buchanan (2002) 707-8 
96 Renzo (2011)  
97 Estlund (2009) and Kolodny (2014a) and (2014b), for instance, both present their 
defences of democracy as including a defence of the legitimacy of democratic states (though 
both are also supposed to establish the authority of democratic decisions). (They both use 
the term ‘legitimacy’ in roughly the same way as I do.)  
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might ask why, or whether, a decision’s being made democratically gives anyone a 
reason to implement or comply with it. Answering neither of these questions 
amounts to justifying a democratic state (supposing we understand ‘state’ as I 
proposed to in the introduction, where a necessary condition for statehood is its 
claiming, and exercising to a reasonable extent, an exclusive right to enforce over 
some population). Democratic institutions need not be states. Democratic decision 
procedures could in principle be followed without any enforcement whatsoever. 
We might well have reason to create (or maintain) democratic institutions or to 
implement or comply with democratic decisions independent of anyone’s having 
any reason to enforce compliance with democratic decisions. Thus, a justification of 
democracy might answer one of these other questions, without giving any 
argument for the legitimacy of democratic states. 
Many, though, who seek to justify democracy do wish to show that democratic 
states are legitimate.98 We can crudely divide justifications of democracy into two 
kinds: outcome-oriented and procedural. Not all accounts will fit neatly into one of 
these categories. I do not have space to go into the details of all the available 
justifications of democracy, but I think some sort of hybrid of the comments I will 
make about each variety of justification will apply to other forms. Outcome-
oriented accounts attempt to justify democracy (answer any or all of the three 
questions distinguished above) by appeal to some feature of the outputs of 
democratic decision procedures. They might argue, for instance, that democracy 
is justified because it tends to produce the morally best, or just, decisions, or 
because it produces decisions that correspond in the right way to the preferences 
of those subject to the decisions, or because it produces decisions that people are 
likely to accept, and so on.99 Procedural accounts attempt to justify democracy by 
appeal to intrinsic features of democratic decision procedures themselves. They 
might argue, for instance, that democratic decision procedures are essential to 
social equality, or to achieving equal opportunity for political activity, or that 
non-democratic procedures (or the failure to follow democratic procedures) 
express a negative judgment about some, and so on.100  
I think that outcome-oriented justifications of democracy, when considered as 
arguments for the legitimacy of democratic states, have the same kind of form as 
                                                          
98 For a view that, on the contrary, separates democratic provenance and legitimacy (in 
my sense), see Stemplowska and Swift (2018). 
99 There are some clear examples of outcome-oriented arguments in, for example, Mill 
(2015) 180-405 and Arneson (2002). 
100 Two examples of clearly procedural arguments: Singer (1973) and Kolodny (2014a) 
and (2014b). 
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the arguments discussed in the previous section. They claim that using 
democratic decision procedures is the only, or the best, way of producing some 
morally desirable outcome. If the relevant outcome is sufficiently important, this 
will be enough to show that we ought to want democratic institutions, or that we 
ought to use democratic decision procedures. It does not yet give us any reason to 
want a democratic state, since democratic decision procedures could be used 
without a state. If we add the claim that an exclusive enforcer, of a democratic 
kind, is necessary for the desirable outcome in question (or the best way of 
producing it), we have the same kind of argument as discussed above. This will 
only support the claim that a particular democratic state is legitimate if it is 
claimed that only through this particular democratic state’s exclusive enforcement 
can the desirable outcome in question be produced (or that it is the best feasible 
way of producing it). 
Procedural justifications of democracy, on the other hand, do not provide an 
answer to a legitimacy anarchist. They should rather, I think, be understood as 
defending a necessary condition for state legitimacy. (That is, they should be 
understood this way if they are understood as addressing the legitimacy question, 
and not just the institutional question or the authority question). Procedural 
arguments claim that democratic decision procedures are necessary for something 
of moral value, or to avoid violation of certain moral constraints. In Kolodny’s 
account, for example, democracy is held to be necessary for legitimacy (as well as 
desirable and authoritative) because it is necessary for avoiding relations of social 
superiority and inferiority in society. A state, however, is not necessary for 
democratic procedures to be followed, and so this does not in itself give us a 
reason to desire a democratic state, or to think that such a state is legitimate. A 
procedural argument may give us reason to think that only democratic states can 
be legitimate, but it will not in itself support the view that any states are 
legitimate. Again, it could be thought to establish legitimacy because something 
like the above argument is assumed. That is, it might be assumed that the 
existence of a state is the only feasible way of achieving the procedural value of 
democracy or some other morally important good. But to show that any particular 
state is legitimate, this would need to be the claim that that state’s exclusive 
enforcement is the only (or the best) feasible way of achieving the relevant moral 
value or requirement.101 
                                                          
101 One of the most sophisticated and influential justifications of democracy, Estlund 
(2009), combines outcome-oriented and procedural elements, but it similarly offers an 
argument for the legitimacy of particular democratic states only on the assumption that 
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3. Consent arguments 
The other main family of explicit arguments for state legitimacy are based on 
consent. If the subjects of a state consent to its exclusive enforcement power over 
them, it may be plausible to think, then whatever moral presumption there is 
against state legitimacy is defeated.102 However, I think that none of the available 
consent arguments can show that actual existing states are legitimate, that is, 
none can defeat the (a posteriori) legitimacy anarchist.  
The classical consent argument is the Lockean one.103 This is an actual consent 
argument: it is argued that certain existing states are legitimate thanks to the 
actual consent they receive from their subjects. This view makes legitimacy 
individualised: states are legitimate with respect to those subjects who do consent 
and not with respect to those who do not. Since no state receives the explicit 
consent of many of its subjects, Locke demanded instead tacit consent. Tacit 
consent, he thinks, can be given by, for instance, using the roads a state provides, 
or simply remaining within the state’s territory.104 However, the problems with 
such an argument are familiar. As Hume famously pointed out, subjects of a state 
rarely have any realistic alternative to remaining in their state, and an action 
cannot plausibly count as valid consent if there is no realistic alternative to it.105 I 
will not rehearse the details of this debate, but it is, I think, widely accepted that 
there are no actually existing states whose legitimacy can straightforwardly be 
grounded in universal actual consent: the kind of actions that count as valid 
consent are not performed by many, let alone all, of the citizens of any existing 
states.106 
Robert Nozick offers a more sophisticated form of consent argument.107 He argues 
that a state could emerge from a state of nature without any violations of rights 
(and would be likely to emerge if inhabitants of the state of nature are acting 
rationally). It is somewhat obscure what exactly the methodological import of this 
argument is supposed to be. On the face of it, the fact that a state could emerge 
                                                                                                                                                   
state enforcement is necessary for some reason. Estlund’s qualified judges could reasonably 
reject the exclusive enforcement of a democratic decision procedure if it were possible (and 
feasible) to establish and make effective a democratic decision procedure with the same 
epistemic and procedural qualities without state enforcement. 
102 This is not uncontroversial, but we can suppose for the sake of argument that this 
much is true. 
103 Locke (1980) ch. 8.  
104 Ibid. s. 119 
105 Hume (1994) 193 
106 Simmons (1991) defends a version of this basic Lockean consent argument, but is 
comfortable with the anarchistic consequences. 
107 Nozick (1974) 
73 
 
without rights violations offers no argument at all for the legitimacy of any actual 
state (nor for political obligation in any actual state). However, Jonathan Wolff 
suggests what seems like the strongest interpretation of this argument, which 
shows how Nozick’s hypothetical story can be relevant to actual states that did 
not emerge in this way.108 According to him, Nozick’s argument proceeds in two 
steps. The first step involves showing that rational people have good reason to 
consider themselves bound to the state, and thus, that they should consent to its 
rule and enforcement. This is done by showing that the existence of the state is a 
good thing (in other words, it is justified). Nozick’s approach to doing this is to 
show that something like a state (a dominant protection agency) would emerge as 
a result of people’s rational free action in the state of nature. Of course, 
considerations like those above suggest that the fact that the existence of a state is 
better than the state of nature is not sufficient to show that one ought to consent 
to one’s particular state.  
But it is the second step of Nozick’s argument that is most important for our 
purposes. This step aims to ‘show that even those who fail to be convinced by the 
argument for the state are, nevertheless, still morally bound to obey it, and 
therefore forcing their obedience violates no rights’.109 It is this step that, if 
successful, will show that states (at least, those of a certain kind) have a general 
and exclusive permission to enforce even where their subjects have not consented to 
their doing so. The argument for this step is intricate, and I do not have space to 
go fully into its detail. But to sum up roughly what is important for our purposes, 
the argument is that when a dominant protection agency emerges from the state 
of nature, thanks to a large number of people buying its services and consenting 
to its enforcement (Nozick argues that the market for protective services in a 
state of nature is something like a natural monopoly), it comes to be permissible 
for it to determine and enforce what procedures for rights protection even non-
members may use. The reason for this is that it is assumed that everybody has a 
right to protect themselves against infringements of their own rights, and it 
becomes permissible for the dominant protection agency to enforce its members’ 
rights when they consent to its doing so on their behalf. Thus, although non-
members of the dominant agency have a right to enforce their own rights, 
members have a right not to be subjected to an unfair procedure. The dominant 
protection agency thus has a right to protect its members from being subjected to 
an unfair procedure, and so it can permissibly enforce non-members’ using only 
                                                          
108 Wolff (1991) 47-52 
109 Ibid. 51 
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procedures that it deems to be fair. Thus, in effect it ends up with an exclusive and 
general permission to enforce (or to determine who may enforce what).  
However, even if we grant that this shows how a state that has the consent of the 
majority of its subjects can be permitted to enforce its directives even on those 
who do not consent (and grant also that we ought rationally to consent to the 
state), it still does not show that any actual states are legitimate. Even if we all 
ought to consent to our states, it remains the case that very few people actually 
have. No existing states are in fact in the position of a dominant protective 
agency. Unlike the hypothetical dominant protective agency in Nozick’s story, 
actual states have no claim to the self-defence rights of the majority of their 
subjects, because they do not in fact have their consent, and so cannot ground a 
permission to enforce the compliance of non-consenters in a permission to enforce 
the self-defence rights of the majority on their behalf. That the majority would 
consent if rational (or even if asked) is neither here nor there. 
Some interesting, more sophisticated consent-based (or similar) accounts of 
legitimacy have been given more recently in a ‘political realist’ vein, notably by 
John Horton and Amanda Greene.110 Both of these views are presented as accounts 
of legitimacy and I want to take no stand on whether they are plausible as such. It 
may well be that something like the sophisticated consent-based (or similar) 
accounts presented by Horton and Greene is the correct account of the concept of 
legitimacy. My use of the term ‘legitimacy’ was not meant to suggest an attempt to 
give the correct account of the ordinary concept, but was merely stipulative. I 
think that neither of these arguments, though, helps respond to the legitimacy 
anarchist in my sense, that is, the denier of existing states’ possession of a general 
and exclusive moral permission to enforce.  
Horton does seem to present his argument as including an argument for the 
permission to enforce. He holds roughly that states are legitimate if and only if 
they meet the criteria that their subjects hold to be relevant for legitimacy.111 
Although he denies that his account is a consent account (since what makes states 
                                                          
110 Horton (2012) and Greene (2016). Williams’s (2005) ‘basic legitimation demand’ is 
quite similar to these accounts, although it is unclear to me whether meeting it is 
supposed to be sufficient for legitimacy, and whether legitimacy is understood in anything 
like my sense (for this reason I focus on Horton and Greene). As Estlund (2017c) points 
out, once we distinguish it from ‘the obvious fact that obstacles are obstacles and cannot 
be ignored’ (the idea that it is pragmatically necessary for a political order to make sense to 
its subjects), it is somewhat unclear what reason there is to suppose that the legitimacy, in 
my sense, of a political order ‘is nothing but its de facto acceptability to whatever freely 
formed points of view are extant, however morally bad they might be’ (375). (This 
objection will apply also to Horton, if not to Greene.) 
111 Horton (2012) 141-2 
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legitimate is not the fact that their subjects consent, but their meeting the criteria 
the subjects consider relevant), on the most natural reading, like consent theories, 
his account seems to have the consequence that no actual states will be legitimate 
(at least not generally so). This is because, almost inevitably, in actual states the 
criteria that people hold to be relevant to legitimacy vary, and existing states are 
not likely to meet them all. States may, then, be legitimate with respect to some of 
their subjects, but their universal claims to legitimacy with respect to all their 
subjects will not be vindicated.  
Unlike Horton, Greene does not obviously present her account as offering the 
grounds for permissible state enforcement. Thus, it need not be to disagree with 
her to state that it does not provide these. The account of legitimacy she gives 
(which she calls the ‘sovereignty conception’) is a form of consent account, which 
holds that a regime is legitimate insofar as it achieves actual quality consent to 
rule based on positive governance assessments from a sufficient proportion of its 
population, where ‘quality consent’ is consent that meets certain conditions (the 
details of which I will not go into). On her account, then, for a state to be 
legitimate with respect to all its subjects, it is sufficient for it to have the consent 
of a certain proportion of its subjects. Her account ‘construes legitimacy as a 
feature of a regime with respect to its subjects collectively. To whatever degree a 
regime is legitimate, its legitimacy applies equally to all the subjects, whether or 
not each has consented in her individual case’.112  
Horton does not in fact seem to think that his account has the consequence that 
existing states are not legitimate (or are only legitimate with respect to some, but 
not all, of their subjects), suggesting that a different reading is appropriate. I 
suspect that he in fact holds something similar to Greene, that in order to be 
legitimate with respect to all of its subjects, the state just needs to meet the 
criteria held to be relevant by most of its subjects, or something like that. Greene’s 
motivation for making legitimacy depend on proportional consent is the idea that 
an account of legitimacy should not lead us to the conclusion that legitimacy is 
‘virtually unattainable’.113 Horton similarly contends that we should take the 
existence of modern states for given and ‘seek to explain how political legitimacy 
is possible’.114 This may be an appropriate constraint on an account of legitimacy, 
but it is obviously not an appropriate constraint on an argument against the 
legitimacy anarchist. In this latter context, it would simply be to beg the question. 
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113 Ibid. 80 
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The claim of my thesis is that the legitimacy anarchist ought to be taken 
seriously, and we cannot deny this simply by saying that an account of what is 
necessary to establish a general and exclusive permission to enforce should not 
have the consequence that no existing states have such a permission (since that is 
just to assume that the legitimacy anarchist is wrong).  
Horton asserts, though, that 
There is … a perfectly straightforward and unobjectionable sense in which we 
can describe living in a political society as “natural”; and by this I mean no more 
than that we know of no viable long-term way in which human beings in general 
can live valuable and worthwhile lives, whatever exactly a worthwhile life is 
taken to be, outside of a political society.115   
It is, of course, true in one sense that we ‘know’ of no such thing: we have not 
experienced (nor do we have any record of) a ‘viable long-term way in which 
human beings in general can live valuable and worthwhile lives … outside of a 
political society’. But in the same sense we do not know of a viable way to live in a 
complex modern society without patriarchy, or in a globalised world without 
famine, and so on. Just the fact that all societies of the relevant type that we have 
experience of have been characterised by (for example) patriarchy doesn’t mean 
that this is something we must take as given and that is not apt for our moral 
criticism. If instead we should understand ‘we know of no viable …’ as meaning 
‘we cannot imagine human beings living long-term valuable and worthwhile lives 
outside of political society’ the claim must surely be false. It is possible to imagine 
a world in which, for example, people coordinate their action by a set of rules that 
they observe spontaneously without the coercion of any state (and in the strict, 
metaphysical, sense at least, such a world is not impossible). We may not know 
how to bring about such a world, but that is a different question. We similarly do 
not know how to bring about a world without patriarchy, or famine, but we are in 
no doubt that these are apt targets of our moral criticism. We cannot simply rule 
out the possibility of a certain type of practice or institution failing to meet our 
moral standards on the basis of its ubiquity. What Horton might claim instead is 
that a functioning social community of the sort that could make human life 
valuable and worthwhile cannot feasibly be achieved without political relations (or 
without exclusive enforcement). Then, again, we get a feasibility-based argument 
against legitimacy anarchism. This is the sort of argument about which my 
account of feasibility will raise some questions.  
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C. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the two most prominent families of arguments 
for state legitimacy can only successfully establish the legitimacy of any existing 
states with the aid of premises about feasibility. One family of arguments (some 
form of which I think underlies the common implicit assumption that state 
legitimacy is on safe ground, and other forms of which are found in a number of 
explicit defences of legitimacy) argues from the idea that the state’s exclusive 
enforcement is necessary for some good. It cannot plausibly be claimed, though, 
that the goods (or good states of affairs) in question make state enforcement 
strictly necessary, but the arguments can be made by arguing that it is the only 
feasible way of achieving something good, or the best. Another family of 
arguments is based on the consent of the state’s subjects, but these cannot 
plausibly ground the legitimacy of actual states (except perhaps with the aid of 
another feasibility-based argument). 
Given the dependence of these arguments on feasibility, it will be worth having 
some understanding of that concept, and the account I will give in chapter 5 will 
cast some doubt on whether these arguments can be taken for granted. However, 
there is another family of views that I have not yet discussed, which, unlike those 
above, hold that the legitimacy of a certain kind of state can be established a 
priori, that is, independently of any empirical considerations (and so, a fortiori, 
independently of any feasibility considerations). These arguments are, in a way, 
similar to the primary kind discussed in this chapter: they too argue that the 
state’s exclusive enforcement is necessary for something of moral importance. 
However, the arguments above cannot plausibly be understood as claiming that it 
is strictly impossible for the relevant good to be achieved, or for things to be good 
in the relevant way, without state enforcement: the claim is better understood as a 
feasibility claim. These a priori arguments, though, claim that there is something 
of great moral importance that could not possibly be achieved without the state’s 
exclusive enforcement, and this can be known a priori (it is not a result of 
empirical facts about the world we live in). These sorts of argument will be the 
subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 3:  
The a priori Kantian argument 
 
It is quite natural and common to think that state enforcement is justified and 
permitted in response to the unfortunate circumstances in which we find 
ourselves, and the arguments discussed in the previous chapter can be understood 
along these lines. Human frailty and material scarcity combine to make state 
enforcement necessary for worthwhile human life in society. James Madison put 
this thought succinctly: ‘if men were angels, no government would be 
necessary’.116 However, as already mentioned, there is an opposing tradition that 
holds that state enforcement is justified and permitted a priori. However morally 
good human beings are, and whatever empirical conditions they find themselves 
in, the existence of an exclusive enforcer is necessary for something of great 
moral importance (and thus an exclusive enforcer that meets certain conditions is 
justified and permitted to exist). The first part of this thesis argues that feasibility 
considerations are essential to establish state legitimacy. It is thus particularly 
important to look at these a priori arguments for state legitimacy, since they deny 
precisely this. In this chapter and the next, I will argue that two different kinds of 
a priori argument both fail in their aim to establish the legitimacy of a certain 
kind of state without any feasibility premises.117 In this chapter, I will look at an 
argument that Arthur Ripstein offers as an interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of 
Right, and in the next, I will look at two similar arguments, one of which is also 
offered as an interpretation of the Doctrine of Right and the other of which is given 
in a recent book by Philip Pettit.118 
                                                          
116 Madison (1990) 267 
117 There is a kind of argument that comes close to claiming that state enforcement is 
necessary a priori for something of moral importance (in this case, the resolution of 
conflicts and competing judgments), but does not quite. This is the argument that even 
morally perfect people may still need state enforcement, made by Gregory Kavka (1996) 
and (in passing) David Estlund (2016). They argue that there may still be sources of 
disagreement and conflict even among a society of morally perfect people: in Estlund’s 
example, it may be morally permissible to go as far as violence to procure the one 
remaining dose of medicine to save one’s parent’s life (2016, 308-9). Thus, the thought 
goes, an exclusive enforcer may be necessary to prevent violent conflict even for morally 
perfect people. However, as Estlund points out, this is not to claim that the need for state 
enforcement is a priori. There is a possible ‘arrangement of moral motives’ that resolves 
these conflicts without state enforcement, and indeed, there is a possible world where no 
such conflicts arise. Moral perfection, though, is not sufficient to guarantee either of these 
things. This does not show that state enforcement is necessary independent of feasibility 
considerations, since if it were feasible to eliminate all of the sources of conflict, for 
instance, then state enforcement would clearly not be necessary. 
118 Kant (1999); Ripstein (2009); Pallikkathayil (2017); Pettit (2012). 
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1. The Kantian argument 
On a Kantian view, justification, obligating power and legitimacy all come 
together from one comprehensive argument. This need not be to say that the 
Kantian view denies any distinction between the three concepts (although it may 
be that it does, and it is certainly true that Kant does not attempt clearly to 
separate them out). It is rather to say just that there is one big argument at the 
centre of Kantian political philosophy that, if successful, establishes all three. My 
aim will be to argue that even if we accept the core of the Kantian argument, and 
that justification and obligation follow from it, legitimacy could only do so with 
the addition of certain feasibility premises: the Kantian hope for a wholly a priori 
argument from freedom is not met. 
In this chapter, I will address the interpretation of the Kantian argument given by 
Arthur Ripstein in his recent book Force and Freedom.119 In the next chapter, I will 
address Japa Pallikkathayil’s interpretation of Kant, which understands the 
argument for legitimacy differently.120 Both present their arguments as exegeses 
of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, so if either is right, I will also be addressing Kant’s 
own argument. I will not attempt to assess the exegetical claims of either. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will suppose that Ripstein is right in his exegesis, and I 
will not distinguish between his and Kant’s arguments. I will begin by setting out 
what I take to be the core of the Kantian argument and I will explain how 
justification and obligation are supposed to follow from it. In the next section I 
will consider what resources the argument has to establish legitimacy and I will 
argue that it requires the claim that enforcement is necessary for a rightful 
condition, which it cannot establish a priori. In the final section, I will argue that 
not only does the Kantian argument fail to establish legitimacy a priori, but to 
establish the legitimacy of actual states it requires, like the arguments discussed 
in the previous chapter, the kind of feasibility premises that cannot be thought to 
be obviously constraints on moral argument. 
2. The core  
Kant’s argument (as presented by Ripstein) begins from the premise of an innate 
right to freedom as independence. Right, Kant thinks, is about the external formal 
relations between people’s choices. It is about the requirements imposed on us by 
the external relations of our choices with those of others. It is not concerned with 
the ‘matter’ or motive of choice (what we choose to do, what ends we choose to 
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120 Pallikkathayil (2017) 
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set), but merely its form: how our external actions impact on the freedom of choice 
of others and so, how the external freedom of all can be made consistent. This 
gives us (analytically) the Universal Principle of Right (UPR): ‘Any action is right 
if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if 
on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law’.121 The idea of freedom in question is that of 
independence. We are free, in this sense, so long as we are not subject, in our 
purposive activity, to the choices or ends of others: thus, to be free is to have the 
capacity to set and pursue one’s own ends.122 If others set ends for us, then we are 
not independent of them in the relevant sense. This innate right to freedom, Kant 
and Ripstein think, extends automatically to our own bodies, since it is by means 
of these that we act in the world. The innate right to freedom, however, does not 
immediately give anyone a right to anything beyond their own body. When we 
are in physical possession of an external object (e.g. when we are gripping it), our 
innate right forbids others from removing it from us. (By removing the apple 
from your hand, I would interfere with your purposiveness, and use you for my 
end.) However, this does not give us any right to external objects beyond when 
we are in physical possession of them; that is, it is not possible on the basis of 
innate right alone for external objects to remain ours even when they are not in 
physical contact with us. It is an analytic requirement of a property right, though, 
Kant thinks, that it extend beyond physical possession: ‘something external is 
mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not 
in possession of it’.123 Thus, we cannot get property rights on the basis of innate 
right alone. 
Through an obscure argument, Kant argues that UPR, the external freedom of 
all, requires a system of private property, exclusive rights to external objects 
beyond physical possession. Thus, a universal system of freedom demands 
something that respect for innate right on its own is not able to provide. Our 
individual freedom requires us to be able to have ‘intelligible possession’ (that is, 
possession that persists when the object is not in physical possession) of external 
objects. However, we do not have any rights to external objects that extend 
beyond our physical possession simply in virtue of our innate right to freedom 
consistent with a universal system of freedom. Thus, a full system of freedom 
consistent with a universal law requires ‘acquired rights’.  
                                                          
121 Kant (1999) 6:230 (In referencing Kant, I give page numbers of the standard German 
edition.) 
122 Ripstein (2009) 15 
123 Kant (1999) 6:249 
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But how are acquired rights possible? Kant’s answer is that acquired right is only 
possible in a ‘rightful condition’. Rights to external objects can be acquired simply 
by taking control of the objects, but these rights can only be provisional (meaning 
they cannot be enforceable or obligating) outside of a rightful condition. A 
rightful condition is one in which there is an omnilateral legislative will that makes 
determinate a system of private acquired right, and so makes possible a situation 
in which an individual’s appropriation of external objects does not subject others 
to the individual’s unilateral will. It is not just a contingent empirical fact that a 
rightful condition is needed in order for there to be a system of acquired property 
rights; it is a conceptual entailment, the idea of a system of private right without a 
rightful condition is ‘morally incoherent from the standpoint of rights’.124 
Without omnilateral law, acquisition of external objects is merely a unilateral 
imposition and so creates no claim of right, but private property rights are 
necessary for universal freedom, i.e., for right.  
Thus, since UPR is the basis of right and obligation, and since UPR requires 
there to be a system of acquired property rights, we are under an obligation to 
create and enter a condition of right. Since a system of equal freedom allows you 
to coerce others to prevent them from coercing you (restricting your freedom), 
and since a condition of right is necessary for the achievement of a system of equal 
freedom, you have the right to coerce others to enter into a rightful condition 
with you. That is, it is permissible to use coercion to establish a legislative (and 
also, Kant thinks, executive and judicial) authority. If you made and enforced laws 
on me unilaterally you would be interfering with my freedom as independence, 
you would be making yourself my master, by subjecting my capacity to set and 
pursue my own ends to your unilateral will. However, if laws are given 
omnilaterally, that is, in the name of all, they do not make me subject to the will of 
another. Ripstein argues that this should be understood in terms of the state 
making arrangements for its citizens. In a rightful condition, public officials can be 
understood not as acting for their own private purposes, but as being empowered 
to act for others (for the people as a whole). A unilateral will always has a 
particular end, while the omnilateral will ‘only acts to preserve the formal 
conditions through which people can rule themselves’.125 This gives rise to the 
‘principle of public right’, which is the principle that ‘the sovereign may not give a 
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people laws that it could not give to itself, and its corollary that the people must 
give to itself laws that are the preconditions of its own continued lawgiving’.126 
The above is a very brief summary of Ripstein’s Kantian argument. We can see 
straightforwardly how this can be considered a justification of the state (or of an 
omnilateral lawgiver). If a rightful condition must be a condition of living in a 
state, it is a good thing that there is a state because the existence of a rightful 
condition is a necessary precondition of a system of universal freedom, which is 
the basic requirement of right. Furthermore, not only is it morally permissible to 
create a state, it is morally obligatory to do so. It also follows from this argument 
that people have certain obligations towards rightful states (or lawgivers). As we 
saw, it is morally obligatory to create and enter a condition of right. Further, the 
rightful laws made in a condition of right make determinate the obligation to 
respect the rights of others (UPR), and they do this by establishing an omnilateral 
system of property rights. When there is a condition of right, what is required by 
UPR is that we obey its laws. (The property laws made by the omnilateral 
lawgiver do not generate new obligations, but give content to an already existing 
one.) I will turn below to the question why we might think legitimacy follows 
from the core of the Kantian argument expounded above. 
Kant’s argument is one that, if successful, would not make legitimacy (or 
obligation or justification) depend on any feasibility claims. Kant thinks the whole 
argument can and must be made a priori, without appeal to empirical or ‘material’ 
premises. The whole argument is supposed to follow a priori from the idea that 
everyone has a right to be her own master, i.e., to freedom.127 Law and coercion 
are morally required ‘however well disposed and law-abiding human beings might 
be’.128 That is, they are not required merely as the best feasible option given the 
violent and conflictual tendencies of human beings. Property rights in external 
objects cannot be made binding unilaterally, and so for them to exist there must 
be an omnilateral lawgiver. This follows conceptually from the idea of right; it is 
not just empirical facts that make this true. Thus, on the Kantian view, obligation 
and legitimacy do not depend on the state’s being the best feasible alternative, but 
simply on its securing a rightful condition.  
                                                          
126 Ibid. 25 
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128 Kant (1999) 6:312 
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3. The assurance argument 
I think there are good reasons to doubt the success of the core argument 
described above that I do not have space to go into here,129 but I want to set aside 
these doubts and suggest that even if we accept the core of the Kantian argument 
and we accept that states’ obligating power follows from it, the exclusive right to 
enforce does not. What we have seen so far is an argument for the claim that the 
imposition of a single set of binding laws is necessary for the existence of a 
rightful condition, and so it is obligatory to create one. All this gives us is the 
claim that it is permissible for the state (or some similar agency) to create binding 
laws, i.e., to create a rightful condition, since if it is obligatory to create one it 
must be permissible to do so. (This is really a combination of the permission to 
create laws and the power to make laws that are binding.) However, it does not 
follow from this that the state is permitted to enforce those laws. Yet it seems that 
Ripstein and Kant think not only that a system of omnilateral law is necessary for 
right, but also that an exclusive enforcer (a state) is too. Ripstein talks of the 
necessity of a system of ‘public enforcement’ and Kant of the necessity of a 
‘common and powerful will’.130 It sounds as though what they are talking about is 
a single, exclusive enforcer (perhaps identical to the omnilateral lawgiver). How, 
then, does the state get this permission to enforce, i.e., legitimacy? 
I think that the beginnings of a Kantian answer come simply from the claim that 
the authorisation to coerce is just the flipside of a right. Kant says that coercion 
that is ‘a hindrance of a hindrance to freedom’ ‘is consistent with freedom in 
accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is connected with 
right by the principle of contradiction an authorisation to coerce someone who 
infringes upon it’.131 A right is what is allowed by freedom in accordance with 
universal laws. Anything that is ‘a hindrance of a hindrance to freedom’, Kant 
thinks, is therefore allowed by right. Any interference with right, then, can be 
coercively prevented by right.  
So, if the state establishes a system of law that is a system of public right (that is, 
it establishes a system of property rights that creates a rightful condition), then it 
is automatically permissible for the state to enforce these laws, since by doing so 
                                                          
129 The core argument is only as strong as the argument that a system of property rights 
is necessary for universal freedom. A.J. Julius (2017) powerfully argues that this latter 
argument is unsuccessful. If he is right, no more would be necessary to show that the 
Kantian argument cannot establish legitimacy, but I do not have space to go into Julius’s 
reasoning here, and so I will set aside such doubts. There are other powerful challenges to 
the core in Sangiovanni (2012) and Valentini (2012c). 
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131 Kant (1999) 6:231 
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they would merely be enforcing right and right is necessarily enforceable. 
However, it is permissible for anyone to hinder hindrances to freedom, to 
coercively enforce right. The question arises, then, how the state gets the exclusive 
right to enforce its laws. That is, how does the state get the right to be the only 
enforcer of public right and to coercively prevent others from using coercion to do 
the same? Whatever gives the state the exclusive right to create authoritative 
laws does not automatically also give it the exclusive right to coerce.  
One answer we might be tempted to give is that an exclusive enforcer is necessary 
for the system of laws to be effective. The state is permitted to set itself up as an 
exclusive enforcer because it needs to do so in order for its system of laws to be 
adhered to and so for rights to be respected. However, this cannot be the Kantian 
answer because it depends on a contingent empirical feasibility fact. It is not true 
a priori that a system of laws can only be effective when enforced by a single 
enforcer. There is no (non-empirical) reason that there could not be a society of 
angels who obey a single dominant system of rules without their doing so being 
enforced, or a society where multiple enforcers all agree to (and do) enforce a 
single system of rules without any higher enforcer ensuring that they do. If you 
think law is necessarily coercive, then you will not want to call such a system of 
rules a system of law, but it could be just as effective at creating a condition of 
right if universally obeyed.  
I think the answer to this problem that we find in Ripstein (and, by extension, if 
he is right, Kant) is that rights are not in fact enforceable (and therefore there are 
no rights) unless we have public assurance of the compliance of others.132 If it is 
true that assurance is necessary for there to be enforceable rights, and 
enforcement is necessary for assurance, then we have an argument for the 
necessity of the enforcement of rights for a rightful condition. This is not quite 
yet what we need. It might be thought, in addition, though, that a single exclusive 
enforcer of rights is necessary for there to be public assurance of compliance. If 
enforcement is necessary for assurance at all then this is presumably because, 
when a system of rules is set up, the only way that we can be sure that it will be 
universally complied with is if compliance is enforced. If there are multiple 
enforcers, the situation is no different to how it would be if there were no 
enforcers. If we cannot have assurance that people will comply with a single 
system of rules with no enforcement, then we similarly cannot have assurance 
that multiple enforcers will all comply with (enforce) a single set of rules. Thus, if 
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enforcement is necessary at all, a single supreme enforcer who can enforce the 
compliance of any other secondary enforcers will be necessary.  
Why, though, think that assurance is necessary for a condition of right in the first 
place? Ripstein’s answer is that there in fact is no obligation, and so no right, if 
there is no assurance of the compliance of others. The duties imposed by right are 
conditional on the conduct of others because ‘all obligations of right must be 
within a system of right “in accordance with universal law”’.133 If you have no 
assurance that I will comply with the system of right and so respect your 
property, you have no obligation to respect my property and so I cannot coerce 
you to respect my property: ‘if either of us refrains from taking what belongs to 
the other without assurance, we restrict our choice on the basis of the other’s 
particular choice, rather than in accordance with a universal law’.134 In general if 
people have no assurance, they have no obligation and so cannot permissibly be 
coerced; we do not have a condition of right. Thus, if the existence of a single 
supreme enforcer (a state) is a necessary part of there being assurance, and there 
being assurance is a necessary part of a condition of right, then the state must 
have an exclusive right to enforce its laws, since there being an exclusive enforcer 
is an essential part of a system of universal freedom. 
Let us grant (for the sake of argument) that the above arguments are sound. 
Suppose that assurance is a necessary part of a condition of right and suppose that 
if enforcement is necessary for assurance, then a single exclusive enforcer is 
necessary for assurance. However, again Kant needs the premise that enforcement 
is necessary for a condition of right or, more specifically, for assurance. What I 
cannot see is that Kant is entitled to this claim at all, without bringing in 
contingent empirical feasibility claims. How is it that coercive enforcement 
provides assurance in the first place? The answer must be that it creates certain 
expectations about how people will behave. Given what we know about human 
preferences, when the state coercively enforces certain property rights, we come 
to expect most people not to interfere with those rights because we expect them to 
prefer avoidance of the punishment to whatever benefit could be gained by 
infringing the right.135 With the exception of certain special cases, coercive 
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135 In some cases, coercive enforcement might consist not in threatening punishment, but 
in making infringement physically impossible (or hard). This is not the usual case, though, 
and there is only so much that the state can make impossible. It is hard to imagine a state 
whose system of laws is enforced entirely by making infringement impossible. If the 
Kantian argument could only ground this sort of enforcement, it would fail to ground 
most of what states actually do. 
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enforcement does not guarantee compliance; there is no entailment from one to the 
other.  
With this in mind, it seems that there is no a priori reason that we cannot have 
just the same sort of assurance of respect for a system of rights without 
enforcement; in other words, enforcement is not a priori necessary for assurance. 
There is no a priori reason why it would not be possible for there to be a society 
of angels in which everyone accepts and observes a single set of laws without any 
enforcement. If this was a general practice, we would come to expect people to 
comply with the laws in just the same way we do as a result of enforcement. If 
enforcement is not a priori necessary for assurance at all, then a single exclusive 
enforcer cannot be necessary for assurance. (The argument above that a single 
exclusive enforcer is necessary was premised on enforcement being necessary in 
the first place for us to be sure of general compliance, but we do not have any a 
priori reason to rule out the possibility of this sort of assurance without any 
enforcement whatsoever, let alone without a single exclusive enforcer.) The only 
argument that there seems to be in Ripstein, however, that might establish an 
exclusive permission for a state to enforce its laws and to determine who may wield 
enforcement power in its territory, is this argument under discussion from the 
necessity of assurance for a condition of right. If a single exclusive enforcer (or 
enforcement at all) is not necessary for assurance, then we have no reason to think 
that a single exclusive enforcer is necessary for a condition of right, and no reason 
to think that right requires rightful states (omnilateral lawgivers) to have an 
exclusive permission to enforce.  
Above I accepted without question Ripstein’s argument that assurance is 
necessary for a condition of right because we can have no obligation to respect the 
property of others without assurance that they will also respect ours. In fact, 
however, I have doubts about this argument. If we imagine a situation with 
universal laws legislated by some public omnilateral lawgiving authority but no 
form of assurance of the compliance of others, then it seems to me that if anybody 
in such a situation restricts our choice on the basis of these laws, it is just as much 
in accordance with a universal law as it would be if we had assurance. If you do 
not comply with the law, but I do, in what sense am I restricting my choice on the 
basis of your particular choice? Japa Pallikkathayil expresses similar doubts, 
asking how respecting your rights in the absence of assurance can permit you to 
violate mine.136 She, however, does not deny that there is an assurance problem in 
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the state of nature, making a state with enforcement power necessary for a 
condition of right. Instead, she proposes a slightly different understanding of the 
assurance problem. The problem is not that one cannot have enforceable rights 
without assurance. (Of course, one cannot have enforceable determinate property 
rights, on the Kantian view, without an omnilateral lawgiver, but this problem 
only establishes the need for the lawgiver, not for an enforcer, so we need to 
imagine a scenario in which you have determinate property rights but lack the 
assurance that they will be respected.) Rather, she says, the problem is that 
whatever assurance you can have in the state of nature that one’s property rights 
will be respected must rely on the unilateral will of others.137 So long as my 
assurance that others will respect my property rights relies on the unilateral 
decisions of others to respect them, I am still dependent on their choices, and so 
not free. We do not have a condition of right.  
If the assurance problem is to be understood as Pallikkathayil suggests, then the 
argument I gave above against Ripstein loses traction. Even in a society of angels, 
where we can have extremely good predictive assurance that others will comply 
with a system of rules, we are still dependent on the unilateral choices of these 
others, since they could, counterfactually, choose not to comply. There is nothing 
to stop them. The same is true in a society of multiple enforcers. If we understand 
the assurance problem in this way, we get a different argument for the necessity 
of an exclusive enforcer for universal freedom. Without one, the argument goes, 
however angelic our fellows in fact are, we will always be dependent on their 
choices, since they have the capacity to subject us to their ends. I will address this 
argument and one by Philip Pettit which it very closely resembles in the next 
chapter. The lesson for now will be that Ripstein has no apparent a priori 
argument for a state’s exclusive permission to enforce, unless he turns to this 
counterfactual sort of argument. 
4. What feasibility premise? 
I have shown that Ripstein does not succeed in his aim of providing an a priori 
argument for state legitimacy. The argument he gives does not plausibly succeed 
without the empirical claim that it is not feasible to achieve assurance of the 
compliance of others without an exclusive enforcer. There is no a priori reason 
why there could not be just the same sort of assurance without an exclusive 
enforcer, but it may well be infeasible (empirically) to achieve this. Since it is such 
a feasibility claim that most plausibly would allow this argument to go through, I 
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think this also supports my claim that plausible arguments for state legitimacy 
depend on feasibility premises. However, it could be thought that it is so robustly 
infeasible to achieve assurance without an exclusive enforcer that the above 
should be treated as, for all intents and purposes, an impossibility claim. In chapter 
2 we looked at an argument that depended on the claim that it is not feasible to 
establish a dominant set of rules in a society that are universally adhered to 
except by exclusive enforcement. There, similarly, we considered the objection 
that worlds in which a dominant set of rules are established in a society without 
exclusive enforcement are so distant that this claim should be treated as an 
impossibility claim, as a straightforward constraint on moral requirement: the 
worlds in which it is not true are just too distant to be relevant to moral 
permissibility. There, I accepted this for the sake of argument and argued that the 
argument’s success relies also on feasibility premises that cannot plausibly be 
thought to be of this sort. 
The same is true here. The success of Ripstein’s argument in establishing 
legitimacy for at least some actual states depends not only on the premise that it 
is not feasible to achieve assurance of the compliance of others without an 
exclusive enforcer, but also on the premise that it is not feasible to achieve 
assurance without the exclusive enforcement of the particular state in question. We 
noted in the introduction the importance of particularising the permission to 
enforce. It will not do to show that some state is permitted to be an exclusive 
enforcer, since this will only show that it is possible for states to be legitimate, not 
that any actual states are. Rather, we need to be able to show that some particular 
state is permitted to be an exclusive enforcer. In order to do this, we would need 
to show that this particular state’s exclusive enforcement is necessary for 
assurance (or it is not feasible without it).  
In general, that fulfilling some task is necessary to solve some weighty moral 
problem is not, intuitively at least, enough to show that it is permissible for any 
particular agent to fulfil that task. It may be that there are many agents capable of 
fulfilling a task, and it could be that some of them are not permitted to fulfil the 
task precisely because their doing so would prevent others from fulfilling the task. 
Some of the capable agents could have a claim not to be prevented from fulfilling 
the task because of some personal connection of theirs to it, or because they would 
fulfil the task better. For example, suppose that I am in a bad mood and there are a 
number of people in a position to lift my spirits by taking me out to dinner, 
including Alex and Brian. Despite this, it could be that Alex would in fact be 
doing something wrong by taking me out to dinner, because he would thereby be 
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preventing Brian from doing so. Perhaps Brian has a special claim to fulfil this 
task because he is my partner, or perhaps Brian would simply be better at lifting 
my spirits. Analogously, I think, the fact that a state is fulfilling some necessary 
task for the society over which it governs and that its acting as supreme enforcer 
is necessary to the fulfilment of this task is not yet enough to show that it has an 
exclusive right to enforce. By doing so it is preventing other agents or 
institutions from fulfilling the task in question. It could be that some other agent 
or institution has a special claim on this task or that some other agent or 
institution would perform this task much better.  
The argument for the permissibility of enforcing rightful laws does not simply 
appeal to the necessity of this task, but rather to the analytic enforceability of 
right. The fact that a state establishes a rightful condition is enough to show that 
its laws can be enforced. However, the argument for the state’s exclusive 
permission to enforce seems to need to appeal to the necessity of exclusive 
enforcement for a particular task: achieving assurance. But it might be that 
another agent or institution has a special claim to establishing assurance of a 
rightful condition or would do so better. Thus, the feasibility premise that 
Ripstein’s argument would need is the strong one that the exclusive enforcement 
of this particular state (the one for which we are trying to establish legitimacy) is 
the only feasible way of achieving assurance of a rightful condition in the given 
circumstances. Again, (as with the arguments discussed in the previous chapter), 
feasibility premises are needed both to show that the state (some state) is 
necessary for right, and to show that any particular state is necessary. Again, the 
feasibility premises required for the latter are less obviously strict constraints on 
moral argument in general.  
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Chapter 4:  
The a priori counterfactual argument 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that one notable attempt to defend the 
legitimacy of a certain kind of state a priori (Ripstein’s Kantian argument) fails in 
its aim. There is no a priori reason to suppose that assurance is only possible with 
the state’s exclusive enforcement. However, we noted that there is a different a 
priori argument available, which Pallikkathayil offers as an alternative 
interpretation of Kant. On this view, the problem with the stateless society is not 
that we lack assurance of the compliance of others, but rather that we are 
counterfactually dependent on the choices of others, since they could choose not to 
respect our rights if they wished to, and this is supposed to be an a priori 
necessary feature of stateless society. Since freedom on the Kantian view is 
independence of the choices of others, this means that unfreedom necessarily 
characterises society without state enforcement.  
Philip Pettit, in his book On the People’s Terms, offers a similar (although not 
identical) argument for the necessity of state enforcement for freedom a priori. 
Pettit takes the problem of political legitimacy (which I think he understands to 
include legitimacy in my sense) to be that of showing that state enforcement (and, 
presumably, the existence of an exclusive enforcer) can be consistent with 
individual freedom. In his book, Pettit makes an empirically informed argument 
that state enforcement can be consistent with freedom, but he also gives an 
argument which purports to show, like the Kantian argument, that state 
enforcement is a priori necessary for freedom. If this can be shown, and if 
respecting freedom is morally required, then state enforcement will be morally 
obligatory a priori (for those in a position to bring it about). And if it is morally 
obligatory, then, a fortiori, it is morally permissible (and if what is necessary is an 
exclusive enforcer, then it is presumably also morally permissible for the state to 
be an exclusive enforcer). (We might question the claim that demonstrating 
legitimacy just amounts to demonstrating the compatibility of state enforcement 
and freedom, or that respecting freedom is morally required, but it seems at the 
very least that a significant step will have been made towards demonstrating 
legitimacy if this can be shown.)  
Like Pallikkathayil’s, Pettit’s argument appeals to the idea that some unfreedom is 
ineliminable from even an ideal stateless society because of the counterfactual 
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capacity of people to interfere in the affairs of others. As mentioned, most of 
Pettit’s extensive and interesting discussion of state legitimacy does not purport 
to be a priori. The argument I am interested in occurs quite briefly towards the 
end of the chapter.138 It is presented by Pettit as showing that the democratic 
state is the source of something good and so is something to be welcomed, not 
merely a remedy for unfortunate (if unavoidable) circumstances. The idea is to 
argue that even in an ideal stateless society (a Kantian kingdom of ends), the 
introduction of a state (an exclusive enforcer) would be an improvement because it 
provides something good that is unavailable without it. The good in question is 
the good of ‘status freedom’.  
One is only truly free, on Pettit’s view, when one has this ‘status freedom’, that is, 
when one has the status of an independent member of society. To be free for 
Pettit is not to be dominated by any other will, where a person, A, is dominated by 
an agent or agency, B, ‘to the extent that B has a power of interfering in [A’s 
choice] that is not itself controlled by A’.139 What matters for A’s freedom as non-
domination is not whether anyone in fact does interfere in her choices, but 
whether anyone has an uncontrolled power to interfere in her choices. Further, 
says Pettit, ‘to enjoy the relevant freedom of non-domination is to be someone 
who commands a certain standing amongst your fellows’.140 To have this kind of 
standing, this equal status, is not to be subject to the uncontrolled power of 
interference of any other. 
Pettit’s argument, then, is that full status freedom would not be achieved in an 
ideal stateless society in a way that it could be achieved with the addition of a 
state. The ideal stateless society, or kingdom of ends, is one populated by morally 
motivated people who, Pettit assumes, are committed to showing respect and 
concern for others.141 This, he says, commits them to not interfering in the basic 
liberties of others and to providing resources required by others’ basic liberties. 
However, even despite this, people’s status freedom would not be fully assured in 
this ideal stateless society: 
Were people moral in the degree imagined, then the more wealthy and powerful 
would be disposed not to interfere with others and not to allow others to go 
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141 Pettit’s argument does not depend on the persistence of conflict among the perfectly 
morally motivated (see footnote 117), so he could also assume that the ideal stateless 
society is one where conflict-generating scarcity is absent. (His conclusion, then, is not 
merely that even the perfectly morally motivated need state enforcement, but the even 
stronger claim that state enforcement is necessary for freedom a priori). 
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without needed resources. But their acting on that disposition would depend on 
their continuing to embrace and abide by the requirements of the assumed 
morality. It would depend … on their displaying a good will rather than a weak 
will or a will to evil. In such a world, therefore, some members would have to 
depend on the goodwill of others for enjoying the basic liberties.142 
Thus, the addition of state enforcement could provide something that could not 
be provided in an ideal stateless society: it could make each member of society 
independent of the will of others. The threat of enforcement, even if not necessary 
to ensure compliance with just laws, guarantees this compliance and removes choice 
about whether to show respect and concern for others. Thus, the addition of a 
state need not change anything about people’s actual behaviour, nor need its 
enforcement involve any actual use of force, but the counterfactual enforcement 
that it establishes gives people a kind of status freedom that they could not have 
before. Thus, if a particular state protects the status freedom, or freedom as non-
domination, of its subjects (and perhaps if it is the only one that could do so in the 
circumstances), then it might be thought that it will be legitimate.        
Both Pettit and Pallikkathayil, then, need to argue that there is a problematic sort 
of unfreedom (dependence on others) that persists even in an ideal stateless 
society (a society of angels, a kingdom of ends) and that can be alleviated by the 
introduction of a state. I will first take note of, and endorse for the most part, 
some arguments recently made by Thomas Simpson. They do not, though, show, 
as they purport to, that republican freedom is impossible, if we understand it as 
status freedom. I then argue that given this understanding of republican freedom, 
and given an assumption of Hobbesian rough natural equality, Pettit is wrong to 
claim that there would be unfreedom in an ideal stateless society made up of 
individuals. However, I then note, if we admit group agents into the ideal stateless 
society (and there is no reason not to), there may be troubling unfreedom in the 
ideal stateless society. But, I argue, the sort of unfreedom that would exist in an 
ideal stateless society with group agents cannot be alleviated by the introduction 
of a state. I then relax the assumption of Hobbesian natural equality and show 
that, although this does have the consequence that there is status unfreedom even 
in the ideal stateless society, again the state can do nothing to alleviate this. 
Finally, I consider a view that takes the sort of freedom that matters not to be 
status freedom, but independence of the unilateral will of others (Pallikkathayil’s 
view). I argue that still the state is no improvement on the ideal stateless society 
in terms of freedom understood thus. 
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1. The possibility of republican freedom 
Thomas Simpson has recently argued that there will always be domination of the 
sort that Pettit is concerned by, and so that republican freedom is impossible.143 He 
argues that it is possible to be dominated by an uncoordinated collection of agents 
who have the uncontrolled power to coordinate to interfere (without forming a 
group agent). However, nobody can protect you from such power except other 
people, who will also have the uncontrolled capacity to coordinate to interfere, 
and so dominate you. As Pettit himself thinks, although the state might protect 
against the sort of domination that there would be in a state of nature, its subjects 
need to be protected from it (so as not to be dominated by it). The only way they 
can be (which Pettit points to) is by the capacity of the people to resist the state. 
But if the people have this capacity, they must also have the uncontrolled power 
to interfere with any individual subject of the state. Thus, although Pettit is right 
(on Simpson’s view) that there will always be domination in a stateless society, no 
matter how ideal, what this misses is that there will always be domination in a 
state society as well. This, if right, provides an easy way to reject Pettit’s a priori 
argument. Though one is inevitably dominated in an ideal stateless society (by 
other individuals and potential collections of individuals), one is also inevitably 
dominated in a state society (either by the state itself or by potential collections of 
other individual subjects of the state) and there is no reason to suppose that the 
domination in a state society is less significant or somehow preferable from the 
point of view of freedom to the domination that there would be in a stateless 
society. I think that Simpson’s argument is right almost all of the way, but I do 
not think it quite establishes its conclusion. I will thus briefly run through what I 
think Simpson gets right, and then explain why his argument will not do to 
answer Pettit’s a priori argument. 
Simpson’s argument is centred around two cases: 
Nearly Coordinated Masters: There are three Masters and a Slave. No Master is 
strong enough alone to interfere with the Slave. If two of them coordinate, they 
can interfere. Master1 is ready to interfere, but Master2 and Master3 are 
benevolent, rejecting the proposed joint intention and not engaging in team 
reasoning. 
Non-Coordinating Masters: As Nearly Coordinated, but all three Masters are 
benevolent.144 
                                                          
143 Simpson (2017). Similar arguments seem like they might well apply to the Kantian sort 
of freedom as independence that Pallikkathayil is interested in. 
144 Ibid. 32 
94 
 
On Pettit’s account, the slave in Nearly is dominated by Master2 and Master3, 
since either has the capacity to bring about interference with the slave at will. 
Simpson argues that the slave in Non is also dominated. In both cases, 
ingratiating himself with the masters is an appropriate strategy for the slave. In 
Non, two masters would need to turn on the slave, not one, but this does not seem 
an important difference: the slave remains dependent on the good graces of the 
masters.  
Pettit, however, might just claim that domination must be a dyadic relation, and 
so there can be no domination in Non. For this reason, Simpson argues that 
polyadic domination is possible. First, he argues that it is possible for collections of 
individuals (groups that do not constitute group agents) to have the power to 
interfere jointly. That such groups can have the power to act jointly is illustrated 
by the case of ‘holidaymakers on a beach, who form a chain to pull a swimmer out 
of difficulty’.145 It would be wrong to say that they do not have the power to 
rescue the swimmer: they have this power together, ‘even though – because the 
chain is not yet formed – no individual does’.146 Further, he argues, when a 
collection of individuals has the joint power to interfere, it is implausible to say 
that it could not be dominating: ‘Interference by a group is just as worrisome, 
perhaps more so, as interference by an individual. A group of agents may be less 
likely to interfere, but it is unclear why their collective capacity to do so at will 
should not compromise my freedom in the same way that an individual’s capacity 
does’.147 We have just the same sorts of reasons to ingratiate ourselves with the 
group that has the collective power to interfere, and so on. I find these arguments 
persuasive: there seems to be no good reason to rule out the possibility of polyadic 
domination. And thus, since if groups of citizens of a state have the power to 
interfere with the state, they must also have the power to interfere with 
individuals, it follows that in a state that is not itself dominating, individuals will 
be polyadically dominated by potential groups of coordinated fellow citizens. 
I think that Simpson is right, then, that domination, conceived simply as the 
capacity to interfere at will (either individually or jointly with others) is 
unavoidable. However, I think that some of what Pettit says suggests that the 
kind of instances of domination that are morally problematic, or that we ought to 
be concerned to eliminate, are only a subset of the instances of domination tout 
court. Thus, I do not think we yet have a reply to the a priori argument, since it 
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might be that the problematic kind of domination is ineliminable from the ideal 
stateless society, but can be remedied by the introduction of a state. We can see 
this way out if we take seriously Pettit’s claim, mentioned above, that ‘to enjoy the 
relevant freedom of non-domination is to be someone who commands a certain 
standing amongst your fellows’.148 This is what is meant by ‘status freedom’. The 
idea, I suppose, is that the status freedom that matters is freedom from subjection 
to asymmetrical domination relations with others. When whatever domination one 
suffers at the hands of others is perfectly matched by exactly equivalent 
domination they suffer at your hands, it seems fair to say that one’s ‘standing’ or 
‘status’ is that of a free person.  
Free persons, those who have status freedom, says Pettit, ‘can walk tall, and look 
others in the eye. They do not depend on anyone’s grace or favour for being able 
to choose their mode of life’.149 This leads to Pettit’s proposal of the ‘eyeball test’ 
for determining how far the basic liberties should be safeguarded: they should be 
protected up to the level where all ‘can look others in the eye without reason for 
the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall 
and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this 
regard with the best’.150 It seems clear that this eyeball test will be met, and all 
members of society will have status freedom in as full a sense as possible when all 
domination or dependence on the good-will of others is fully symmetrical. If, on 
the other hand, you are dominated by another in a way that you cannot match, 
your status is in some sense inferior to theirs and the eyeball test may not be met. 
This, it might be thought, is the true or troubling kind of unfreedom. It is in this 
sense that status freedom is bound up with status equality. For all to have status 
freedom is for there to be status equality. It is only possible for nobody to have 
inferior status if all have equal status. 
If what matters is status freedom, and thus status equality (the absence of 
asymmetrical domination), then it may still be that republican freedom (of the sort 
that matters) is possible. If the only sort of domination present is domination by 
potential coordinated groups among, say, the people who keep checks on the 
power of the state, there will only be troubling (asymmetrical) domination if there 
are differences in people’s capacity to interfere with others. If all individuals had 
equivalent capacities (which is not impossible) domination would be fully 
symmetrical. Though of course A would be dominated polyadically by the 
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potential group of B, C and D in a way that the potential group of B, C and D 
would not be dominated by A, A’s dependence on each individual as part of a 
potential group would be exactly matched by that individual’s dependence on A as 
part of an equivalent potential group involving A. It might be thought, then, that 
the trouble with the ideal stateless society is that it involves asymmetrical 
domination (and Pettit points to the dependence of those with less wealth and 
power on those with more), and that this asymmetrical domination could be 
removed by the introduction of a state. If the state’s capacity to interfere were 
fully controlled by its citizen body, then it could succeed in removing 
asymmetrical domination, since the polyadic domination among members of the 
citizen body need not be asymmetrical. Let us see, then, whether the case can be 
made that there would be asymmetrical domination in the ideal stateless society 
of the sort that a state could eliminate. 
2. Mutual domination 
There are two ways of interpreting the ideal stateless society as conceived by 
Pettit. We have said that the inhabitants of the ideal stateless society are morally 
motivated and committed to showing concern and respect for their fellow 
inhabitants. Either these inhabitants of the ideal stateless society agree on and 
abide by a common set of rules or they do not. Let us start with the first 
possibility.  
Part of the plausibility of Pettit’s claim that some would be dominated by others 
or depend on the good-will of others rests on there being differences of wealth 
and power. Those with less wealth and power will depend on the good-will of 
those with more, even if the wealthy and powerful are perfectly disposed never to 
interfere in the choices of the less wealthy and powerful. If people in the ideal 
stateless society agree on and abide by a common set of rules, then we can 
imagine these rules including a set of property rules, and so we can easily make 
sense of such differences in wealth and power. However, if avoiding domination is 
a requirement of justice or morality (and if it is not, there is no complaint against 
the ideal stateless society), then ideal morally motivated agents ought to agree on 
and abide by a set of rules that, so far as it is possible for a set of rules to do so, 
rules out relations of domination. Thus, if A’s having more wealth or power than 
B allows A to dominate B, by making B dependent on A’s good-will, the 
inhabitants of the ideal stateless society ought to agree on rules that rule out 
inequalities of wealth and power sufficient to make domination possible. There 
presumably are possible sets of rules that a society of perfectly morally motivated 
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individuals could agree on and keep to that would restrict inequalities of power 
and wealth. Thus, in an ideal stateless society with a common set of rules, there 
would be no domination arising from differences of wealth or power. Further, if 
we make a Hobbesian assumption that people’s physical strength or power is 
roughly equal (an assumption that I will relax later), there would be no 
domination of the sort Pettit envisages at all.151  
However, it might be objected that there still is domination, since even if all 
members of this ideal stateless society abide by rules preventing inequalities of 
wealth and power, they still could counterfactually interfere in the choices of 
others if they wanted to. On the one hand, people could accumulate wealth or 
power if they broke the collectively agreed-on rules (so long as the rules that 
make the social wealth and power possible are still followed). On the other hand, 
even without wealth or power, people still could interfere in the choices of others. 
In both of these respects, though, whatever domination there is (or counterfactual 
capacity for interference) is symmetrical for all (assuming still that we have 
Hobbesian rough natural equality). All are in exactly the same position with 
regard to the possibility of accumulating wealth or power, or the possibility of 
interfering in the affairs of others. If you and I are both members of the ideal 
stateless society, you could counterfactually accumulate wealth or power and so 
dominate me (and so, it might be thought, because domination is a counterfactual 
capacity, you already do dominate me now), but equally I could counterfactually 
accumulate wealth or power and come to dominate you. Thus, we both dominate 
each other equally (and, indeed, in exactly the same way). In fact, everybody in the 
ideal stateless society dominates every other equally in these respects. 
Domination is fully mutual. There might, further, be polyadic domination, of each 
member of society by potential coordinating groups. But, as argued above, where 
the power of individuals is equal, this polyadic domination will be symmetrical for 
all. There thus is domination in the ideal stateless society (with Hobbesian rough 
equality), but not asymmetrical domination, and so seemingly not status 
unfreedom. In other words, the domination there would be does not seem to be of 
the kind that Pettit considers troubling (or indeed, given Simpson’s arguments, of 
a kind that is not inevitable). 
It might be thought that even mutual domination is morally troubling (as, I think, 
Pallikkathayil’s Kant will say). If we take this route, as we have seen, troubling 
unfreedom will be inevitable. Nevertheless, I will return to this view below to see 
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whether there is any reason to think that the state could improve on the 
domination or dependence inherent in the ideal stateless society. 
I have argued that if the inhabitants of the ideal stateless society agree on and 
abide by a common set of rules there will be no status unfreedom. The other 
possibility is that the inhabitants of the ideal stateless society do not agree on a 
common set of rules. However, property accumulation and powers and privileges 
associated with offices or positions can only make sense against the background of 
a set of rules defining property rights and conferring powers on individuals. 
Without common agreed rules, then, there can be no inequalities in wealth or 
power beyond what results from natural inequalities in strength or ingenuity. 
However, if we assume Hobbesian rough natural equality, then there can be no 
significant inequalities in these. Thus, as above, if there are no agreed-on rules in 
the ideal stateless society, the capacity of all members of society to interfere with 
the choices of others will be roughly equivalent. Thus, here too, whatever 
domination there is will be symmetrical.152  
If we assume rough natural equality, then, there is no status unfreedom in the 
ideal stateless society. Thus, it is possible for there to be status freedom without 
state enforcement: it is not an a priori requirement of freedom as such. 
3. Collective domination 
It might be said that my argument thus far has been too quick. The argument 
above needed two assumptions to show that all domination in the ideal stateless 
society is symmetrical: that the only agents capable of domination in the ideal 
society are individuals, and that there is rough natural equality. If either of these 
assumptions does not hold, it might be thought, there would be asymmetrical 
domination (and so status unfreedom) in the ideal stateless society. Since an ideal 
stateless society without group agents and natural inequalities is possible, it is still 
the case that state enforcement is not an a priori requirement of freedom as such. 
But it might be argued that state enforcement, though not required a priori by 
freedom as such, is required a priori for freedom in societies with group agents or 
natural inequality (which may be ordinary features of human society).153 I will 
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status unfreedom, and so no troubling republican unfreedom.  
153 It might then be that an argument to the permissibility of state enforcement (for a 
certain kind of state) is available that does not depend on feasibility premises: natural 
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take each in turn and argue that, although relaxing these assumptions has the 
consequence that there is troubling unfreedom in the ideal stateless society, the 
introduction of a state would be no improvement.  
First, then, it might be thought that individuals are not the only sorts of agent 
dependence on whose will could amount to domination. (Potential coordinated 
groups are not agents, even when coordinating.) As well as individuals, there may 
also be group agents, corporate groups with a structure giving the group the sort 
of unity that allows it to have and express attitudes, to set and pursue purposes 
and so on.154 (Some may want to deny the possibility of such group agency, but 
there is no need for me to do so.)  
There is not obviously anything inherently morally troubling about the existence 
of corporate agents (and it might even be thought that the opportunity to become 
a member of such a corporate agent is valuable for individuals). Thus, there is 
every reason to think that the existence of group agents is consistent with the 
ideal stateless society. And because group agents are capable of setting and 
pursuing their own purposes, because, in short, they have a will, it is possible for 
them to dominate other agents (whether groups or individuals).  
In an ideal stateless society in which group agents are present, some agents will 
be dependent on the good-will of others in a way that is not entirely mutual. Even 
if all individuals are roughly equal in natural power, groups of individuals will 
obviously be more powerful collectively than any individual (and may be more or 
less powerful than each other). As we saw before, agents in the ideal stateless 
society are dependent on the good-will of others, since others could interfere with 
their choices (even though we know they in fact will not). I argued that this is not 
problematic because fully mutual. However, the dependence of an individual on a 
corporate agent is not reciprocated. The corporate agent, by virtue of being made 
up of multiple individuals, will be more powerful than the individual, so the 
individual will be dependent on the collective in a way the collective is not 
dependent on the individual. The mere existence of corporate agents, then, creates 
domination. Even if it will not be exercised, a group agent automatically has a 
capacity to interfere in the choices of individuals which those individuals have no 
recourse against; the individuals have no equivalent capacity.  
                                                                                                                                                   
inequality might be strictly impossible to eliminate, and group agents, though presumably 
possible to eliminate, might be thought desirable. 
154 I will use ‘group agent’, ‘collective agent’ and ‘corporate agent’ interchangeably.  
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Let us grant that this sort of non-mutual domination is troubling and can count 
as a lack of status freedom; the individuals who are dependent on the good-will of 
corporate agents fail the eyeball test: they could not look the corporate agents in 
the eye (metaphorically speaking) without reason for fear or deference. Someone’s 
not being a member of a group that dominates them might constitute a troubling 
lack of status. However, I do not think that the introduction of the state can 
eliminate non-mutual dependence on the will of corporate agents, and so the 
presence of this sort of dependence in even the ideal stateless society is no 
argument for the necessity of state enforcement for freedom.  
The state can eliminate some dependence on the will of corporate agents. It may 
be that the state can use its enforcement power to remove the uncontrolled 
capacity to interfere of all group agents existing within its jurisdiction. It cannot 
make group agents’ interference any more predictively unlikely, since in the ideal 
stateless society it is already the case that all agents are perfectly morally 
motivated, and so they will not in fact interfere against another agent’s will. 
However, the state can either control their capacity to interfere, making it non-
dominating, or remove the capacity altogether. It can make it the case that if, 
counterfactually, a group agent decided to interfere with another agent, it could 
not (or would find it costly to do so).  
However, there remains one group agent whose capacity to interfere the state 
cannot control. That is the state itself. Pettit is committed to the state being an 
agent.155 Indeed, for anyone who holds that the sort of freedom that matters is 
independence of the will of others, it will not be a plausible line of defence to 
maintain that the state is not an agent and so not capable of dominating because it 
has no will. This would have the consequence that no properly constituted state 
could possibly dominate or limit the freedom of its subjects (or others), which 
surely is unacceptable. Thus, let us assume that the state’s superior capacity to 
interfere in the choices of its citizens, which it must have if it possesses exclusive 
enforcement power, is potentially dominating. Even if the state is perfectly well-
intentioned, it could interfere at will in the choices of its subjects. Unless, that is, 
this capacity is suitably controlled by its citizens. If it is possible for the citizens to 
achieve suitable control of the state (and so, for the state not to be able to interfere 
at will), then asymmetrical domination could be eliminated, since the kind of 
domination that would remain among the citizen body (highlighted by Simpson) 
could be symmetrical. The problem of achieving suitable control over the state, 
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Pettit says, is the problem of legitimacy. If citizens have individualised, 
unconditioned and efficacious control of the interference power of the state, he 
argues, then it does not dominate them. It is, he maintains, possible for a 
democratic state to be suitably controlled in this way.  
The requirement of unconditioned control is particularly important for the purpose 
of marking the difference between the ideal stateless society and the democratic 
state (i.e., for showing that the state can be an improvement). A state’s citizens 
have unconditioned control if it is not conditional on the will of the state or 
anyone else. Influence over the behaviour of an agent is not adequate for control if 
this influence is conditional on the good-will of either the influenced agent or 
some other agent.  
In the ideal stateless society, because all agents (including group agents) are 
perfectly morally motivated, they will not interfere in the choices of other agents 
in ways not accepted by those agents. However, individual agents are still 
dominated in Pettit’s terms by collective agents because their influence on the 
collective agents’ interference in their choices is entirely conditional on the good-
will of the collective agents: if the collective agents were to choose to interfere 
against the will of an individual, the individual would be unable to prevent it. 
Thus, because individuals in the ideal stateless society do not have unconditioned 
control over the interference of collective agents, there is domination. It is 
essential, then, for the introduction of the state to count as an improvement, that 
its capacity to interfere be controlled unconditionally by its citizens.  
How does Pettit think citizens of a democratic state can come to have 
unconditioned control of its actions? What can make the state’s following the 
direction imposed on it by the democratic decisions of its citizens non-optional? 
Popular influence, he answers, has to impose an equally acceptable direction on 
government ‘independently of the willingness of government to go along and 
independently of the willingness of any other agency to have the government go 
along’.156 If the state has no choice but to follow the direction imposed by the 
people, then they have the sort of counterfactually robust control required. It has 
to be the case that if the state wanted to do otherwise it could not, or that there 
would be heavy costs associated with doing otherwise. It is not sufficient for 
control that the controlled agent’s compliance be made improbable.  
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Pettit considers a case in which you give me the key to your alcohol cupboard 
asking me to prevent you from accessing it until a specified time, and in which ‘I 
go along with your instructions, but merely with a view to giving you the 
pleasant illusion of control; suppose that I am about to exit our relationship and 
think of this as a parting, somewhat sardonic gift’.157 This does not count as your 
having control, he says; although my compliance with your direction is probable 
(or even guaranteed) I remain in control. In the normal alcohol cupboard case 
where I do as you ask out of friendship, you do have control because ‘the 
relationship matters to me, whether for intrinsic or instrumental reasons, and 
there are heavy costs associated with refusing to go along’.158 Thus, though 
probability of compliance is not sufficient for control, my having control over 
your interference does not require that it be impossible for you not to comply with 
my direction. There being heavy costs associated with non-compliance suffices. 
How can citizens of a state get the sort of control where non-compliance with 
their democratic direction is not merely improbable, but ineligible (or sufficiently 
costly) for the state? There are many ways in which constitutional and 
institutional design can make state usurpation of control improbable. This, though, 
is not what we are looking for. 
Pettit says that the people can have this sort of robust control when there is ‘a 
disposition of people to rise up in the face of a government abuse of legitimacy 
and a disposition of government to back down in response to the fact or prospect 
of such opposition’.159 In other words, the possibility (or likelihood) of resistance, 
rebellion or revolution can allow the state’s superior capacity for interference to 
be non-dominating. However, it seems a mistake to think that the sort of control 
that people can have over state interference by virtue of the threat of resistance 
allows the state to be non-dominating in a way that corporate agents in the ideal 
stateless society are not.  
Firstly, the kind of resistance that could make following the people’s direction 
non-optional is usually extremely difficult and costly. If you have the capacity to 
force the choice on me between accepting your interference and paying some very 
high cost, this seems just as problematic as the ordinary case of domination. 
Secondly, though, and more importantly, the sort of control that citizens of a 
democratic state have in virtue of the citizen body’s tendency to resist does not 
seem to be adequate. It does not seem to give citizens any control over the state 
                                                          
157 Ibid. 171 
158 Ibid. 171 
159 Ibid. 173 
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that they do not have over group agents in the ideal stateless society. The state 
has a capacity to interfere in the choices of each individual subject that is 
uncontrolled by that individual. The individual can (in a democratic state) 
exercise some influence over the direction taken by the state, but that influence is 
not unconditioned. The state has the capacity to ignore the individual’s decision if 
it wants to. There is nothing the individual can do to ensure that the state has no 
choice but to take account of her influence, except in concert with a large number 
of others. If the state were to decide to persecute, disenfranchise or interfere 
arbitrarily with one or two individuals, there is nothing those individuals could do 
to prevent it except with the aid of a large number of their fellow citizens. If agent 
A has the capacity to interfere in the choices of another agent B and B has no 
control over that capacity so long as a third agent C (or group of agents C, D, 
E…) are willing to allow A to interfere with B, B seems to be just as dominated 
(or lacking in status freedom) as in Pettit’s ordinary case of domination. Certainly, 
B does not meet the eyeball test with respect to A.  
Whether or not we want to say B is dominated in such a case, the state in a 
resistive society is not any more controlled by its citizens than group agents are 
in an ideal stateless society. Group agents in the ideal stateless society dominate 
individuals in that society because, in virtue of their size, they have the power to 
interfere in the choices of individuals that those individuals cannot control (and 
the individuals do not have an equivalent uncontrolled capacity to interfere in the 
choices of group agents). The same is true of the state. As noted above, no 
individual has the capacity to remove the state’s option of ignoring their influence. 
The individual can control the state’s capacity to interfere in concert with others. 
But the same is true of individuals in the ideal stateless society. If others are 
willing to support an individual in resisting the interference of some group agent, 
they will together be able to prevent it from doing so. No group agents in the 
ideal stateless society have the uncontrolled capacity to interfere with the entire 
society (or large subgroups of the society). It is true that no group agent will in 
fact abuse their power, and we can assume the same of the ideal state that is 
introduced to the ideal stateless society. But these group agents in the ideal 
stateless society are counterfactually controlled by the society as a whole in just 
the same way that the ideal state is counterfactually controlled by its resistive 
citizen body.160  
                                                          
160 Of course, states depend on their citizen body to function (including to have the 
capacity to interfere that they do); it might seem that group agents in the ideal stateless 
society need not. Citizens can resist their state just by withdrawing support. But the sense 
104 
 
4. Natural inequality 
In the previous section, we allowed in group agents to the ideal stateless society. I 
argued that, although this might introduce status unfreedom, the introduction of 
a state to the ideal stateless society can do nothing to eradicate this. When we 
allow in natural inequalities to the ideal stateless society as well, the case is 
exactly the same. Natural inequalities similarly create asymmetrical domination. If 
A is naturally more powerful than B, then B will be dependent on A’s will in a 
way unmatched by A’s dependence on B’s will. Again, just as the state can 
eliminate domination by group agents by controlling the interference of these 
group agents, the state can also eliminate the domination of powerful individuals 
by controlling their interference with others. For exactly the same reasons as 
above, however, the introduction of the state will not improve matters in terms of 
domination. Subjects of the state cannot have unconditioned control of its 
interference that is any better than the control they can have of the interference of 
powerful individuals (or group agents) in the ideal stateless society. Subjects of 
the state can control its interference when acting in concert with others, but in 
just the same way naturally less powerful members of the ideal stateless society 
can control the interference of more powerful members when acting in concert 
with others.  
Assuming rough natural equality, then, we showed that it is possible for there to be 
a stateless society with no status unfreedom, and so that freedom as such does not 
require state enforcement a priori. We can now see that it is also not the case that 
freedom in societies involving group agents or natural inequality requires state 
enforcement a priori: the introduction of the state is no improvement on the ideal 
stateless society even when it contains group agents and/or natural 
inequalities.161 
                                                                                                                                                   
in which their support is relevant to the issue at hand is their allowing the state’s 
interference with others to happen, either by actively participating in it, or simply by not 
preventing it. A sufficient number of people in the ideal stateless society can prevent any 
given group agent from interfering with other individuals, so in just the same sense, 
group agents in the ideal stateless society depend on the (at least tacit) support of other 
members of that society. 
161 It is also worth noting that once we introduce group agents or natural inequality, 
Simpson’s arguments may apply. Even if the citizens of a state could have adequate control 
of it, domination among the citizens will no longer be fully symmetrical. Thus, if they did 
adequately control the state, the state’s domination would be removed, but there would be 
domination among the citizens in its place: group agents or uncoordinated groups will 
have the uncontrolled capacity to interfere with individuals, and this need not be 
symmetrical since individuals will not be members of exactly equivalent groups or will 
not be of equivalent natural strength. 
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5. The state as omnilateral lawgiver 
The preceding argument assumed that the sort of freedom that we should be 
concerned to protect is the sort of status freedom (and so, status equality) in 
which Pettit is interested. One reason for making the latter assumption was that, 
as Simpson shows, freedom as non-domination cannot be realised; there will 
always be domination or dependence on the will of others. However, a theorist 
like Pallikkathayil, for whom it is not non-domination that matters but just 
independence of the unilateral will of others, may reject Simpson’s conclusions (or 
deny their relevance to freedom as independence), on the grounds that with the 
introduction of the state, the only remaining dependence is on an omnilateral 
legislative will. It is thus worth seeing whether the a priori argument can be made 
if freedom is not understood as status freedom, but in this latter way.   
The Kantian notion of freedom on which Pallikkathayil’s argument is based is 
similar to Pettit’s, but not identical. Kantian freedom is independence from the 
will of others. To be free in this sense is to have the capacity to set and pursue 
one’s own ends, which is to say, not to be subject to the ends of others. Even in an 
ideal stateless society in which determinate property rights are somehow 
established without a state, Pallikkathayil argues, people will be dependent on the 
unilateral wills of others. My capacity to set and pursue the ends I choose will be 
dependent on the unilateral decisions of others not to interfere. This is true even 
if the capacity of others to interfere with me is equivalent to my capacity to 
interfere with them. Because others could violate my property rights, these rights 
are dependent on their unilateral wills. And in just the same way, the property 
rights of others are dependent on my unilateral will.  
The state can remove the capacity of others to interfere, or at least make 
interference highly costly for others, so that it is no longer the case that they could 
easily (and at little cost) interfere if they wanted to. We have seen, though, that 
domination, if understood simply as the uncontrolled power of interference, is 
unavoidable. It seems plausible that this will be the same for dependence on the 
will of others. If the state removes the capacity of its subjects to interfere with 
each other at will, they will become dependent on its will. I argued that subjects of 
a state cannot control its interference in a way that improves on the ideal stateless 
society, and Simpson argues that even if they can, it will be at the cost of 
becoming dependent on each other’s will again. 
However, Pallikkathayil will argue that subjects of the state need not be 
dependent on its will in a troubling way since it simply enforces an omnilateral 
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will. The assurance the state gives of others’ respect of rights does not reflect the 
unilateral will of any agent.162 In other words, even if dependence on the will of 
others is unavoidable, dependence on the unilateral will of others is avoidable. The 
assurance that state enforcement gives is dictated by an impartial decision 
procedure, one that reflects the will of all. However, if having assurance dictated 
by an impartial decision procedure that reflects the will of all is sufficient to 
alleviate dependence on the unilateral will of those who provide the assurance, 
then state enforcement is not necessary for independence. The necessary assurance 
can be achieved by members of an ideal stateless society following an impartial or 
omnilateral decision procedure: there is no a priori reason to suppose that this is 
impossible without state enforcement. If such a decision procedure is required for 
freedom (and if the requirements of universal freedom are central to the 
requirements of right, as Kant and Pallikkathayil certainly think they are), then 
perfectly morally motivated inhabitants of the ideal stateless society will willingly 
adhere to a freedom-respecting omnilateral decision procedure, if one is set up. 
There will then be perfectly good predictive assurance of rights respect (just as 
good as a state could provide) that is dictated by an omnilateral decision 
procedure. I am not aware of any a priori argument that it is impossible for such a 
decision procedure to be set up without enforcement.  
Of course, even with a non-coercive omnilateral decision procedure, people would 
still make unilateral decisions about whether to observe and follow its decisions. 
Being perfectly morally motivated, they would always decide to follow these 
decisions, but their doing so would not be enforced, and so it would be up to them. 
I think it is for this reason that Pallikkathayil thinks assurance in an ideal 
stateless society must depend on the unilateral will of others. However, there 
seems to be no way of getting assurance without some dependence on the 
unilateral will of others. When we introduce a state with enforcement power as 
well as an omnilateral decision procedure, the assurance we have that others will 
observe the decisions of this procedure still depends on the unilateral decisions of 
either the state or the individuals who make up the enforcement agency. There 
are rules (made by the omnilateral decision procedure) instructing the 
enforcement officials as to what they can enforce on other people, so in this sense 
what they do is not up to them. But there can be rules like this in the ideal 
stateless society too. It is up to the members of the enforcement agency whether 
to follow these rules (the decisions of the omnilateral decision procedure), just as 
                                                          
162 Pallikkathayil (2017) 38 
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it is up to the members of the ideal stateless society whether or not to observe its 
omnilateral rules.  
One possible rationale for claiming that the state removes problematic unfreedom 
is the idea that it is not up to the individual members of the enforcement agency 
whether to observe the rules, since if one member disobeys, there will be other 
members who can enforce their compliance (or punish their non-compliance). 
Therefore, no individual can make a unilateral decision about whether to obey or 
not. But it will always be the case that some group of the members of the 
enforcement agency could, if they joined together, disobey the rules of the 
omnilateral decision procedure. So long as we admit the possibility of polyadic 
domination or dependence, as, following Simpson, I think we should, this 
constitutes problematic dependence. Polyadic dependence is of course not 
dependence on anyone’s unilateral will, but, as Simpson powerfully argues, there is 
no plausible reason to think that dependence on the multilateral wills of several 
agents is necessarily less problematic from the point of view of freedom. It is, of 
course, very unlikely that members of the enforcement agency would exercise 
their collective power to disobey the rules, since there are coordination problems 
making it difficult. But it is also very unlikely that members of the ideal stateless 
society would disobey its omnilateral decision procedure since they are perfectly 
morally motivated. In addition, if the state itself is an agent then, even if all it in 
fact does is implement (enforce) the decisions of the omnilateral lawgiver, it will 
always have the capacity to interfere at will, so there will be dyadic dependence or 
domination as well. And, as I argued above, it is not possible for citizens of a state 
to achieve the sort of control that could alleviate dependence on its unilateral will.  
6. Conclusion 
In this and the previous chapter, I have argued that two prominent sorts of a 
priori argument for the legitimacy of a certain kind of state fail to establish their 
conclusion. Ripstein’s Kantian assurance argument fails because it gives us no 
reason to think that an exclusive enforcer is necessary for assurance. 
Counterfactual dependence arguments, of the sort suggested by Pettit and 
Pallikkathayil, fail too because the introduction of a state cannot eliminate 
dependence on the will of others. While in an ideal stateless society we are 
dependent on the wills of other members of society or corporate groups, in a state 
society we are dependent on the wills of enforcement officials and of the state 
itself. Given this, there is little reason to think that anything about the idea of 
freedom itself demands state enforcement, or that there is any a priori argument 
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for the legitimacy of states that meet certain conditions. If state enforcement is 
necessary for freedom this is because of certain empirical and contingent facts 
about the world we live in. I have not demonstrated this, since all I have done is 
show that certain arguments to the contrary are not successful. However, I think 
that in the absence of a compelling a priori argument for state legitimacy, we can 
at least provisionally conclude that empirical considerations about the world we 
happen to live in are needed to establish the legitimacy of existing states.  
Arguments like those discussed in the past two chapters could, perhaps, establish 
their conclusions if feasibility premises are added: premises such as the claim that 
the only feasible way of achieving status freedom or freedom as independence is 
through the state’s exclusive enforcement. As I argued about the assurance 
argument, this premise will need to claim that the only feasible way of achieving 
freedom involves this particular state’s exclusive enforcement, not just some state’s 
exclusive enforcement; the same will be true for the counterfactual argument 
discussed in this chapter. In chapter 2 I argued that all of the arguments that 
might plausibly ground the legitimacy of some actual states depend on feasibility 
premises. Again, I did not demonstrate conclusively that any argument for the 
legitimacy of an existing state must depend on feasibility premises, but having 
surveyed prominent and plausible such arguments, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that we should not take the legitimacy of existing states for granted 
unless we can also take the necessary feasibility premises for granted. Thus, in 
order to get a picture of how feasibility premises can and cannot be used in moral 
argument, I turn, in the next chapter, to the question of how we should 
understand the concept of feasibility. 
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Chapter 5:  
The concept of feasibility 
 
The first part of this thesis claimed that plausible arguments for the legitimacy of 
existing states (their general and exclusive moral permission to enforce) depend 
for their success on premises about feasibility. They depend on premises like ‘the 
only feasible way to achieve status freedom or freedom as independence is 
through the state in question’s (‘state S’s’) exclusive enforcement’ or ‘the only 
feasible way to achieve assurance that people will respect each other’s rights is 
through state S’s exclusive enforcement’, or ‘the best feasible world is one in 
which state S is an exclusive enforcer’. Whether premises like these can play the 
role that they need to play in these arguments will depend on when exactly 
infeasibility acts as a constraint on moral permissibility. Does something’s being 
the only feasible way to do something morally required (or just morally good) 
mean that it too is morally required (or morally good)? Does something’s being 
infeasible mean that it cannot be morally required, and thus that it is morally 
permissible not to do it? In order to answer these questions, and others like them, 
it seems that we will do well to have some idea of what exactly it means to say 
that some outcome is or is not feasible. How do we adjudicate these claims? What 
are their truth conditions? 
It is quite common in moral and political philosophy to criticise and reject 
theories for making recommendations that are not feasible (call this a feasibility 
critique). A normative principle or recommendation cannot be true, or apply to us, 
it is commonly thought, if it is not feasible for us to do as it requires. If this is 
right, then it is quite plausible to think that, for example, if some action is the 
only feasible way to do something morally required, then it too is morally 
required. The question that we are interested in, then, is one that is of wider 
interest for moral and political philosophy. The account of feasibility I give in this 
chapter will be a general one, and so its conclusions will be relevant generally to 
the use of feasibility critiques in normative philosophy, but in the next chapter I 
will use it to draw some conclusions about state legitimacy in particular. 
As noted above, the standard view of the relation of feasibility to moral theory 
takes feasibility to be a straightforward constraint on moral theory: proposals are 
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ruled out as morally required if not feasible.163 For feasibility to operate as a 
constraint in such a straightforward manner (for there to be a single simple 
constraint on morality in general) there would need to be a single relevant binary 
notion of feasibility. In this chapter, I aim to argue that there is no single 
privileged binary concept of feasibility that can be assumed to play this role. Our 
ordinary concept of feasibility, I argue, is multivocal; that is, there are many 
different ways in which it can be made precise (which I call ‘sharpenings’), with 
different truth conditions. Not all of these can plausibly be thought to constrain 
morality, and there is no immediate reason to suppose that any particular one of 
them is the constraint for morality in general. The import of my account of 
feasibility, then, will be to create a burden of proof. The thought that there is a 
simple and general constraint on moral theory cannot be justified by appeal to the 
ordinary concept of feasibility: we should not assume without argument that any 
one of the possible sharpenings of ‘feasibility’ is always a constraint on moral 
requirement. If there is a simple and universal constraint of this sort, it will need 
to be established by substantive argument (and if we cannot assume there is such 
a simple feasibility constraint on moral requirement, then something’s being the 
only feasible way of doing something morally required and so being morally 
permissible is also no longer such a straightforward matter). Some thought, at 
least, needs to be given to which sharpenings of ‘feasibility’ constrain moral 
requirement when. Thus, to conclude that something is morally permissible 
because the only feasible way of φ-ing, we will need some reason to think that the 
sharpening according to which alternatives are not feasible is the appropriate one. 
One way to reject the idea that the concept of feasibility is straightforwardly 
requirement-blocking would be to claim that no unified account of feasibility can 
be given at all. I think, though, that it is possible to give a unified account (that 
captures ordinary use), and I will argue for this simply by giving one. However, 
the best unified account going, I argue, is not univocal and so does not make 
feasibility claims determinate. There is a whole range of different ‘sharpenings’ of 
‘feasibility’, a whole range of different binary definitions, but all of these can be 
unified under a single schema (or set of schemas). In the first part of the chapter, 
then, I will propose such a set of schemas in order to flesh out the multivocal 
account. Though there is no single binary definition of ‘feasibility’ as such, I will 
give an account of binary feasibility given a choice of sharpening. The account I 
                                                          
163 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) and Lawford-Smith (2013) argue that the role of 
feasibility is not only to rule out proposals but also to contribute to ranking them. I do not 
intend to deny that it may have this latter role. 
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give is a possibility-based account: feasibility is to be analysed, I argue, in terms of 
possibility. To claim that some outcome is feasible is to make a claim about 
something being possible, but it is not simply to claim that that outcome is 
possible. Though related, possibility and feasibility are distinct concepts. 
Feasibility, unlike possibility, has to do with agency. It is about what it is possible 
for agents to do intentionally, in a way that my account will make clear, not just 
what might possibly come about. 
I will defend the multivocal account (in the second half of the chapter) by showing 
that a variety of attempts to give a univocal account (or an account that gives 
‘feasibility’ a small number of determinate senses) encounter problems that do not 
trouble a multivocal account. This does not yet motivate my (possibility-based) 
account, but the account given in the first half of the chapter is offered as a 
plausible and natural way of fleshing out a multivocal account. After motivating 
the need to go multivocal, I argue that there is no obvious plausible way to 
provide a probability-based multivocal account instead. My account, then, I argue, 
best captures our intuitions about feasibility. It might, though, be thought that 
this just shows that it is some concept other than feasibility that is the relevant 
constraint on morality. I thus argue, finally, that the alternative accounts of 
feasibility, not only do not capture the ordinary concept of feasibility, but also do 
not plausibly identify a general constraint on moral requirement. 
1. Feasibility and desirability 
Before I proceed to give an account of the concept of feasibility, it is important to 
note that feasibility critiques are frequently not as simple as the above description 
suggested. Often when a proposal or principle is criticised for being infeasible we 
do not really mean that it is infeasible simpliciter. Often these critiques are mixed 
up with questions of desirability, that is, with evaluative or normative questions. 
When we say that, for example, communism is not feasible, we may well not mean 
that it really is infeasible as such, but rather that it is not feasible in a desirable 
way. The concept of feasibility, as I understand it, is not an evaluative or 
normative one. However, sometimes when we say that some proposal is not 
feasible, this is shorthand for the claim that it is not feasible in conjunction with 
certain other things that we take to be more desirable or with the observance of 
other principles, which we take to be weightier than the proposal in question.164 A 
feasibility critique of this form, then, says something like ‘given that we should do 
                                                          
164 Alan Hamlin (2012) makes the point that it is often through the infeasibility of 
combinations of things that feasibility constraints bind. 
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x or realise (values v, proposals p, principles q), it is not feasible to do/bring 
about/realise y in a desirable way’. Thus, when we say, for example, that X-ing is 
the only feasible way of doing something morally required, we may really mean 
that it is the only desirable (or morally acceptable) feasible way of doing the 
morally required thing.  
The fact that feasibility critiques are often mixed up with questions of desirability 
does not mean that questions of feasibility themselves are evaluative or 
normative. The feasibility question is separate from the desirability question.165 
Or rather, the two can be separated, though often we put them together.166 
However, in general, what tends to be most important to know is not just 
whether some proposal is feasible, but rather whether it is feasible in an all-
things-considered desirable way. We need to ask whether it is feasible in 
conjunction with the realisation of those other principles or values that would 
make it all-things-considered desirable. Nevertheless, questions about feasibility 
are independent of questions about morality.167 
2. Background 
Though feasibility has long been in the background of political philosophy, it has 
not until recently been explored in any detail. In an early philosophical discussion 
of feasibility, Juha Räikkä described what he took to be the standard binary 
approach to feasibility.168 Proposals are feasible, on this approach, if and only if 
they are not rendered impossible by certain strong constraints. Feasibility began 
to become more prominent with the flowering of debate over ‘ideal theory’ and 
‘realism’ in political theory. The paradigm of ‘ideal theory’ was criticised for being 
                                                          
165 Gilabert (2008, 415), (2009, 663-4) and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012, 816-7) also 
make this point.  
166 Juha Räikkä (1998) argues, on the contrary, that a definition of feasibility itself should 
include ‘the necessary moral costs of changeover’ as a constraint on feasibility. However, I 
think this is a mistake. The question of whether some outcome is feasible in conjunction 
with acceptable changeover costs is a different feasibility question to whether the outcome 
is feasible tout court. 
167 Brennan and Sayre-McCord (2016) argue that normative facts do make a difference to 
what is feasible, since normative judgments affect what people are willing to do and so 
how they behave, and these normative judgments are sometimes explained by their truth, 
by their reflecting the normative facts. However, the influence that the normative facts 
have on feasibility is wholly mediated by people’s normative judgments. If we have the 
information about people’s normative judgments, information about the normative facts 
would tell us nothing additional relevant to feasibility. 
168 Räikkä (1998) 32. He references as an example Beitz (1979) 156. (There were some 
earlier discussions of feasibility in the social scientific literature, such as Majone (1975), 
but nothing I am aware of in philosophy.) Some attempts to give univocal, binary 
definitions of ‘feasibility’ appear in Cowen (2007); Buchanan (2004); Hawthorn (1991, 
158); Räikkä (1998) and Jensen (2009), and attempts to give a handful of binary definitions 
in Miller (2008), Brighouse (2004) and Elster (1985). 
113 
 
useless for action-guidance in the real world and an assumption underlying many 
of these arguments was that the recommendations of ideal theory, because it 
abstracted away from many of the facts of the world, were infeasible.169 Geoffrey 
Brennan and Philip Pettit explicitly cast roughly this issue as ‘the feasibility 
issue’.170 These authors did not generally address in much detail what exactly it 
meant for a proposal to be feasible or infeasible. However, the importance that they 
saw feasibility to have gave the impetus for the development of such an account. 
In the past ten years some attempts have been made to give a serious account of 
the concept of feasibility and what David Wiens has called the ‘conditional 
probability’ account has emerged as a prime contender.171 In defending an 
‘”ought” implies “feasibility”’ principle, Geoffrey Brennan and Nicholas 
Southwood considered how ‘feasibility’ should be understood.172 They reject a 
‘logical or nomological possibility’ understanding of feasibility because there are 
many things that are logically or nomologically possible that they think do not 
qualify as feasible, such as a medical ignoramus performing a neurological 
operation for which he lacks the relevant expertise, or the realisation of a 
communist ideal. These things, they think, are not feasible because, though 
possible, they are not probable. It is possible that by sheer luck the medical 
ignoramus could perform the exact correct sequence of movements to perform a 
neurological operation. However, this is extremely unlikely, and we do not want 
to say that it is feasible. On the other hand, they reject the view that ‘feasibility’ 
just means ‘sufficient probability’. If someone is too lazy to get out of bed at the 
weekend to go and watch their daughter’s hockey games, then it may be very 
improbable that they will do so. However, it seems clearly not to be the case that 
this is thereby infeasible. On the contrary, it is perfectly feasible, but not likely. 
Thus, Brennan and Southwood opt for a conditional probability account of 
feasibility. The reason it is improbable that the lazy parent will go to their 
daughter’s hockey match is that it is improbable that they will try. However, the 
conditional probability of their going if they tried is presumably much better. 
Thus, they say, feasibility should be understood ‘in terms of reasonable 
probability of success conditional on trying’.173  
Some of the most extensive treatments of the concept of feasibility, in particular 
those by Holly Lawford-Smith, Pablo Gilabert and Zofia Stemplowska, have 
                                                          
169 E.g. Phillips (1985); Goodin (1995); Sen (2006) and (2009) 
170 Brennan and Pettit (2005) 
171 Wiens (2015a) 449.  
172 Brennan and Southwood (2007) 
173 Brennan and Southwood (2007) 9-10 
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followed along similar lines.174 They, however, modify the account in ways that 
will appear below. David Wiens has, on the other hand, rejected the conditional 
probability account and defended what he calls a ‘restricted possibility account’, 
which is closer to the account I will give below in that it analyses feasibility in 
terms of possibility rather than probability.175 In the next section I will set out a 
possibility-based, multivocal account of feasibility, and motivate it intuitively. I 
will then return to the rival accounts just mentioned and argue that they 
encounter problems to which my account is not vulnerable.  
3. The multivocal account 
One might assert ‘It is not feasible to institute a system of participatory 
democracy’. Supposing that we know exactly what it would take for a system of 
participatory democracy to be instituted, there are still many different things this 
statement could mean; it is not clear, without any context, what exactly its truth 
conditions are. This, anyway, is what I will argue. In the second half of this 
chapter (section 4), I will argue that available univocal accounts of the concept of 
feasibility fail to capture intuitive judgments about feasibility, in a way that can be 
resolved by abandoning the attempt to identify a single binary notion of feasibility. 
In this section, I will flesh out in detail the multivocal account and explain how 
the various ‘sharpenings’ of ‘feasibility’ can be unified under a general set of 
schemas. The detailed account I give here is offered as a plausible and natural way 
to flesh out the multivocal account. I will motivate the various elements of my 
detailed account, but there may be alternatives, and I do not as such defend this 
account, except by arguing (in section 5) that there is no obvious way of giving a 
multivocal account instead in terms of conditional probability.  
I proceed in this way, by first setting out the details of my multivocal account and 
leaving the argument for its multivocality until later so as to have a full fleshed-
out account to compare to the various available univocal accounts. First, though, 
let me briefly intuitively motivate the idea that our ordinary concept of feasibility 
is a multivocal one. Return to the assertion mentioned in the first sentence of this 
section. I submit that there are various natural interpretations of this claim, with 
different truth conditions. Different ones may be salient in different contexts. Put 
roughly, one thing we might mean is that with the state being as it currently is, 
with people’s motivations and preferences being as they currently are, and with 
the political system and power balance being as they are, we cannot institute 
                                                          
174 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012); Lawford-Smith (2013); Gilabert (2017) and 
Stemplowska (2016). 
175 Wiens (2015a) 
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participatory democracy. If this is what we mean, it seems likely that the 
statement is true. However, this seems not to be the only thing that might 
naturally be understood by this claim; in a different context, we might hold fixed 
a different range of facts. At the far extreme, we could mean that such a system is 
not physically, or logically, possible. If we meant this, we would probably say that 
the statement is false. This, perhaps, is an interpretation that will not be salient in 
many ordinary contexts. However, there seem to be various other interpretations 
in between, which might represent perfectly natural uses of the term ‘feasibility’. 
We could mean, for instance, that, even if people’s basic motivations, the power 
balance and so on are allowed to change, a system of participatory democracy is 
made impossible by some reasonably deep facts about human nature. There is no 
immediately obvious reason to suppose that any one of these various possible 
readings of the claim is privileged over the others as representing the ‘proper’ use 
of the term ‘feasibility’. It would seem like a perfectly sensible response to the 
question ‘is it feasible to institute a system of participatory democracy?’ to ask, 
‘holding fixed what?’. (Of course, in many ordinary conversational contexts, some 
particular range of facts to hold fixed will be made salient, but if the question is 
asked with no relevant context, it is not obvious how to answer.) 
I think that what this points to is the availability of a variety of different possible 
sharpenings of the term ‘feasible’, i.e., different ways in which we might make it 
precise. There is no obvious reason to think that any one of these is privileged as 
the thing we must mean by ‘feasibility’ simpliciter. Each sharpening, or 
precisification, corresponds to what I will call a ‘feasibility constraint’ (FC). An 
FC is a selection of which facts of the actual world to hold fixed (and 
correspondingly, which to allow to vary).176 For each possible FC, there is a 
possible sharpening of ‘feasibility’. Feasibility, then, is assessed (and feasibility 
claims have truth conditions) relative to a choice of FC. Often it is obvious from 
conversational context what FC, or rough range of FCs, is assumed in talking 
about feasibility. That is, sometimes in a particular context, a choice of which facts 
of the world to hold fixed is tacitly assumed and understood when a feasibility 
claim is made. However, this need not always be the case. Sometimes, when we 
make a feasibility claim we fail to say anything determinate because no choice of 
                                                          
176 These can be thought of as what Kratzer (2012) calls ‘conversational backgrounds’, 
where conversational backgrounds are functions mapping possible worlds to sets of 
propositions (those propositions relative to which modal claims are to be evaluated for 
each world) (32-3). My account will thus bear some similarities to a Kratzerian account of 
modality, where the truth of modal sentences is relative to sets of propositions, but the 
only propositions that are relevant to feasibility are propositions true of the actual world 
(or the world for which feasibility is being assessed). 
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FC is understood or specified.177 Some possible sets of facts (FCs) relative to 
which feasibility claims could be made may never be used in this way, such as 
perhaps the extreme cases where we hold fixed nothing but the laws of logic or 
where we hold fixed everything. It may seem like when we hold fixed so little or so 
much we are not really talking about feasibility, but I am happy to say that these 
are limiting cases of feasibility that may be little use for the sorts of purposes for 
which we ordinarily use the concept of feasibility. What seems clear is that there 
is at least a fair range of different sharpenings of the concept relative to which 
feasibility claims are and can be made.  
I defend this picture below by arguing that attempts to give a univocal account of 
feasibility are subject to problems that can be resolved by going multivocal in the 
way just sketched. First, though, in this section I will fill out my multivocal 
account. Once a choice of FC has been made, then, what does it mean to say that 
some outcome is or is not feasible? There is no single binary concept of feasibility 
tout court, according to my multivocal account, but I think we can give a binary 
definition of feasibility given a choice of FC. If we simply claim that an outcome is 
feasible or infeasible, we fail to say anything determinate, but if a choice of FC is 
tacitly assumed or explicitly specified, any given outcome will be determinately 
either feasible or infeasible.  
I think that the details of the multivocal account I am about to propose give a 
plausible and natural way of understanding feasibility claims. I start from the 
intuitive idea that feasibility is a special form of possibility and then motivate 
certain modifications in order to deal with problem cases. In the next section, I 
argue that an account of feasibility ought to be multivocal, and this supports the 
account I am about to give as the most natural candidate multivocal account. I 
suggest in section 5 that there is no obvious way to give a multivocal account in 
terms of probability instead.  
3.a) Feasibility on an FC 
In order to give such a binary definition of feasibility given a choice of sharpening, 
the first question to ask is what feasibility is of. It seems clear that feasibility can 
be of outcomes, or states of affairs. We might think, though, that actions can also 
be assessed for feasibility. We might wonder whether it is feasible, say, for me to 
                                                          
177 We could think about feasibility in terms of a supervaluational structure, meaning that 
if a proposal is ‘superfeasible’ (feasible on all FCs) then we can say straightforwardly that 
it is feasible tout court and if it is ‘superinfeasible’ (infeasible on all FCs) then it is infeasible 
tout court. Thus, the question may have a determinate answer if the proposal is either 
superfeasible or superinfeasible, but most of the time this will not be the case. 
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run to Africa. I think actions can certainly be assessed for feasibility, but actions 
can be outcomes. That is, for every action φ there is an outcome consisting in X’s 
performance of φ. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we can bring all the categories 
that can be assessed for feasibility under the category of outcomes. The left-hand-
side of my definition, then, will be the schema, modified from Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith: 
  O is feasible (for X) in Z on f.178 
where O is an outcome, Z is a context (the set of facts of the world that we start 
from in defining an FC – in other words, a choice of time and possible world; FCs 
are defined as subsets of the facts that hold at this time in this world, facts which 
are to be ‘held fixed’) and f is some FC.  
Now, G.A. Cohen has suggested that there are two elements to feasibility: 
accessibility and stability.179 Accessibility is a matter of whether we can get there 
from here, while stability is a matter of whether the outcome can be maintained if 
we do get there. Sometimes ‘feasibility’ is used simply to mean accessibility but in 
other uses it requires both accessibility and stability.180 (Really what is required is 
that the outcome be capable of being stable.) These two things are separate: an 
outcome can be accessible but not capable of being stable, or capable of being 
stable but not accessible. I will focus for now on accessibility, but all that will be 
needed to get an account of the use that requires stability is to add to the account 
given below a requirement that the outcome be brought about stably, and an 
account of what stability is, which I will give below.  
3.b) Agent-Relative Accessibility 
I think that, most plausibly, accessibility given a choice of sharpening is a matter 
of possibility restricted in various ways. This will be motivated only intuitively, as 
well as by the lack of any obvious way of making a multivocal account work in 
terms of probability. If it is asserted that some outcome is accessible for us, it is 
                                                          
178 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) 812. 
179 Cohen (2009) 56-7. This distinction is very similar to Erik Olin Wright’s (2006) 
distinction between ‘viability’ and ‘achievability’ (97-9).  
180 For this reason David Wiens (2015a) argues that stability is not a necessary condition 
for feasibility (3, n. 2). It seems clear that there is a use of ‘feasibility’ for which stability is 
a necessary condition, as in when we say that communism is not feasible because human 
nature will lead it to collapse. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith argue that getting to some 
outcome, if it cannot be maintained, does not really look like ‘getting there’ at all (2012, 
813). Wiens is right, though, that this is not always how ‘feasibility’ is used, as in when we 
say that it is feasible to balance a spinning-top on its point, despite the instability of that 
position. 
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natural to think about the truth of this as having to do with whether it is possible 
for us to get there, or to bring it about. What is accessible for us, goes the 
thought, though not simply anything that might possibly come about, has to do 
with what might possibly be brought about by us. Brennan and Southwood begin 
their discussion of feasibility by rejecting the two simple and natural suggested 
analyses as simple possibility or simple probability.181 I start with possibility, 
since, as I argue below, there is no straightforward way to give a probability-based 
multivocal account (and because it seems to me more intuitively plausible to 
associate accessibility with possibility than probability). Brennan and Southwood 
reject a simple possibility account on the basis of counterexamples, but, as we will 
see, a more sophisticated possibility account is not subject to such 
counterexamples.  
On the possibility-based account I will present, then, feasibility is not simply 
equivalent to possibility: something’s simply being possible is not sufficient for its 
being feasible. But feasibility can be cashed out in terms of possibility.182 For 
something to be feasible, as already noted, it needs to be possible for it to come 
about in a particular way, one that involves agency. I think this is the most 
intuitively plausible way of understanding what feasibility is: it is about what we 
can bring about, what it is possible for us to bring about. For something to be 
feasible given a set of facts being held fixed is for it to be possible (in the 
restricted way) compatibly with these facts. 
Thus, I propose the following definition for binary accessibility given a choice of 
FC: 
Agent-Relative Accessibility. O is accessible for X in Z on f if and only if φ(X’s φ-
ing to bring about O in Z is possible given constraint f, that is, is not 
incompatible with constraint f) 
where ‘φ-ing to bring about O’ means performing some intentional action φ that 
will bring about O, or will make things such that an event e occurs that will bring 
about O, (though it need not be intended to bring about, or contribute to 
bringing about, O) such that X brings about O safely and competently (notions to 
be explained below). 
In order to see what is involved in something being possible given some FC, it 
may help to think of an FC as playing a similar role to an accessibility relation in 
                                                          
181 Brennan and Southwood (2007) 8-9 
182 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) define binary feasibility in terms of possibility 
compatibly with certain constraints: I think we just need to extend this to any set of 
constraints, rather than merely the hard constraints they identify (as I will argue below). 
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modal logic.183 An event is possible given an FC if it occurs in some possible 
world out of a restricted range selected by the choice of FC and Z.184 The world 
from which the accessible worlds must be accessible (call this the home world) is 
selected by Z (it is likely to be the actual world, but need not be). The accessible 
worlds are then restricted to those identical to the home world up until the time 
of Z. Finally, the FC then restricts the accessible worlds to those in which, after 
that time, all facts remain fixed except for those that the FC allows to vary. If an 
outcome is brought about in the right way (directly or indirectly) by X in some 
possible world out of this restricted range, then it is accessible for X given this 
FC (and Z). What this means, in less abstract terms, is that when we choose a 
range of facts to hold fixed, say the deepest facts of human nature along with the 
laws of physics, biology and so on, an outcome is accessible for me if and only if 
there is some possible world in which those laws and facts of human nature hold 
(and which is identical to the actual world up to now) in which I bring about the 
outcome in question.  
Although, as I have said, feasibility and possibility are distinct concepts, and what 
is distinctive about feasibility is that it has to do with what agents can bring about 
through intentional action, my definition does not require that for O to be 
accessible to X it must be possible for X to bring about O intentionally. It is 
possible, I think, for certain outcomes to be feasible for an agent despite its not 
being possible for the agent to bring them about intentionally. This appears to be 
brought out by the case of a university student, Florence, taking an exam, who is 
unfamiliar with the grading system for that exam.185 The student’s teachers might 
ask whether it is feasible for Florence to get a 2:1 in the exam. It seems like it can 
be feasible for her to get a 2:1 even if she has no idea what a 2:1 is and is simply 
intending to do as well as she can on the exam and find out later what mark this 
translates into. If she does not know what a 2:1 is, she cannot intentionally bring 
about her getting a 2:1, but she can intentionally act in a way that results in her 
getting a 2:1 and it seems like in some cases this can be sufficient for an outcome’s 
being feasible for an agent. 
                                                          
183 Wiens (2015a) also suggests thinking of feasibility in terms of an accessibility relation 
on possible worlds (457), but his account fails to deal with all of the problems that 
motivate my account (see below). 
184 Note that e must be an event that occurs in one of these possible worlds and brings 
about O. It may be synchronically or only diachronically possible (on this distinction see 
Jensen, 2009). That is, it must just occur at some point in one of those possible worlds, it 
need not be immediate from the time of Z. 
185 Thanks to Han van Wietmarschen for suggesting this case to me. 
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It is not enough, though, that it be possible for X’s intentional action to bring 
about O for O to be feasible for X. We have already seen that such a simple 
possibility account will not do. It is possible that a medical ignoramus who sets out 
to perform brain surgery by trying out a random series of movements will choose 
exactly the right sequence of movements and so successfully perform brain 
surgery. (This is, of course, possible even consistently with the medical 
ignoramus’s knowledge, skills and so on being held fixed.) It is surely not, though, 
thereby feasible for the medical ignoramus to perform brain surgery. It needs to be 
possible for the agent to bring about the outcome not just by freak luck. For this 
reason, I add the requirements of safety and competence. I borrow these notions 
from the literature in epistemology, where it is often thought that an account of 
knowledge must accommodate the intuition that true belief achieved by luck does 
not count as knowledge.186  
Firstly, O’s being feasible for X requires that there be a possible action of X’s that 
brings about O competently, by which I mean that O is creditable to some sufficient 
extent to X’s relevant competence. Ernest Sosa describes a competence as ‘a 
disposition, one with a basis resident in the competent agent, one that would in 
appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any 
relevant performance issued by it’.187 I will not attempt to give a full account of 
what a competence is, but will assume that there is an intuitive notion pointed at 
by Sosa’s description. A competence is like a skill: some actions that an agent 
performs manifest competence or skill, while others do not. An experienced archer 
hitting a target in ordinary conditions and with no intervening factors seems to 
be an example of the former, while a game-player rolling a 6 seems to be an 
example of the latter. It seems clear that a medical ignoramus is not competent to 
perform brain surgery, though they may be competent to perform the precise 
sequence of movements that would be needed in a particular instance to perform 
brain surgery. (For this reason, the requirement is that the agent be possibly 
competent to bring about the outcome, not to perform the action that brings about 
the outcome; the medical ignoramus is competent to perform a sequence of actions 
that would together bring about the outcome of her performing brain surgery, but 
she is not competent to perform brain surgery.) On the other hand, Florence, the 
student in the above exam case, may be competent to get a 2:1 despite not 
knowing what this means.  
                                                          
186 See for instance Ichikawa and Steup (2017), Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2012). 
187 Sosa (2007) 29 
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My account requires that there be a possible world in which X’s bringing about O 
is sufficiently creditable to X’s competence. Sosa’s account of knowledge demands 
that the correctness of a belief be explained by an agent’s competence in order to 
count as knowledge. Duncan Pritchard argues that the requirement on knowledge 
is a weaker one: that the agent’s true belief be the product of her relevant 
competence (but he also adds an additional safety requirement).188 He motivates 
this with a case that he thinks Sosa’s strong requirement will get wrong: 
Jenny. Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that 
she meets for directions. The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about 
the area, and helpfully gives her directions. Jenny believes what she is told and 
goes on her way to her intended destination.189 
In this case, Pritchard thinks, Jenny’s knowledge is not explained by any 
competence, or cognitive ability, of hers. It is, though, he says the product of her 
cognitive ability. The difference is that ‘Jenny’s cognitive success is not primarily 
creditable to her cognitive agency’, while ‘her safe true belief is to a significant 
degree creditable to her cognitive agency’.190 A good account of feasibility should 
also be able to deal with cases like Jenny; we will want to say that it is feasible for 
Jenny to find out how to get to her destination (even holding fixed her 
knowledge, that of those in the area, and so on). Thus, we should not require that 
there be a possible world in which O is primarily explained by X’s competence. But 
how far an outcome’s being brought about is creditable to an agent’s competence 
is a matter of degree: there must be some degree of (possible) creditability to X’s 
competence that is sufficient to make an outcome feasible for X. I will not attempt 
to determine exactly what this degree is. (Note that it will not be sufficient merely 
for X’s competence to have some (possible) role in bringing about the outcome. 
Imagine that X is a competent dart thrower who throws a dart headed towards 
the bullseye. However, a malevolent onlooker, Y, is poised to blow X’s dart away 
from the bullseye as it approaches. Fortunately, though, there is another, 
benevolent, onlooker, Z, ready with a wind-machine to direct the dart back to the 
bullseye. X throws the dart, and, after the interventions of Y and Z, it hits the 
bullseye. X’s competence plays some role in explaining the dart’s hitting the 
bullseye, but if this is the only possible way in which X can hit the bullseye, it is 
not plausibly feasible for her to do so.) 
The inclusion of a requirement of (possible) competence does not turn my account 
into a dispositional account of feasibility (one that analyses the feasibility of O for 
                                                          
188 Pritchard (2012) 273 
189 Ibid. 269, adapted from Lackey (2007). 
190 Ibid. 273-4, emphasis added. 
122 
 
X as X’s being disposed to bring about O in certain conditions). The requirement 
of my account is not that X actually be competent to bring about O, but rather 
that it be possible for X to be so competent. There must be a possible world in 
which X performs an action that brings about O, and in which O is sufficiently 
creditable to X’s competence. This, of course, requires that X be competent to 
bring about O, but this requirement applies to the possible world in question. No 
doubt to say that X is competent to bring about some outcome in a world w is to 
make some claim also about worlds other than w. For instance, it may entail that 
in a certain proportion of the worlds close to w, those in which circumstances are 
relevantly similar, X brings about O. However, this need not entail anything 
about the actual world.191  
I also add a safety requirement. The requirement is that it must be possible for X 
to bring about O safely, where the notion of safety is again borrowed from the 
epistemology literature.192 Sosa characterises safety thus: ‘A performance is safe if 
and only if not easily would it … have failed, not easily would it have fallen short 
of its aim’.193 For a performance to be safe, it needs to be the case that it succeeds 
not only in the actual world, but also in other nearby worlds, similar to the actual 
world in certain relevant respects. If there is a possibility sufficiently close to the 
actual world in which the performance does not succeed, then it too easily could 
have failed. The requirement on feasibility is that there be a possible world w in 
which X brings about O safely. This means that in all the sufficiently close 
possible worlds to w, in which circumstances are relevantly similar, X succeeds in 
bringing about O. The requirement is not that in all those close possible worlds in 
which X φs, X successfully brings about O, but just that in all those sufficiently 
close possible worlds in which circumstances are relevantly similar, X brings 
about O. The addition of a safety requirement on top of the competence 
requirement is needed because there could be cases where some piece of freak luck 
makes possible the exercise of a competence. We would not want to say that it is 
                                                          
191 What exactly the disposition is that is involved in a competence for bringing about O, 
in what sense it must have its basis in the competent agent, and what exactly is required 
for an outcome to be creditable to an agent’s competence are questions that I will have to 
leave unanswered. The disposition cannot simply be a disposition for the agent’s φ-ing to 
bring about O, since there is a possible φ that the medical ignoramus can perform that 
will tend to result in brain surgery being performed (a specific sequence of movements). It 
would presumably have to be something like a disposition to produce O given similar 
circumstances and in response to similar stimuli (where these include something like the 
agent’s desires or preferences); cf. Pritchard (2012) 256-7. 
192 Note that the requirement is that the agent bring about O safely, not that the action do 
so. For discussion of safety in epistemology, see for example Ichikawa and Steup (2017), 
Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2012). 
193 Sosa (2007) 25 
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feasible for X to bring about O where the only way that X could possibly bring 
about O is where some piece of freak luck allows her to exercise a competence. 
For example, suppose there is a brick wall separating Ella, a competent darts 
player, from a dartboard. There are some large rocks in the vicinity that, if they 
were positioned in a particular spot, would allow Ella to climb on top and throw a 
dart over the wall at the board. However, the rocks are too heavy to move. The 
mere fact that it is possible that, say, a small landslide could happen to shift one of 
these rocks into exactly the right position, enabling Ella to exercise her dart-
throwing competence, is surely not sufficient to make it feasible for her to hit the 
bullseye. This is because the conditions could too easily not have permitted Ella 
to exercise her competence. The possible successful bringing about of an outcome 
(hitting the bullseye) is too modally fragile, it is not safe. 
There is some overlap in the work that can be done by the safety and competence 
requirements (they can deal with some of the same cases), but the safety 
requirement will not do on its own. The need for the competence requirement is 
brought out by a case of Sosa’s: 
A protecting angel with a wind machine might ensure that [an] archer’s shot 
would hit the bullseye … and a particular shot might hit the bullseye through a 
gust from the angel’s machine, which compensates for a natural gust that initially 
diverts the arrow.194 
The archer’s shot hits the bullseye safely in this case, but the possibility of this 
scenario is not plausibly sufficient to make hitting the bullseye feasible, given the 
initial natural gust of wind. For this reason, the competence requirement is 
necessary as well. 
3.c) Non-Agent-Relative Accessibility 
Now, the above definition is a definition of agent-relative feasibility (or 
accessibility). This means that it defines the feasibility of an outcome for some 
agent. We may also, however, want a non-agent-relative definition of feasibility 
(on a given FC), a criterion for what it would take for an outcome to be feasible 
tout court on some FC (as opposed to feasible for some X on a given FC).195  
I suggest the following: 
                                                          
194 Sosa (2007) 29 
195 We can also talk about feasibility for some group of agents. My definition of non-agent-
relative feasibility below gives an account of what it is for something to be feasible for the 
group of all agents. This definition can thus also give us a definition of feasibility for any 
particular group of agents, just by narrowing the domain (over which the quantifiers 
range) to the group in question. 
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Non-Agent-Relative Accessibility. An outcome O is accessible in Z on f iff 
∃𝑋∃Φ(X’s Φ-ing is possible given constraint f, that is, is not incompatible with 
constraint f). 
where either  
a) X is an agent and Φ is an intentional action that will bring about O (or will 
make things such that an event e occurs that will bring about O) such that X 
brings about O safely and competently, or 
b) X is a group of agents and Φ is a set of intentional actions and for X to Φ is for 
it to be the case that, for each 𝜑 ∈ Φ there is some 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 such that x φs safely 
and competently (see above196); and the combined result of all 𝜑 ∈ Φ is O; and 
the group X brings about O safely.197  
One might think that a non-agent-relative definition of accessibility ought not to 
involve reference to agents and actions at all; an action is accessible on some FC 
just if there is a possible event that would bring it about compatibly with that FC. 
However, as I have said, I think that feasibility is a modal concept about doing. If 
something is possible, but cannot be brought about by intentional action, then it 
is not feasible, it is merely possible. This I take to be a key distinction between the 
two concepts, feasibility and possibility; the former requires agency while the 
latter does not. So, for an outcome to be (non-agent-relative) feasible (accessible) it 
must be possible for it to come about in an agential (and intentional) way. 
Again, this definition can be understood in terms of possible worlds. The 
existential quantifier quantifies over the restricted set of possible worlds selected 
by Z and the chosen FC together. The requirement of the definition is that there 
be an action (or set of actions) that brings about O in at least one of these possible 
worlds. To illustrate, then, participatory democracy is accessible on an FC that 
holds fixed certain deep facts of human nature only if, compatibly with those facts, 
it is possible for some agent(s) to bring it about in the right way. If there is an 
agent or group of agents who, in any of the possible worlds in which the facts of 
human nature hold, bring about participatory democracy (in the right way) then it 
is accessible on this FC. What is necessary is that there is an agential route to the 
                                                          
196 The definition of agent-relative accessibility above requires that the agent safely and 
competently bring about the outcome. Here, non-agent relative accessibility requires rather 
that each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 safely and competently φ. That is, each agent’s performance of the action 
φ must be creditable to a sufficient degree to their competence and would not too easily 
have failed. It is then added that the group, X, must safely bring about the outcome O. The 
considerations that motivated including a competence requirement in the agent-relative 
definition motivate including one here also (at the individual level). Competence is not 
required at the group level because it is not clear whether it makes sense to talk about a 
group, which need not be an agent, or anything more than a simple set of individuals, being 
competent to bring about a certain outcome. A safety requirement, though, is added at the 
group level for reasons that will be discussed below. 
197 Cf. Lawford-Smith (2013) 247. 
125 
 
outcome; if the outcome is possible but only through non-actions then, though it 
is possible, it is not feasible.  
Zofia Stemplowska raises a problem for accounts of feasibility: that of dealing 
with cases of joint, uncoordinated, action.198 Some outcomes that require joint, 
uncoordinated, action seem to be infeasible even though it is possible for everyone 
to perform the action required, and even though if everyone were to try to bring 
about the outcome, they would likely succeed. In Stemplowska’s example, if 
everyone were to try to touch their nose next Tuesday, they would likely succeed, 
but we might still think that the outcome consisting in everyone touching their 
nose next Tuesday is infeasible because of the difficulty of coordination. 
Stemplowska’s response to this problem is to argue that what is important is that 
the agent know how to do the necessary action, where knowing how to do an 
action requires knowing that some action will bring about a given outcome.199  
My account does not require that the agent know how to bring about the outcome 
in question, since it seems that an outcome can be feasible for an agent despite the 
agent not knowing how to bring it about. For instance, as in the case discussed 
above, it can be feasible for Florence to get a 2:1 despite not knowing what a 2:1 
is.200 Nevertheless, knowhow is not irrelevant to feasibility on my account. 
Though competence for bringing about an outcome O does not require knowledge 
how to bring about O, it will often, or usually, be the case that knowhow of some 
sort is bound up with competence. One can be competent to, say, get a 2:1 without 
knowing how to do so (because, perhaps, one does not know what a 2:1 is), but it 
seems clear that this competence will require knowledge how to do certain things. 
For instance, one will probably need knowledge how to write, how to sit an exam, 
answer the kind of questions asked by the exam, and knowledge of the material 
assessed. Thus, an agent’s knowledge (both propositional and, especially, 
procedural) will, when held fixed by the chosen FC, constrain feasibility.  
However, this does not deal with Stemplowska’s problem, since for cases of 
feasibility for groups, the competence requirement only applies to the individual 
actions that make up the group action (or collectively produce the outcome). The 
problem with everyone in the world touching their noses next Tuesday is not that 
                                                          
198 Stemplowska (2016) 276-7 
199 Ibid. 284 
200 My account does, though, require intentional action. Stemplowska (2016) seems nearly 
right when she says that ‘the feasibility of actions depends on there being an intentional 
agent, single or collective, who can perform the action in question’ (289). This is not quite 
correct, since in cases of joint, uncoordinated action there is no collective agent that 
performs the action, but the thought is close to the truth: there must be a set of intentional 
actions that bring about the outcome in question. 
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any individual agent is not competent to touch their nose. This problem is instead 
dealt with by the requirement that the group possibly bring about the outcome 
safely. The requirement here is that the group would not too easily have failed to 
produce the outcome. There has to be a possible world in which the group 
produces the outcome and in which it is true that in relevantly similar 
circumstances and in response to relevantly similar stimuli, the group would have 
produced the outcome (in all relevantly similar possible worlds, the outcome must 
also be produced by the group). It seems that, if we hold fixed the knowledge of 
everybody in the world, and their lack of coordination, there will be no such 
possibility in which the outcome in which everyone touches their nose next 
Tuesday is safely produced. There is, to be sure, a possible world, consistent with 
these constraints, in which everyone touches their nose next Tuesday. But it 
seems like the only possible worlds in which this happens will be ones in which it 
happens by luck, and thus not safely. Often, in fact, safety will require knowledge. 
If no members of a group possess knowledge how to bring about an outcome (or 
something equivalent to the outcome), it is likely that that group will not be able 
to bring about the outcome safely or reliably.201   
3.d) Stability 
I noted above that there is a use of ‘feasibility’ according to which an outcome 
must be both accessible and stable. To get a definition of this use, all that we need 
do is replace ‘bring about O’ in the above definitions of agent-relative and non-
agent-relative accessibility with ‘bring about O stably’. What, though, does it 
mean for an outcome to be stable? One writer who discusses this is Rawls, who put 
some importance in the stability of his conception of justice.202 He defines stability 
for systems, whereas what I want is a definition of stability for outcomes, or states 
of affairs. However, what he says for systems will be useful as a point of departure. 
He says that stability for systems is a matter of the forces in the system that will 
return the system to equilibrium. A system is in equilibrium ‘when it has reached a 
state that persists indefinitely over time so long as no external forces impinge 
upon it’. An equilibrium is stable ‘whenever departures from it ... call into play 
forces within the system that tend to bring it back to this equilibrium state’.203 
Rawls thus requires that departures from a stable system must themselves bring 
                                                          
201 Note, though, that my account does not, as Stemplowska’s does, say that everyone’s 
touching their nose next Tuesday is straightforwardly feasible. If we hold fixed agents’ 
knowledge and lack of coordination and so on, I think, then it does. But on other FCs, in 
which these things are allowed to vary, it may in fact be feasible.  
202 Rawls (1999a) 398-400 
203 Ibid. 400 
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about a return to equilibrium. I don’t see, however, why we must require this. 
Presumably an outcome would be stable whether departures from it tended to 
bring about returns to equilibrium, or whether departures were simply followed by 
returns.  
Brennan and Pettit’s discussion of feasibility centres exclusively around 
stability.204 They suggest that institutions are stable if they can be kept in place 
and enabled to promote the benefits for which they are designed.205 However, I want to 
reject this latter part, since stability, like feasibility, I take to be a non-moral 
notion; this definition conflates the desirability and feasibility questions into one. 
Whether it will promote the benefits for which it is designed should be a different 
question. It is the question of whether the proposal in conjunction with the 
realisation of those benefits is stable.  
Thus, my definition of stability is the following: 
 Stability. An outcome O is stable in Z on f if, and only if, it can be sustained 
    indefinitely as an equilibrium, compatibly with f. 
The inclusion of the phrase ‘as an equilibrium’ is intended to indicate that a stable 
outcome need not be sustained indefinitely and perfectly, without any departures. 
There may be some departures from the given outcome, so long as they tend to be 
followed by a return to the outcome in question. There is obviously some 
vagueness here, since the question how frequent, extensive or pervasive 
departures from an outcome must be before we determine that that outcome is not 
stable is not given any clear answer.  
I think that to be stable simpliciter an outcome must be sustainable indefinitely. 
However, I can see that we might want to say that outcomes that are not 
sustainable indefinitely, but for relatively long periods of time approximate more 
to stability. There is clearly a scale of unstable outcomes that approximate more 
or less to stability. An outcome that can only be sustained for, say, a day is further 
from being stable than one that can be maintained for long periods (years, decades 
perhaps), but that will eventually collapse.  
Thus, this definition requires that for an outcome O to be stable on an FC f, there 
must be no facts held fixed by f that prevent O from being sustained indefinitely.  
                                                          
204 Brennan and Pettit (2005) 
205 Wright (2006) also gives a moralised definition of his notion of viability, but it could be 
that his notion of viability is not simply equivalent to stability, but rather the combination 
of stability and desirability: it requires that outcomes ‘actually generate in a sustained 
manner the emancipatory consequences that motivated their proposal’ (97). 
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If some fact held fixed on f will tend to produce uncorrected departures from O, 
then O will not be stable. Thus, for example, on a certain FC that holds fixed a 
number of facts about human motivational nature, social life without coercion 
might be said to be unstable because if no-one coercively enforces law, then 
human nature (as held fixed on f) is such that people will be tempted to coerce 
others for their own advantage and so coercion will reappear. 
4. Alternative accounts 
The above concludes the presentation of my account of feasibility. It has two main 
features: first, there is no single binary concept of feasibility, but rather a range of 
possible binary sharpenings, no single one of which is obviously privileged over 
the others, and second, on any given sharpening, feasibility is a matter of what it 
is possible for agents to bring about safely and competently and through 
intentional action. I will now defend this account by showing that alternative 
accounts available in the literature are problematic. More specifically, I will 
defend the first of these two features, the ‘multivocality’ of my account. In this 
section, I argue that the main alternative accounts encounter difficulties that do 
not trouble a multivocal account of the sort offered above. This will also, however, 
indirectly constitute a defence of the second feature, the possibility-based account 
of feasibility given a choice of FC, since that account was offered as the most 
natural way of filling out a multivocal account, and avoiding the problems for 
univocal accounts that this section will adduce. In the next section, I argue that 
there is no obvious way to make a multivocal account work instead in terms of 
probability. 
4.a) Conditional probability account 
I will begin with the conditional probability account, which seems to be the most 
prominent account in the literature. This is the account suggested by Brennan 
and Southwood in response to the failure of the simple possibility and simple 
probability accounts.206 It says that feasibility is a matter of reasonable probability 
of success conditional on trying. This analyses feasibility claims as counterfactual 
statements. The claim that it is feasible for A to bring about O becomes: ‘if A tried 
to bring about O, A would probably (with a reasonable degree of probability) 
succeed’. However, given its simplest and most natural reading, this does not 
correspond to the ordinary concept of feasibility.  
                                                          
206 Brennan and Southwood (2007) 
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We can begin to see what the problem is when we note that the proposed 
analysans is a straightforward counterfactual statement of the form ‘If A were the 
case, C would be the case’. David Lewis’s is the most well-known analysis of 
counterfactuals. According to him, a statement of this form is true at a world i ‘iff 
some (accessible) AC-world [world at which both A and C are true] is closer to i 
than any A¬C-world [world at which both A and not-C are true], if there are any 
(accessible) A-worlds [worlds at which A is true]’.207 Thus, the above statement 
could be analysed as: 
‘There is some (accessible) possible world at which A tries to bring about O and 
has a reasonable probability of success that is closer to the actual world than any 
world at which A tries to bring about O and has an insufficient probability of 
success’. 
However, the closest possible world in which I try to, say, run a mile is not one in 
which I try very seriously. I am not very fit and am quite lazy, so a world in 
which I seriously try to run a mile (say, train myself, get fit, make repeated 
efforts) departs more from the actual world than one in which I just make a half-
hearted attempt once and then give up. On the above analysis, then, it is 
straightforwardly infeasible for me to run a mile. But it is not obvious that it is: 
there seems to be at least a sense available in which it is feasible for me to run a 
mile, despite the fact that in the closest possible world in which I try, I fail.208  
A plausible version of the conditional probability account, then, must demand 
probability conditional on something like wholehearted trying. This is obviously 
not a plausible account of the ordinary use of ‘trying’, but we could just stipulate 
that this is what is meant by the conditional probability account. My 
wholeheartedly trying to run a mile would no doubt involve training, making 
repeated efforts and so on, and so understood thus, the account would no doubt 
say that it is feasible for me to run a mile (at least within, say, a year). This gives 
us the following account: 
                                                          
207 Lewis (1973) 424-5 
208 The account could alternatively be read as interpreting the feasibility claim as saying 
something like ‘The probability that A brings about O given that A tries is sufficiently 
high’. If conditional probability is understood in terms of proportion of possible worlds, 
this reading could avoid the need to talk about probabilities in different possible worlds 
(which requires us to be able to make sense of single-case probability). We would simply 
take all of the possible worlds (or perhaps all of the sufficiently close possible worlds) in 
which A tries to bring about O and ask whether A succeeds in a sufficiently high 
proportion of them. However, there is an infinite number of possible worlds in which A 
tries. Thus, unless A succeeds in none or all of them, it is far from obvious what the 
proportion will be. In any case, if we can make sense of probability in this way, the same 
objections I make below to the counterfactual conditional probability account apply 
equally here. Southwood (2016) suggests moving from a counterfactual to a dispositional 
account of ability to avoid counterexamples to do with ‘finkish dispositions’: again, the 
objections I will raise apply mutatis mutandis to such an account of feasibility. 
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(CP) It is feasible for A to bring about O if, and only if, if A wholeheartedly tried (A 
tried her best) to bring about O, she would probably bring about O (or would 
tend to bring about O).209 
What, then, is meant by ‘wholeheartedly trying’? One option would be: 
‘performing the objectively best bundle of actions for bringing about O’. This, 
though, would give us a view quite different from the conditional probability 
account we started with, and one that loses some of the advantages that motivated 
it in the first place. It would say the following: 
(CPa) It is feasible for A to bring about O if, and only if, if A were to perform the 
objectively best bundle of actions for O (which presumably means something like: 
the bundle of actions, of those possible for A to perform, that would give O the 
highest probability), she would probably bring about O.210,211 
This is open again to the kinds of objection Brennan and Southwood made against 
the simple possibility view. A medical ignoramus, if they performed the best 
bundle of actions (not just what they consider to be the best bundle of actions), 
would have a good probability of performing a neurological operation. The best 
bundle of actions is the sequence of manoeuvres that constitutes the neurological 
operation in question. The problem is that they do not know which actions to 
perform and so, in actual fact, if they tried, they would have a very low probability 
of success. 
Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly, we could understand wholehearted 
trying in terms of what the agent believes to be best. David Estlund has suggested 
to me that we could understand it as ‘pursuing whatever is believed to be an 
effective (or likely to be effective) means to the outcome’. This would give us the 
following: 
(CPb) It is feasible for A to bring about O if, and only if, if A were to pursue 
whatever is believed to be an effective (or likely to be effective) means to O, she 
would probably bring about O. 
It seems like the conditional probability account will need to be fleshed out in 
something like this way, and this is the strongest version of it that I am aware of. 
However, there are still intuitions that this account does not capture. The 
intuitions I will point to are cases where our intuitions pull in different directions, 
so the account’s forcing us to go one way and not the other would not normally 
                                                          
209Stemplowska (2016) suggests understanding ‘trying’ in a similar way (275).  
210 Lawford-Smith’s (2013) account of scalar feasibility is something like this: she makes 
the degree of feasibility of O equal to its probability given the best action (255).  
211 If probabilities are entirely subjective, then ‘the objectively best bundle of actions’ 
should be understood, rather, as something like the bundle of actions that a fully-
informed, ideal observer would choose to bring about O. 
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count against it. However, in all of these cases, my account will accommodate the 
intuitive pull in both directions, where the conditional probability account fails to 
do so. Of course, the defender of the conditional probability account might accept 
these intuitive judgments about the use of ‘feasible’ but say that they are looking 
only for the concept that constrains moral requirement. For now, I will just 
address the question of whether the conditional probability account gives an 
adequate account of our ordinary concept of feasibility, but I will turn below to 
the thought that, although it does not do this, it provides an account of something 
that is a constraint on moral requirement (and to the thought that conditional 
probability premises, rather than feasibility premises, could complete the sorts of 
arguments for legitimacy that are the main subject of this thesis). 
4.b)i) CPb rules out too much 
Firstly, then, this specification of the account seems to concede too much to the 
agents’ beliefs. Something may be feasible for an agent even though they do not 
believe there to be any effective means to it available. For instance, suppose that 
the only way for me to successfully run a 4-minute mile in the next month is for 
me to cut off my legs and replace them with enhanced ‘super-legs’ and that it 
would be very easy for me to do this. It may be that I do not believe this to be an 
effective means, perhaps just because it does not occur to me, or perhaps because I 
do not know that it is possible or that it would work. Nevertheless, there is at 
least some intuitive pull to say that it is feasible for me to run the 4-minute mile 
(at least in one sense) just because it is an option for me to cut off my legs and 
replace them with super-legs. There also seems to be a valid sense in which it is 
not feasible, but my account can allow for both of these senses (for one we hold 
fixed the agent’s knowledge and for the other we do not), while the conditional 
probability account cannot. Similarly, I think intuitions are even clearer in a case 
where there are several apparent means available but only enough time to try one 
of them. Suppose I mistakenly believe that shouting at Geoff for a minute will 
make him angry and that this is the most effective means to make him angry; I 
also correctly believe that tickling Geoff for a minute will make him angry. 
Presumably the agent trying wholeheartedly will try the means she believes to be 
the most effective, so if I wholeheartedly tried to make Geoff angry in the next 
minute I would shout at him and I would fail. However, we intuitively want to say 
that it is feasible for me to make Geoff angry in a minute even though in the 
closest possible world in which I wholeheartedly tried I would fail. In this case, 
not only is there an effective means available, I am aware of it. 
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4.b)ii) CPb rules out too little 
This version of the conditional probability account, then, rules out too much. On 
the other hand, it also seems to rule out too little: there are certain sorts of facts 
that at least sometimes seem to constrain feasibility claims that the conditional 
probability account cannot count as constraints. One straightforward case where 
this happens is the case of a sleeping or unconscious agent. Suppose I was fast 
asleep between 3 and 4 am. Was it feasible for me to call you at 3.30 am? There is 
a very natural sense in which the answer is no (it might be denied that before I 
went to sleep it was infeasible for me to call you at 3.30 am, but it is hard to deny 
that the sense is available in which at 3.15 am it is infeasible for me to call you at 
3.30 am). Suppose, though, that I have all the correct beliefs about where the 
telephone is, how to use it to call you, and so on. If I had pursued the means I 
believed to be most effective (supposing, not implausibly, that beliefs can persist 
through unconsciousness), I would have had a high probability of success. The 
problem, though, is that, holding fixed my sleeping, it was not feasible for me to 
even try to pursue these means.212 
4.b)iii) Motivational failure 
The conditional probability account has further counterintuitive consequences in 
the case of motivational failure. There is an intuitive temptation to include at least 
some motivations as constraints on feasibility as well as some temptation not to 
always include all motivations as constraints.213 In some cases we do not want the 
agent’s motivations to count as a constraint on feasibility; that is, we want it to be 
feasible for A to bring about O despite the fact that A is not motivated to do so 
(such as in Brennan and Pettit’s lazy parent case or Estlund’s chicken-dancing 
case). In other cases, we want to allow an agent’s motivations to count as a 
constraint on feasibility, such as in cases of pathological motivational failure. The 
conditional probability account cannot, I think, capture both of these intuitions 
where, again, my account can.  
Account (CPb) can be read in two ways: ‘pursue’ in ‘pursue whatever means to O 
are believed to be effective’ can be read as a success verb or not. If read as a 
success verb, it means ‘perform (successfully) whatever actions are believed to be 
                                                          
212 Lehrer (1976) 249 makes a similar point about conditional analyses of ‘ability’. 
213 Stemplowska (2016) argues that conditional accounts of feasibility fail adequately to 
deal with cases of motivational failure. 
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such that if they were successfully performed would be effective for O’.214 If read in 
this way, the account seems to exclude all motivations, even extreme pathological 
ones. If I believe that walking across the plank positioned over the 500-metre 
chasm would be an effective means to cross it then there is an action that I believe 
to be effective that, if successfully performed, would have a high probability of 
resulting in my getting across the chasm. But if I suffer from a pathological fear of 
heights such that I could not bring myself to walk on the plank, I think we would 
be loath to say that it is feasible for me to cross the chasm. In any case, this is not 
a plausible reading of the condition, since it would make almost any action feasible 
for an agent: generally, one action I will believe to be effective for φ-ing is φ-ing, 
and if I successfully did that, then of course I would have a high probability of 
success in φ-ing.  
If, on the other hand, we do not read ‘pursuing’ as a success term, we get 
something like ‘setting out to perform whatever actions are believed to be effective 
if attempted’. In this case, motivations seem to be ruled in as constraints more or 
less wholesale, since in the closest possible world in which I try wholeheartedly in 
this sense, it may be that I would not in fact succeed in performing the actions 
believed to be effective if attempted, just because I would not be motivated to do 
so: my attempt would be blocked by my motivations (or it could be that there are 
no actions believed to be effective if attempted because I know that I will not be 
motivated to carry through the attempt). This, too, seems implausible: we do not 
want to say that outcomes are infeasible for me whenever I lack the motivation to 
carry through actions/sequences of actions that would bring them about. A 
natural response is that ‘pursuing’ means neither ‘performing’ nor ‘setting out to 
perform’ but rather ‘trying wholeheartedly to perform’ but then the question is 
just postponed ad infinitum. On my account, these seemingly conflicting intuitions 
are accommodated since it simply says that on some sharpenings of ‘feasibility’ 
motivations are constraints, and on others they are not. If we hold fixed your 
motivations and there is no possibility of your intentionally performing an action 
to bring about your φ-ing given those motivations, then it will not be feasible for 
you to do so, but if we allow your motivations to vary and there is a possibility 
                                                          
214 I simplify things here since, as can be seen, there are two possible readings of ‘believed 
to be effective’ and each of the two readings of ‘pursue’ could be matched with either of the 
two readings of ‘believed to be effective’. The two possibilities not tried out here do not 
change matters. 
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(given the other constraints) of your φ-ing with different motivations then it will 
be feasible for you.215  
Zofia Stemplowska defends a modified version of the conditional probability 
account that she thinks deals with the problem of motivational failure.216 Her 
suggestion is that when there is a conceivable incentive ‘that would bring the 
agent’s motivational state in line with what is needed to perform the action in 
question’, the action is feasible for the agent, whatever may be true about their 
actual motivations, but if there is no such conceivable incentive, then the action is 
infeasible for them. Her first proposal defines ‘feasibility’ thus: 
Action φ is (more) feasible if there is an incentive I such that, given I, X will try 
to do φ and, given I, is (more) likely to do φ.217 
However, there is a problem with this, which is that there seems to be at least a 
sense in which it is feasible for me to, say, kill someone I love, even if there is no 
conceivable incentive that would induce me to do so. There may be few such 
actions, but we can certainly imagine there being some things that we are so 
motivationally committed to not doing that we never will (so long as our 
motivations remain constant). Nevertheless, it is natural to say that, in some cases 
at least, we are committed to not doing these actions despite their feasibility for us. 
Stemplowska notes this problem in the case of actions that we are committed to 
not performing for moral reasons: ‘If [an agent’s] failure to respond [to 
incentives] is solely due to her seeing action φ as (normatively) wrong, then we 
should not brand her as genuinely motivationally unable’. Thus, she revises the 
above definition to: 
Action φ is (more) feasible if there is an incentive I – or had the agent X not seen 
φ as wrong there would be I – such that, given I, X will try to φ and, given I, X 
is (more) likely to φ.218 
                                                          
215 My account allows that it can be feasible for you to do something despite its not being 
possible for you to do it intentionally. For instance, supposing that holding fixed your 
motivations there is no possibility of you walking out onto a plank over a 500m chasm, it 
could still be feasible for you to walk out onto the plank if it is possible for you to press a 
button that activates a machine that takes control of your legs and makes you walk onto 
the plank. This may seem implausible, but I do not think that it is a serious problem. All 
that is needed is to distinguish between walking onto the plank, and the intentional action 
of walking onto the plank. In the above case, the outcome consisting in your walking onto 
the plank will be feasible for you, but the outcome consisting in your performing the 
intentional action of walking onto the plank will not. (If we understand the verb ‘walking’ 
as necessarily requiring intentionality, then there is no problem in the first place.) There 
is also, of course, the possibility of you taking a pill to change your motivations and 
thereby making the intentional action possible, but this, of course, is not consistent with 
your motivations being held fixed. 
216 Stemplowska (2016) 
217 Ibid. 280 
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However, this only resolves part of the problem. An agent’s robust motivational 
commitment to not doing an action need not be for moral reasons. It does not 
seem inconceivable that you might be perfectly committed to not doing φ for 
non-moral reasons, but yet there be no (or little) motivational difficulty in doing 
φ if you wanted (and thus presumably no motivational inability). I might resolve to 
pursue some project (with no particular moral value) come what may and be so 
stubborn or determined that no incentive will induce me to do otherwise even 
though I can easily motivate myself to do otherwise if I want to. For this reason, I 
think my account does better than Stemplowska’s: something we will never be 
motivated to bring about can be feasible when we do not hold motivations 
fixed.219   
4.c) Mixing possibility and probability 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith present versions of the conditional-probability 
account that mix elements of possibility-based accounts with probability-based 
accounts.220 They argue that there is both a binary and a scalar notion of 
feasibility. The binary sense is a matter of possibility (consistent with certain 
expansive ‘hard constraints’, such as logical, nomological and biological 
constraints), while the scalar sense is a matter of probability conditional on 
trying. The degree of feasibility in the scalar sense is supposed to be determined 
by ‘soft constraints’, such as economic, institutional and cultural constraints. In 
other words, the former ‘hard constraints’ are taken to make outcomes impossible 
(and thus rule them out as infeasible), while the ‘soft constraints’ merely make 
them less probable (and thereby reduce their degree of feasibility).221  
I think they are right to note that there is a binary sense of ‘feasibility’, and it will 
be noticed that my account of feasibility given a choice of FC is similar to their 
account of binary feasibility, only replacing compatibility with hard constraints 
with compatibility with the chosen set of facts. However, I think it is wrong to 
think of constraints on feasibility as working in these two discrete ways. Social, 
cultural, and economic constraints can render things impossible. For example, so 
long as the laws are as they are, it is simply impossible for a non-citizen to become 
                                                                                                                                                   
218 Ibid. 281 
219 I think she is right, though, that when we hold motivations fixed, actions that we may 
seem motivationally unable to do are feasible if there is some incentive that will induce us 
to do them. 
220 Gilabert (2009) and (2017); Lawford-Smith (2013); Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012). 
There are small differences between the accounts presented in these four papers, but the 
elements I discuss seem to be constant throughout. 
221 Tyler Cowen (2007) and Geoffrey Brennan (2013) have also argued that feasibility is 
(or at least can be) a matter of degree. 
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president of the USA. If the laws are fixed, there is no possible world in which a 
non-citizen becomes president of the USA; if a non-citizen claims to be president 
of the USA they will simply be wrong. This is of course a different kind of 
impossibility from that involved in contravening the laws of physics. The positive 
laws of the USA can be changed; the laws of physics cannot. (Even this 
distinction, though, does not obviously correspond to Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith’s distinction between hard and soft constraints: while laws of logic and 
physics can certainly not be changed, it may not be inconceivable for the laws of 
biology to be changed.) However, this difference is to do with whether the 
constraints themselves can be removed (how ‘fixed’, or hard to change, they are), 
not the manner in which the different kinds of constraints affect feasibility given 
that they are in place. The ‘soft constraints’ can affect the probability of outcomes, 
but they can also rule out outcomes. (They cannot, of course, rule out outcomes as, 
for example, physically impossible, but they can rule out outcomes as impossible 
so long as the soft constraint in question is constant.)  
On the other hand, the laws of physics may render things improbable but not 
impossible. This point does not depend on the laws of physics themselves being 
probabilistic: a non-probabilistic law could contribute to some outcome’s having a 
low probability. For instance, if we hold fixed the laws of physics as well as my 
knowledge, skills, strength and so on, I will have a low probability of surviving if 
I jump off a cliff into the sea. It is not impossible that I will survive, but if the laws 
of physics were different I could have a much higher chance of survival (for 
example, if the laws of physics were such that when an object falls towards earth 
it is repelled back towards where it started).222  
Something like this problem motivated David Wiens to look for a binary sense of 
feasibility that is more restrictive than that suggested by Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith.223 He, like me, rejects the conditional probability account and offers a 
possibility-based account in its place, arguing that feasibility should be 
understood as possibility consistent with a ‘resource stock’: ‘realising a target 
state of affairs is feasible only if there is an attainable resource stock that enables 
us to realise it’.224 The resource stock defines an accessibility relation on the set of 
possible worlds and feasibility is a matter of possibility within this accessibility 
relation: in other words, there being a possible world consistent with the resource 
stock in which the outcome comes about. The accessibility relation is defined thus: 
                                                          
222 Wiens (2015a) makes a similar objection to Lawford-Smith (450). 
223 Wiens (2015a) 
224 Ibid. 455 
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‘a world is a member of the feasible set only if it is compatible with the facts 
pertaining to the composition of the total resource stock, the conversion 
processes, the causal processes and the state(s) of affairs that obtain at the actual 
world at the time of evaluation’.225 Now, as I think Wiens is aware, it is not 
plausible to define feasibility simply in terms of possibility, even restricted 
possibility (he seems only to offer it as a necessary condition for feasibility). Such an 
account, if taken as definitional of ‘feasibility’, would, just like the simple 
possibility account, have implausible consequences of the sort raised by Brennan 
and Southwood. There is almost certainly a possible world consistent with the 
‘resource stock’ in which our medical ignoramus successfully performs a 
neurological operation. In general, it would allow too many outcomes to count as 
feasible that one might succeed in bringing about only by luck. I think Wiens is 
right to reject the conditional probability view and to bring possibility back in, 
but I think it is also necessary to add an additional element to the simple 
possibility account, as my account does, to rule out outcomes that an agent could 
possibly bring about by luck.  
This is not, though, something that Wiens need disagree with. Some additional 
elements could be added to Wiens’s necessary condition to give a full account. His 
aim appears to be primarily to argue that there are binary constraints on 
feasibility (capable of ruling out proposals as infeasible) that are more restrictive 
than Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s hard constraints. However, even as only a 
necessary condition, Wiens’s account has to rule out outcomes that could in some 
contexts reasonably be said to be feasible and it also has to count as feasible 
outcomes that could reasonably be said to be infeasible. Wiens defines his 
accessibility relation (the set of worlds that constitutes the feasible set) in two 
steps: it includes not only worlds that can be realised given the actual resource 
stock, but also worlds that are realisable given resource stocks that are attainable 
by transformation of the actual resource stock. Either we only allow one 
transformation of the resource stock (supposing there is some way of delimiting 
what counts as a single transformation) or we allow multiple iterations.  
If we only allow worlds realisable after one iteration of transformation of the 
actual resource stock (whatever that means), then we seem to arbitrarily restrict 
the feasible set, and we rule out many things that we will intuitively want to 
count as feasible. For instance, suppose that to institute some policy we will need 
increased economic resources and in order to get these we will need to change 
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public opinion about government spending (but this is quite easily done). This 
sounds like it will involve multiple successive transformations of the resource 
stock but it does seem that there is at least a sense in which it is feasible.  
On the other hand, we could allow multiple iterations of transformation of the 
resource stock. This, though, seems to make Wiens’s account of feasibility very 
permissive. There are very many (quite unrealistic) outcomes that come about in 
some possible world that is accessible by some possible series of transformations of 
our current resource stock. There is almost certainly, for instance, a possible series 
of transformations of the current resource stock that is consistent with the 
realisation of a proportional electoral system in the UK. But it does not seem 
obviously false to assert that the realisation of such a system is not feasible, in at 
least some valid sense. Wiens does note that his account has the consequence that 
it is very difficult to know whether distant outcomes are feasible.226 This, though, 
is not the problem here. It is not natural to think that someone asserting the 
infeasibility of a proportional electoral system should rather be asserting simply 
that we do not know whether such a system is feasible. It in fact seems that we can 
have fairly good grounds for believing that such a system will come out as feasible 
on Wiens’s account, but yet there seems to be a valid sense in which it is not. Any 
attempt to give a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions for feasibility 
will, I think, miss the fact that for many outcomes there is both a sense in which 
they are feasible and a sense in which they are not. A proportional electoral 
system in the UK is feasible in one sense in that it is perfectly consistent with the 
deeper facts of human society and so on, but plausibly is not feasible in another 
sense, which holds fixed more of the actual facts. 
4.d) The constraint on moral requirement 
I have argued in this section that available alternatives to my multivocal account 
fail to capture the concept of feasibility. Proponents of these alternatives, 
however, might grant that their accounts do not provide an analysis of the 
ordinary concept of feasibility, but claim that they do provide an account of some 
other concept that is a constraint on moral requirement. Thus, for instance, it 
might be claimed that, even if feasibility is not conditional probability, conditional 
probability is a constraint on moral requirement: something like an ‘“ought” 
implies “conditionally probable”’ principle holds. Even if I have found the best 
analysis of the ordinary concept of feasibility, it might be said, this just shows that 
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feasibility is not the constraint on morality that it was thought to be; the 
constraint is rather conditional probability (or something else).  
The reason that we are interested in feasibility here is that plausible moral 
arguments for state legitimacy appear to depend on premises about feasibility. It 
is standardly thought that feasibility has some relevance to morality (it is usually 
thought to be a simple constraint). If it is morally relevant, then it makes sense to 
expect to be able to make arguments about moral permissibility using premises 
about feasibility. However, if you think that it is instead something else (like 
conditional probability) that is morally relevant, then you might think that the 
arguments for state legitimacy can be made instead using premises about 
conditional probability (or whatever else is the constraint on moral requirement). 
In that case, my account of feasibility will have no particular bearing on state 
legitimacy.  
The plausible arguments for state legitimacy that I discussed in the first part of 
the thesis required premises like ‘This state’s being an exclusive enforcer is the 
only feasible way of doing something morally required (e.g. achieving full status 
freedom) or morally good’ or ‘The best feasible way things might be involves this 
state’s being an exclusive enforcer’. If feasibility is a constraint on moral 
requirement (that is, an action can only be morally required if it is feasible), then 
it seems plausible that, for instance, if an action is the only feasible way of doing 
something morally required, then it too is morally required. If a) you are morally 
required to φ, b) only feasible actions can be required and c) the only feasible way 
to φ is to ψ, then plausibly you are required to ψ. (It might also be thought to 
follow that an action which makes things the best they might feasibly be is 
permissible, though that is more controversial.) However, if it is not feasibility 
that constrains morality in this way, but, say, conditional probability (that is, an 
action can only be morally required if it is probable conditional on trying), then a 
similar principle for conditional probability might plausibly follow. In that case, it 
will be possible to make versions of the arguments for state legitimacy discussed 
above based on conditional probability premises (for instance). Instead of a 
feasibility premise, we might have something like the following: ‘this state’s being 
an exclusive enforcer is the only way of doing something morally required that 
has a sufficient probability of success conditional on trying’. If conditional 
probability is a constraint on moral requirement, then this might be sufficient to 
establish permissibility. 
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However, I think that not only do the alternative accounts discussed in this 
section fail to give a plausible account of feasibility, they also do not identify a 
straightforward constraint on moral requirement. In fact, I think, the arguments I 
gave above against these alternative accounts as accounts of feasibility also show 
that they fail as accounts of a constraint on moral requirement. I will briefly run 
through them in turn to indicate how they transfer. 
Firstly, it seems plausible that you can be morally required to φ even though in 
the closest possible world in which you pursue the means you believe to be 
effective for φ-ing, you would be unlikely to succeed. In my example above, I 
mistakenly believe that shouting at Geoff for a minute will make him angry and 
that this is the best way to do so, but I correctly believe that tickling him for a 
minute will make him angry. In the closest possible world in which I pursue the 
means I believe to be effective for making Geoff angry in the next minute, I 
presumably shout at him for a minute and fail. It seems plausible, though, that 
this is compatible with my being morally required to make Geoff angry in the 
next minute in this case (leaving aside why this might ever be morally required of 
me). To take another case, it seems plausible that Daphne fails to do something 
she was morally required to do if she votes for a racist party A, believing it to be 
an anti-racist party. Whether she is culpable for this moral failing will presumably 
depend on whether she was culpably ignorant. But suppose she was culpably 
ignorant. If (CPb) is a constraint on moral requirement, then we cannot say that 
Daphne failed to do something she was morally required to do (vote for a non-
racist party) because she was culpably ignorant. In the closest possible world in 
which she pursues the means she believes to be effective for voting for an anti-
racist party, she fails. Nevertheless, it is natural to think that she did fail to do 
something she was required to do. If we take (CPb) as a constraint on moral 
requirement, we can still say that she was required to inform herself about the 
parties, and that she failed to do this morally required thing, but we cannot say 
that this led her to do another wrong thing (vote for the racist party).  
Secondly, as we saw above, if we read ‘pursue’ in (CPb) as a success verb, almost 
any action turns out to be conditionally probable, rendering the proposed 
constraint on moral requirement bloodless. On the other hand, if we do not read it 
as a success verb, we get something like the claim that required actions must be 
likely to succeed conditional on ‘setting out to perform whatever actions are 
believed to be effective if attempted’. This makes motivations a constraint on moral 
requirement pretty much wholesale. If you lack the motivation to carry through 
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an attempt to φ, then you will be unlikely to succeed if you set out to perform the 
actions you believe to be effective for φ-ing if attempted. It must be possible, 
though, to be morally required to do things that you lack the motivation to do.227 
If it is possible to be morally required to do something even though you would 
not be likely to succeed given wholehearted trying, then something’s (ψ) being 
the only way of doing something morally required (φ) that would be likely to 
succeed conditional on wholehearted trying does not show that it too is morally 
required (since you could be required to φ in some other way). 
It might be thought that (CPa) (probability conditional on performance of the 
objectively best available action), which we rejected as an account of feasibility, 
provides a constraint on moral requirement. It obviously cannot be the only 
constraint on moral requirement, since the medical ignoramus who performs the 
objectively best sequence of actions will be likely to successfully perform a 
neurological operation, yet it is not plausible that they could be morally required 
to do so. But it might be thought that (CPa) is nevertheless a constraint on moral 
requirement: it is necessary that something be probable conditional on the 
objectively best action for it to be morally required. This claim, though, adds little 
to the thought that you cannot be required to do what is not feasible for you. The 
notion of availability it makes use of is just as much in need of elucidation as that 
of feasibility. We could understand it in terms of conditional probability, but then 
all of the above problems resurface. If instead we understand it in terms of my 
account of feasibility, or in terms of possibility, we end up with multiple possible 
ways in which the notion could be made precise, and so it is unclear, in just the 
same way as for feasibility, exactly what constraints this does put on morality.  
Stemplowska’s definition of feasibility also cannot be a constraint on moral 
requirement. She proposed the following: 
Action φ is (more) feasible if there is an incentive I – or had the agent X not seen 
φ as wrong there would be I – such that, given I, X will try to φ and, given I, X 
is (more) likely to φ.228 
As I argued above, it seems perfectly possible that one could be so committed to 
not doing something for non-moral reasons that there is no incentive that will in 
fact lead you to try to do it. And it also seems perfectly possible that one could be 
morally required to do that thing despite this extreme level of commitment. If 
somebody has such an extreme commitment, for example, to not touching people 
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of some gender that no incentive could induce them to do so, this does not rule 
out their being morally required to save someone of that gender from drowning 
(even when this requires physical contact). 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith’s ‘hard constraints’ could act as a constraint on 
moral permissibility (and they are designed to do so). However, as we saw, they 
are not the only constraints that, insofar as they are held fixed, can rule out 
proposals. It seems somewhat arbitrary to draw the line exactly where they have 
done. Perhaps it is true that the constraints they point to (logical, nomological 
and biological constraints) are always, or almost always, constraints on moral 
requirement. But it does seem plausible that these are not in all contexts the only 
feasibility constraints. Their ‘soft constraints’ on the other hand cannot play a 
constraining role, and they are not designed to, since they are scalar. There could 
be some threshold of scalar feasibility below which actions cannot be morally 
required, but if we say this we just end up with the standard conditional 
probability account again, since that account just restricts moral requirement to 
those actions that are sufficiently probable conditional on trying (i.e. those above 
some threshold of conditional probability). We saw above that this does not 
identify a general constraint on moral requirement.  
Wiens’s account of feasibility is an attempt to argue that there is a binary 
feasibility constraint on moral requirement that is stronger than Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith’s hard constraints. But, as I argued above, it seems either to 
arbitrarily restrict the feasible set in a conservative way to what can be achieved 
through one iteration of transformation of the resource stock, or else to be 
excessively permissive. On the one hand, it does not seem plausible that we can 
never be morally required to pursue outcomes that require reasonably long-term 
planning, and multiple iterations of transformation of the existing resource stock. 
On the other, there are very many unrealistic outcomes that come about as the 
result of some series of possible transformations of the current resource stock. It 
seems quite plausible that there are constraints on moral requirement more 
demanding than this. 
Thus, I do not think that these alternative accounts provide a straightforward 
constraint on moral requirement. If something is feasible for you (on some 
relevant sharpening) but not conditionally probable (that is, would not be likely to 
come about if you pursued the means you believe to be effective), it may still be 
morally required. If it is possible for you to do it or bring it about reliably given 
certain aspects of the way the world is (i.e., holding them fixed), you may be 
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morally required to do it even if you would not be likely to succeed in the closest 
possible world in which you pursue the means you believe to be effective. It does 
not matter what happens in the closest possible world in which you try 
wholeheartedly; what matters is what is possible for you (but the question remains, 
possible given what?). It seems natural to think that the constraints on what you 
can be morally required to do are not given by what would happen in some 
particular counterfactual possible world, but by what is possible for you given 
certain facts of the actual world. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that 
the arguments for state legitimacy I discussed in the first part of the thesis go 
through if made with, for example, conditional probability premises instead of 
feasibility premises. If, for instance, it is the case that being an exclusive enforcer 
is the only way for state S to ensure status freedom (which, let us suppose, is 
morally required) that is likely to succeed conditional on wholehearted trying, it 
does not follow that it is permissible, since there could be other ways of doing it 
that are morally required despite not being likely to succeed conditional on 
wholehearted trying.  
My claim is not that feasibility is a straightforward constraint on moral 
requirement, and these other concepts are not. As I will argue in the next chapter, 
my account of feasibility has the consequence, on the contrary, that feasibility as 
such cannot be. There is no single sharpening of ‘feasibility’ that is obviously 
privileged over others, and most outcomes are feasible on some sharpenings and 
not on others. It is not obvious which facts an action must be compatible with in 
order to be morally required. Feasibility tout court, then, is not apt to be a 
straightforward constraint on morality: at best some sharpening(s) of feasibility 
can be (and most likely, different sharpenings are in different contexts). But I 
think that whatever constraints there are on moral requirement (though they may 
not be as simple as they are often thought to be) are most plausibly to do with 
feasibility (or possibility), not conditional probability or other alternatives. Since 
none of these, though, provide a straightforward constraint on moral 
requirement, arguments for state legitimacy that rely on feasibility premises (or 
conditional probability, or similar) cannot be taken for granted. Whether they are 
read as being about feasibility as defined by my account, or about conditional 
probability, or any other alternative discussed above, they cannot be assumed to 
make the arguments for legitimacy go through. 
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5. A multivocal conditional probability account? 
The above arguments suggest that my multivocal account does better at 
capturing the concept of feasibility than alternative available univocal accounts, 
and also that these latter accounts do not identify a constraint on moral 
requirement (and so do not offer a straightforward alternative way of arguing for 
state legitimacy). However, one might accept these arguments and this 
conclusion, and accept the need for a multivocal account of feasibility, but think 
that the correct multivocal account should be cashed out in terms of conditional 
probability, rather than in terms of possibility, as in my account. I will call such an 
account, snappily, the multivocal conditional probability account (MCP). Such an 
account would accept my primary contention that the best account of feasibility 
we can give is a multivocal one, and so would have similar consequences for 
arguments for state legitimacy to those that follow from my account (which I will 
discuss in the next chapter). Still, I will briefly argue here that there is no obvious 
way to make an MCP account work, and so we should take my possibility-based 
account to be the best going attempt at a multivocal account of feasibility. 
We could give such an account as follows. When we ask about the feasibility of φ-
ing for me in the actual world, we say (just as I do) that there are multiple 
possible ways of making this precise, and we will only get a determinate answer 
once we specify a sharpening. On this account, though, a sharpening is just a 
specification of the facts of the world; call it a starting point (SP). Unlike for my 
account, we do not ask which of the facts that actually hold we will hold fixed, 
rather we just choose a set of facts. These could be any facts: while normally we 
will be interested in starting points that have some resemblance to the actual 
world, we simply choose the facts however we like. There will then need to be 
some account of how the facts chosen on some SP must relate to the facts of the 
actual world in order for it to count as a possible sharpening of feasibility for me 
(or any actual agent). An MCP account must do something like this rather than 
choosing a set of the actual facts to hold fixed (like my account) as I will explain 
below.  
We can then define (agent-relative) feasibility on an SP thus: 
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(MCP) It is feasible for agent X to bring about O on SP s iff, with the facts 
being as specified by s, if X tries wholeheartedly to bring about O, X has a 
reasonable probability of success.229 
I do not think, though, that the account is viable, and for this reason think that we 
should consider the possibility-based account to be the best available multivocal 
account.  
There is a basic problem with the MCP account, which is that there is no obvious 
way to determine which sets of facts relate to the actual world in the right way for 
an SP to count as a sharpening of ‘feasibility’ for me or us. My account starts with 
the facts of the actual world, and then defines sharpenings as choices of which of 
those facts to hold fixed. Admittedly, it allows for outlandish limiting cases, where 
barely any of the facts of the world are held fixed, but these are still limiting cases 
of feasibility for the actual world; an FC could not hold fixed any facts that do not 
hold in the actual world. The MCP cannot do things this way. If we choose an 
arbitrary set of facts of the actual world to hold fixed and then ask what would be 
likely to happen if we tried to φ, the choice of facts to hold fixed makes little 
difference to the answer. For instance, even if we allow, say, all of the actual facts 
to vary except the laws of physics, the truth of a conditional probability statement 
will still depend only on nearby possible worlds in which the agent tries 
wholeheartedly. Even if we allow to vary all but the laws of physics, it will still be 
the case that if I tried wholeheartedly to run a mile in 5 minutes I would fail, 
because there is a closer possible world in which I have human legs and limited 
strength and so on than any in which I do not. Thus, for the multiple sharpenings 
to make a significant difference, they need to give us a world from which 
conditional probability is to be evaluated, not just a set of actual facts to hold 
fixed. For instance, if we assumed a starting point where the laws of physics were 
different, then it might be that if I tried wholeheartedly to run a mile in 10 
seconds I would be likely to succeed. Or if we assumed a starting point where 
people were motivated differently, we might be likely to succeed in establishing 
some social structure that we would be unlikely to successfully establish in the 
actual world. 
It is plausible that when we make a feasibility claim we tacitly assume a choice of 
which facts of the world to hold fixed and then mean something to do with what 
is possible given these facts. It is not plausible, though, that, as the MCP account 
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problems that motivated these modifications.  
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would have it, we are making a claim about what counterfactuals would hold in 
some specific non-actual possible world. On this view, feasibility claims that appear 
to be about the actual world lose their connection to it. There is no obvious 
principled way to determine which SPs (possible ways the world might be) can 
give sharpenings of claims about feasibility for us in the actual world. The MCP 
account also, relatedly, has the consequence that in order to make a determinate 
feasibility claim (with sharpening specified), I need to know how the world must 
be for the agent to bring about the outcome in question. On my account, when we 
make a feasibility claim, we just assert that there is some possible world out of a 
range in which the agent brings about the outcome, but on the MCP account, we 
assert that in a specific possible world (the closest world to the world specified by 
the SP in which the agent tries to bring about the outcome) the agent succeeds. 
This seems implausible. Thus, I think there is reason to prefer my account to the 
MCP account. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to understand what we mean when we say that 
some outcome is or is not feasible. I have argued that no single binary definition is 
obviously privileged as the definition of feasibility tout court; rather, there is a 
whole range of possible binary ‘sharpenings’, corresponding to FCs, or selections 
of facts to hold fixed. Which of these is meant by some feasibility claim may be 
determined by the context or background assumptions. Alternatively, it may be 
indeterminate, requiring further specification for the claim to have determinate 
truth conditions. In principle, what I have said does not rule out the possibility of 
someone giving an argument that one of these sharpenings is in some way 
privileged over the others, but unless such an argument emerges, I think there is 
no reason to think that feasibility is a univocal concept. This, I believe, captures 
our ordinary concept of feasibility better than any of the rival accounts. There are 
many different ways in which we use ‘feasibility’, many different constraints that 
are tacitly assumed when we make feasibility claims. When we say, for example, 
that a proportional electoral system is not currently feasible in the UK we usually 
tacitly hold fixed a different range of facts to when we say that communism is 
made infeasible by human nature. I argued that a unified account of feasibility 
given a choice of FC can be given, illustrating how the different sharpenings are 
all sharpenings of a single concept. Feasibility, I claimed, is a matter of possibility 
consistent with the facts held fixed by the FC. This is the most plausible 
multivocal account of the concept available. An FC can thus be understood as 
functioning like an accessibility relation on a domain of possible worlds.  
147 
 
As I will argue in the next chapter, this account of feasibility has the consequence 
that we cannot take the success of arguments that depend on feasibility premises 
for granted until we have some idea of exactly which sharpenings of ‘feasibility’ 
these premises must be true on to make the arguments work. I also argued in this 
chapter that the alternative available accounts of feasibility, in addition to failing 
as accounts of feasibility, do not identify a straightforward constraint on moral 
requirement, and there is no reason to think that in considering the consequences 
of my account of feasibility for arguments for legitimacy, we are focusing on the 
wrong concept. If anything, I think, it is feasibility that will allow us to argue for 
the permissibility of some action, but there is no immediate or obvious answer to 
the question which sharpenings of feasibility are relevant as constraints for which 
moral claims.   
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Chapter 6:  
Conclusions: unrealistic anarchism 
 
Let me begin by taking stock of what we have done so far. The conclusion of the 
first part of my thesis was that the only arguments that could plausibly establish a 
general and exclusive permission to enforce for at least some existing states 
depend on feasibility premises. I argued that attempts to show that the legitimacy 
of certain kinds of states can be established a priori are unsuccessful, and the most 
plausible grounds we have for thinking that the legitimacy of at least some 
existing states is on safe ground depend on assumptions about feasibility. If there 
were a simple ‘“ought” implies “feasibility”’ constraint on morality, and feasibility 
were a simple binary and univocal concept, then, as we saw, some feasibility 
premises like the following might well be sufficient to establish the legitimacy of 
some state S (that is, its having a general and exclusive permission to enforce): 
 ‘The best feasible worlds involve state S being an exclusive enforcer’. 
 ‘A condition of right can only feasibly be achieved or maintained with the 
  existence of exclusive enforcer S.’ 
‘Full status freedom can only feasibly be achieved or maintained with the 
existence of exclusive enforcer S.’ 
 Etc. 
(Whether or not these premises would establish legitimacy I leave open, but it 
does not seem implausible that some such premise, if true, would suffice.)  
In general, it is plausible that something like the following principle is true: 
(P1) If x is the only way for agent A to do something A is morally required to 
do, then A will be morally required to do x, and so, a fortiori, permitted 
to do it.  
In addition, though much more open to doubt, it could also be thought that 
another similar principle holds: 
(P1’) If x is the only way of bringing about the best possible state of affairs, 
then it is at least permissible to do it. 
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Certainly, on a consequentialist view, P1’ will hold. If there is a deontological 
complaint against x, then P1’ need not hold, but it might be thought that it does 
generally hold where the complaint against x is only pro tanto, i.e., is defeasible.  
If, then, it is morally required, for instance, to create and enter, or maintain, a 
condition of right, then if state S’s being an exclusive and general enforcer is the 
only way this could be done, it follows from P1 that it has an exclusive and general 
permission to enforce. The claim, though, of the first part of the thesis is that 
there are no plausible strict necessity claims of this sort capable of making 
arguments for state legitimacy go through. The most plausible way to make these 
arguments work involves feasibility premises instead of strict possibility premises. 
It might seem plausible, though, that, as mentioned above, as well as P1 (and 
perhaps P1’), a similar principle involving feasibility is true: 
(P2) If x is the only feasible way for agent A to do something A is morally 
required to do, then A will be morally required to do x, and so, a fortiori, 
permitted to do it. 
And again, more controversially, perhaps also: 
(P2’) If x is the only feasible way of bringing about the best possible state of 
affairs, then it is at least permissible to do it. 
(We saw in the last chapter that there are certain alternative candidates to 
feasibility premises to complete arguments for state legitimacy, such as 
conditional probability premises, but we saw also that it is not plausible that an 
equivalent of P2 (or of P2’) holds for these.)  
Principle P2 (and perhaps P2’) seems plausibly to be the corollary of an ‘“ought” 
implies “feasibility”’ principle. If you can only be morally required to do the 
feasible, then your being morally required to do something must be your being 
morally required to do it in a feasible way, and if there is only one feasible way to 
do something morally required, then it must be morally required to do it in that 
way. If P2 holds, then, and if feasibility is a simple binary and univocal concept, 
we can see how premises such as those mentioned above will suffice to establish 
the legitimacy of a given state. If it is morally required to create and enter a 
condition of right, for example, and the only feasible way of doing so involves 
state S’s being an exclusive and general enforcer, then, by P2, it must be 
permissible for A to be an exclusive and general enforcer.  
However, the last chapter has the consequence that matters are not quite so 
simple. I argued that the best account of the concept of feasibility is a multivocal 
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one; there are a good many different possible binary sharpenings of the concept, 
no single one of which is obviously privileged in general or for the purposes of 
moral theory. Thus, if there is an ‘“ought” implies “feasibility”’ principle with 
which moral and political theory must deal, it is not a straightforward matter 
what it is. Perhaps there is some single sharpening of ‘feasibility’ of the many my 
account alludes to which is the constraint on moral ‘oughts’, but it is not obvious 
which one it is, and nor is there any immediate reason to suppose that there is a 
single one. It could well be that different feasibility constraints are relevant to 
different sorts of moral claim.  
Thus, whether or not a principle like P2 is true is not a straightforward matter. It 
is certainly not true for all sharpenings of ‘feasible’ (all FCs). For instance, if we 
filled in P2 with a sharpening of ‘feasible’ that holds fixed all of the facts of the 
world (the most restrictive FC), then it would have us being permitted to do x 
just because it is the method that we are currently using to do something morally 
required. The only feasible way of doing something morally required on such a 
restrictive understanding of feasibility is the way that it is currently being done. 
It certainly does not follow, though, from the fact that x is the method we are 
currently using to do something morally required that x is permissible. Unless we 
are consequentialists, we should be open to the possibility that there are 
impermissible ways of doing morally required things. There are thus at least some 
sharpenings of ‘feasible’ for which a P2-like principle does not hold. Plausibly it is 
not just the most restrictive FC that is too restrictive for such a principle: for at 
least a number of different sets of the actual facts, something’s being the only way 
of doing something morally required that is consistent with holding fixed that set 
of facts does not entail its permissibility. Thus, it seems that principle P2 will be 
true given some sharpenings of ‘feasible’ (some FCs), but not others (i.e., it may be 
true if you replace ‘feasible’ with ‘feasible-on-FC-f’ for some FCs, but not for 
others).  
In addition, it may well be that no version of P2 holds uniformly for all possible 
actions, but that different versions of P2 (involving different sharpenings of 
‘feasible’) are true for different possible actions. (That is, it may well be that the 
sharpening on which it is true that x’s being the only feasible way to do 
something morally required is sufficient for x to be morally permissible is 
different from the sharpening on which it is true that y’s being the only feasible 
way to do something morally required is sufficient for y to be morally 
permissible.) 
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Thus, without an account of which sharpenings (which FCs) make P2 (or some 
similar principle) true (which will presumably be closely related to an account of 
which FCs make an ‘“ought” implies “feasibility”’ principle true), we cannot 
assume that the feasibility-dependent arguments for states’ legitimacy go 
through. It will need to be the case that the relevant feasibility premises are true 
on the same sharpening(s) that make P2 true (or make it true for the relevant 
subdomain of morality). If the sharpening(s) of feasibility that makes P2 true is not 
one on which, for example, state S’s being an exclusive enforcer is the only 
feasible way of achieving a condition of right, then these arguments will not be 
valid. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the legitimacy of some existing states is on 
safe ground unless there is some good reason to think that the sharpening of 
‘feasible’ on which P2 is true (for exclusive enforcement) is one on which the only 
feasible way of achieving a condition of right (or whatever else) does involve these 
states having exclusive enforcement power.  
One might have reason to think this if one thinks that the sharpening of feasibility 
that makes P2 true, and the sharpening that constrains moral requirement or 
‘ought’ claims in general, is quite a restrictive one.  We saw already that the most 
restrictive FC (which holds fixed all of the actual facts, and so makes nothing but 
the status quo feasible) does not plausibly make P2 true. While presumably 
nobody would think that morality is constrained by such a restrictive feasibility 
constraint, it could be thought that it is constrained by a fairly restrictive FC, 
which holds fixed many or most of the actual facts. If φ’s being morally required 
entails its being feasible on some restrictive FC f, then if φ is morally required and 
the only way of φ-ing that is feasible on f is ψ-ing, then ψ-ing must be morally 
required. If status freedom (to take one example) being achieved without the 
state’s exclusive enforcement is a somewhat distant possibility, then morality’s 
being constrained by a restrictive FC will have the consequence that the 
requirement to achieve status freedom necessitates the state’s exclusive 
enforcement (as the only way of meeting the requirement that is feasible on the 
restrictive FC), and thus makes it permissible.  
I will thus attempt to argue in this chapter that there is little reason to suppose 
that morality must generally be constrained by a restrictive sharpening of 
feasibility. I will first borrow from discussion by David Wiens (which in turn 
draws on work by David Estlund) to suggest that moral principles are relative to 
possibilities or feasibility facts. I will argue that my account of feasibility creates 
significant uncertainty about what the set of possibilities is that moral principles 
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for a given factual context are relative to. This in itself creates doubt about 
whether the legitimacy of some existing states is on safe ground: if the moral 
principles for the actual factual context are relative to a set of feasibility facts that 
do not make the necessary feasibility facts true, then we have no argument for the 
legitimacy of some existing states. Thus, an argument would be needed that this 
is not the case.  
I then suggest that the possibilities relative to which it is worthwhile identifying 
principles need not be just those that give us the sets of principles that are in fact 
true in our factual context. I argue, further, that theory identifying relatively 
unrealistic principles (i.e., constrained by non-restrictive feasibility constraints, 
which hold fixed relatively few of the actual facts) can be worthwhile and useful 
for guiding action in the real world. My conclusion will thus have two parts. 
First, we cannot be confident that state legitimacy is on safe ground, since it is 
not obvious that the sharpening of feasibility that makes a principle like P2 true is 
one on which the feasibility premises necessary to establish state legitimacy are 
true. Second, even if these premises do come out as true on the relevant 
sharpening (and so some existing states do in fact have a general and exclusive 
permission to enforce), it is still worth knowing that these states’ enforcement is 
not permissible relative to less restrictive feasibility constraints. I will conclude by 
exploring how this knowledge can be worthwhile and what implications it has for 
us in the actual world. 
1. A ’realisticness’ scale 
Feasibility constraints (FCs), as I have defined them, are sets of facts. An FC is 
the set of facts that is held fixed and relative to which feasibility is assessed by the 
corresponding sharpening of ‘feasible’. We can make sense of the idea of a scale 
along which these FCs are ranked in terms of ‘realisticness’. The most ‘realistic’ 
or ‘restrictive’ FC, the lowest on the scale, is the one mentioned above that holds 
fixed all of the facts of the given factual context. At the other extreme, the most 
unrealistic FC, the highest on the scale, holds fixed no facts (except perhaps the 
laws of logic). Between these two extremes, we progress up the scale as we allow 
to vary more and more facts, and facts that are more and more ‘unchangeable’. On 
the lowest, most restrictive FC, the only thing that will come out as feasible is the 
status quo. On the highest, least restrictive FC everything will come out as 
feasible (except perhaps the logically impossible). In general, as we progress up 
the scale, more and more outcomes will come out as feasible.  
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It is a complex and difficult matter what exactly determines these rankings and 
we do not need a full answer. What will determine the position of an FC in the 
ranking is a measure of how plausible is a possible world in which all of the facts 
that the FC allows to vary (all of those that it does not hold fixed) do not hold. 
What fixes the plausibility of possible worlds is not a question I shall attempt to 
answer, but it will suffice to notice that we do often have a very rough intuitive 
ability to judge this. While we are certainly unlikely to be able to make a full 
ranking with any confidence (and it may not be possible to make a full ranking), 
there are a number of pairwise comparisons about which we will have no 
hesitation. Thus, although without a measure of plausibility of worlds we cannot 
suppose that the ranking of FCs on the realisticness scale will be complete, we can 
safely assume that we will be able to achieve a rough ranking of at least a number 
of FCs. It will be clear for a number of FCs that they are either quite realistic or 
quite unrealistic. Given such a scale, then, we can understand the idea that might 
support an assumption that the legitimacy of some states is on safe ground as the 
idea that morality is generally constrained by a quite realistic FC. It may well be 
the case that the only way of meeting a moral requirement like the requirement to 
create and enter a condition of right that is feasible on a realistic or restrictive FC 
involves the state having general and exclusive enforcement power. Thus, if P2 or 
a similar principle is true for such a realistic understanding of ‘feasible’, it may be 
possible to make a successful argument for the legitimacy of such a state. My aim 
now, then, will be to argue that it is not obvious that morality is constrained by a 
sufficiently realistic FC and that moral theory constrained only by quite unrealistic 
FCs can be worthwhile.  
2. Possibility-relative principles 
David Wiens has recently defended a model for understanding normative 
principles that begins from what he calls the ‘Uncontroversial Thesis’.230 He 
divides moral principles into ‘evaluative principles’ (which ‘serve to comparatively 
assess and rank options according to some set of normative criteria’) and 
‘directive principles’ (which ‘perform a deontic function’ by marking ‘the lines 
between obligatory, permissible, and impermissible options’).231 The 
‘Uncontroversial Thesis’ states that ‘a set of directive principles is justified relative to 
a particular set of salient possibilities’, and, more precisely, ‘which options – actions, 
institutional schemes, states of affairs – an agent is required, permitted, or 
prohibited to realise depends on the set of options that is open to that agent in 
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some (for now, unspecified) sense’.232 The idea is that what an agent can be 
required to do is not insensitive to what it is possible for the agent to do. The 
thought is similar to the common thought that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.  
Wiens presents a number of pieces of evidence to support the claim that this 
thesis holds (and holds uncontroversially). These include the fact that much of the 
debate concerning the use of idealisations in normative theory depends on the 
idea that assumptions about the set of feasible options matter for the content of 
the normative theory, as well as the fact that the standard semantics for deontic 
modals fits with the thesis. One important thing (for our purposes) he points to is 
Jackson and Pargetter’s much-discussed case of Professor Procrastinate.233 
Professor Procrastinate is given a review assignment, but knows that he is 
disposed to procrastinate, and will not in fact complete the review on time if he 
accepts it. The standard judgment is that he ought to [accept and complete] the 
review, but given that he will not complete it, he ought not, all-things-considered, 
to accept the review. Relative to a set of possible worlds that includes one at 
which he completes the review, he ought to accept it. But relative to a set of 
worlds at which he will fail to complete the review, he ought not to accept it. 
Thus, it seems, as Wiens concludes, that ‘the directive principle to which 
Procrastinate is subject is sensitive to the set of possibilities one deems salient’.234  
The ‘concessive’ directive principle (to use Estlund’s term), i.e., the principle 
requiring Procrastinate to refuse the review given that he will not complete, 
disappears when the salient set of possibilities includes worlds at which he does 
complete the review, and thus at which the ‘non-concessive’ principle is 
satisfied.235 The non-concessive principle, though, does not disappear when the 
salient set of possibilities only includes worlds at which he does not complete the 
review, i.e., worlds at which the non-concessive principle is not met. Even if he 
will not complete, and so ought not to accept, it remains the case that he ought to 
[accept and complete].  
Estlund argues that this asymmetry shows that the non-concessive principles 
have a certain kind of primacy over the concessive ones.236 In order to 
accommodate this appearance, Wiens suggests what he calls a ‘nesting model’ of 
directive principles. According to this model, one directive principle appears to 
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have primacy over another because the second is specified relative to a set of 
possibilities that is a subset of the set of possibilities relative to which the former 
is specified. If a principle A is relative to a set of possibilities that includes all the 
possibilities that another principle B is relative to, then A will appear to have 
some kind of primacy over B. Wiens thus explains the Professor Procrastinate 
example as follows: 
Let C be the set of whatever facts about Procrastinate determine that he will not 
complete this particular review assignment … and let D be the set of background 
facts that are salient to the case less those in C … Now let V be the set of worlds 
that are consistent with the facts in the union of C and D and let W be the set of 
worlds that are consistent with the facts in D. Notice that V is a proper subset of 
W … Now we restate the standard pair of judgments: Procrastinate ought to 
refuse the assignment given V because he refuses at the highest-ranked worlds at 
which he fails to complete; he ought to accept (and complete) the assignment 
given W because he accepts and completes at the highest-ranked worlds in W. 
Put this way, we can see how natural it is to think that the former directive 
“evaporates”, giving the latter directive some sort of primacy. The (concessive) 
directive to refuse is specified relative to V and, thus, only obtains at the worlds 
in V, whereas the (nonconcessive) directive to accept and complete is specified 
relative to W and, thus, obtains at the worlds in W, including the worlds in V.237 
This explanation of the case draws on Wiens’s optimisation model of normative 
theory, according to which identifying directive principles is a matter of 
‘optimisation’ of rankings of possible worlds within a feasibility constraint. Wiens 
denies that his optimisation model relies on a consequentialist picture of morality, 
but it is not quite clear to me that we really can think of deontological principles 
as establishing a ranking of possible worlds (rather than just a partition of possible 
worlds) without losing what makes them distinctively deontological. I think, 
though, that the nesting model described above need not depend on the 
optimisation picture. We need not say that a directive principle’s holding relative 
to a set of possible worlds is a matter of its being realised at the highest ranked 
worlds in that set. Rather we can just say that a necessary condition on a directive 
principle’s holding relative to a set of possible worlds is its being realised at some 
member of that set. This is just to state a version of the ‘“ought” implies “can”’ 
principle. Whatever the salient set of possibilities is, a directive principle must not 
require something that is impossible given the salient set.  
Further, it seems that a directive principle’s holding relative to a set of 
possibilities requires not only that there be some world in the set at which what it 
requires comes about, but that what it requires be feasible given the set of possible 
worlds in question (or given an FC). On my account of feasibility, an outcome’s 
                                                          
237 Wiens (2017) 162 
156 
 
being feasible for an agent given an FC requires not only that it come about at 
some world in the set fixed by the FC, but also that there is a world in the set at 
which the agent performs an intentional action that brings about the outcome 
safely and competently. It seems irrelevant to a principle’s holding relative to a 
set of possibilities that what it requires comes about at some world in that set if it 
only comes about by luck or not as a result of intentional action. Thus, I think the 
necessary condition for a principle to hold relative to a set of possibilities is that it 
be feasible given the set of possibilities. Procrastinate ought to accept and 
complete the assignment given W because there is some member of W at which he 
does so as the result of intentional action, safely and competently; it is feasible for 
him to do so. However, there is no member of V at which he does both, so given V 
he ought to refuse, because if he will not complete, he ought not to accept. Still, 
because all of the worlds that are members of V are also members of W, it remains 
the case in any world at which he will not complete that he ought to [accept and 
complete]. 
I will return below to the idea of primacy and hierarchies of principles, but for 
now let me make use of the idea that directive principles are relative to sets of 
possible worlds, and the idea that it is a necessary condition on a principle’s 
holding relative to a set of possible worlds that it be feasible given that set. That 
directive principles are relative to sets of possibilities means that the directive 
principles that hold vary across different factual contexts, since presumably what 
is possible, or what is feasible (i.e., what the salient set of possible worlds is) varies 
with factual context. Wiens describes his ‘Uncontroversial Thesis’ as the thesis 
that what an agent is required or permitted to do depends on the options that are 
open to that agent. Any plausible way of cashing out what the set of options open 
to an agent is will presumably need to be able to deliver the result that these 
options vary with factual context.  
There is, though, a question as to what the salient set of possibilities is for any 
given factual context. Wiens takes the set of options to be given by a set of 
feasibility constraints.238 The account I have given of the concept of feasibility, 
though, has the consequence that for any given factual context there is no single 
determinate set of options that are the feasible options (for a given agent). There 
is no single determinate set of possible worlds that are relevant to an outcome’s 
feasibility. For different FCs, different sharpenings of ‘feasible’, different 
principles will be ruled out. Thus, for a given factual context, there are many 
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different sets of feasible options and so, many different possible sets of principles 
whose realisation is feasible. The idea that the realisation of a directive principle 
must be feasible does not fix a single salient set of possibilities for a given factual 
context. It might be that there is some particular sharpening of ‘feasibility’ that is 
the salient one for directive principles, but given my account of feasibility, there is 
no particular reason to suppose that there is. An argument would be needed to 
show that there is some such salient sharpening. Wiens himself argues for a 
particular binary feasibility constraint on political theory, but as argued above, it 
seems either to be too restrictive or too permissive (depending on how it is read). 
It is not plausible to think that the constraint he proposes always gives the salient 
set of possibilities to determine the directive principles that hold in a given factual 
context.  
It could be that there are multiple sets of directive principles (specified relative to 
different sets of possibilities given by different sharpenings of ‘feasible’) all of 
which hold at once. Estlund has suggested that there could be many different sets 
of principles relative to different sets of facts applying at once. He is interested in 
the distinction between principles that are nonconcessive and principles that are 
concessive to people’s moral non-compliance, and he notes that the nonconcessive 
standard requiring Professor Procrastinate to [accept and complete] applies at 
the same time as the concessive standard requiring him to refuse given that he 
will not complete. He suggests that it could be that ‘there are infinitely many 
concession-relative standards, one for each set of moral shortfalls that are being 
taken for granted’.239 It could be that the same is true more generally, that there 
are many different sets of principles relative to different sets of facts being held 
fixed (i.e., to different FCs). Perhaps it can be true simultaneously that you ought 
to φ (relative to FC 𝑓1) and that you ought not to φ (relative to FC 𝑓2). However, 
if this is the case, then another similar question arises about which is the salient 
set of possibilities (the salient FC) relative to which the directive principles telling 
us what we ought to do all things considered are specified. Given the multiplicity of 
different possible FCs and the lack of any single one that is obviously privileged, 
no simple, general answer to this question suggests itself. It may well be that 
there is no simple, general answer. It could be that the answer varies depending 
on the specific practical decision that we are facing. One upshot, then, of my 
account of feasibility is that there is significant uncertainty about what the 
feasibility constraint is relative to which the all-things-considered directive 
principles that apply to us are specified (given a factual context).  
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This leads to the first part of the conclusion of this thesis. I set out to investigate 
whether it is possible to justify the common assumption that state legitimacy (the 
general and exclusive permission to enforce that states claim and are often taken 
to have) is on safe ground for at least some actual states and can be taken for 
granted (unlike the obligation to obey, which is quite widely thought not to exist). 
The combination of the argument of the first part of the thesis and the account of 
feasibility seems to have the result that it cannot simply be taken for granted. It 
cannot simply be assumed that this sort of general and exclusive permission to 
enforce is something that states (at least of the best existing kind) have. The first 
part of the thesis argued that plausible arguments for state legitimacy (or the 
legitimacy of states of a certain kind) depend on feasibility premises. These 
arguments tend to require a premise along the lines of the claim that the general 
and exclusive enforcement of the state is the only feasible way of meeting some 
moral requirement, or that the best feasible worlds involve the general and 
exclusive enforcement of the state. Given the above-mentioned uncertainty about 
what the feasibility constraint is relative to which the all-things-considered 
principles about moral requirement and permissibility are specified, it follows that 
in order to justify taking state legitimacy for granted, more work will have to be 
done to show that, on some feasibility constraint that is the salient one for the 
relevant all-things-considered directive principles (and so one on which 
something like the above principle P2 holds all things considered), there really is 
(for example) no other feasible way of meeting some moral requirement than 
through the general and exclusive enforcement of this particular state. (I argued 
also that the necessary feasibility premises do not obviously require an 
outlandishly unrealistic understanding of ‘feasibility’ to be false.) 
However, given this uncertainty about the correct all-things-considered directive 
principles, we might ask a different question. Instead of asking what the correct 
all-things-considered principles are, we might ask what sets of principles (i.e., 
those relative to which sets of possibilities) are worth knowing about? Which sets 
of principles is it useful seeking to discover? It need not be the case that the sets 
of principles that it is worthwhile identifying are just those that hold for us.240 It 
could be that there is a multiplicity of different sets of principles relative to 
different FCs that hold for us, but that there is no value in knowing about many of 
these. Conversely, it could be that the only set of principles that can be said 
genuinely to hold for us are the all-things-considered principles which are relative 
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to some determinate FC, but that nevertheless it is worthwhile identifying the 
sets of principles that would be true if other FCs were salient.  
Above I said that one might have reason to think that the feasibility premises 
necessary for an argument for some state’s legitimacy to go through can be taken 
for granted if one thinks that the sharpening of feasibility that constrains the 
truth of moral principles is some quite realistic one. However, I have just argued 
that given my account of feasibility, we have no immediate reason to suppose that 
this must be the case. One might, though, think that only principles specified 
relative to quite realistic feasibility constraints can be of interest or of practical use. 
There is no point asking about principles relative to FCs that are too unrealistic. 
In the next section, then, I will argue that this is wrong: it can be worthwhile and 
of practical use identifying principles constrained only by relatively unrealistic 
feasibility constraints. 
3. Unrealistic theory: pro tanto principles 
It is a common complaint against unrealistic moral or political theory (that is, 
theory unconstrained by realistic feasibility constraints) or against ‘ideal theory’ 
that it fails to be action-guiding and so is not interesting or useful.241 Let us 
suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that moral theory that is worth doing 
must be action-guiding, that is, must contribute to the provision of guidance for 
our all-things-considered choice of real-world actions. Even so, I think that 
unrealistic theory can be action-guiding, despite its not being realistically 
constrained. I will, in this section and the next, argue that two different sorts of 
unrealistic moral theory can in general be useful for action guidance. I will then, 
in section 5, say something about why unrealistic theory specifically about the 
permissibility of state enforcement can be interesting and useful.  
The first way in which I think unrealistic theory can be useful for action guidance 
relies on a somewhat speculative picture of moral principles (which I will suggest 
has some plausibility but I will not give a full defence of) and may be rejected if 
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that picture is rejected, but in the next section I will offer another way in which 
unrealistic theory can be useful for action guidance, which is not dependent on 
this picture.  
An obvious defence of unrealistic theory is that we need it to act as a target for 
which to aim, or as a benchmark by which to measure the moral acceptability or 
goodness of various realistic options. When we know what we would be required 
to do when a wider range of the current facts can vary, we will have an idea of 
what sorts of outcomes we should direct our action towards achieving. Though 
our action will be constrained here and now (in the short term) by low (realistic) 
FCs which may rule out the target, we can choose actions within these low FCs 
with an awareness of what would be better and thus what we should strive 
towards. Theorising at relatively high (unrealistic) FCs tells us what is ‘ideal’, or 
relatively ideal. This, it might be thought, gives us action guidance for what we 
should do, even though the theory is arrived at assuming that certain facts can 
change that it is unrealistic to think could change, because we should just attempt 
to get as close as possible to doing what we should do ideally. If, say, what we 
should do when we allow human motivations and so on to vary is achieve perfect 
equality of welfare, then when human motivations and so on are not variable and 
we cannot achieve such equality, what we ought to do, the thought goes, is get as 
close as possible to this ideal. Furthermore, the principles that represent the ‘ideal’ 
might be able to serve as a benchmark: how far what we are actually doing is from 
this ideal shows us how good or morally acceptable it is. Rawls’s defence of ideal 
theory is an argument of this sort. ‘Until the ideal is identified’, he says, ‘nonideal 
theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be 
answered’.242 Other variations on this argument are present in various other 
contributions to this debate.243 
However, it has been noticed that there is a result in economic theory that applies 
generally to the relation between optimal outcomes and ‘second best’ outcomes, 
which seems to pose a problem for this argument. In 1956 Richard Lipsey and 
Kelvin Lancaster proved a theorem in economics that they called ‘the General 
Theory of Second Best’.244 The idea is that if a Pareto optimal outcome consists in 
the fulfilment of a number of ‘Paretian conditions’, then 
given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an 
optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian 
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conditions ... Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which more, but not all, 
of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to be, 
superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.245 
Several philosophers have noted that the theory of second best (TSB) has 
implications for political philosophy.246 Robert Goodin notes that the very strong 
conclusion Lipsey and Lancaster arrive at (that an optimum situation can be 
achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian conditions) stems from 
certain assumptions they made. However, the second point they make in the quote 
above holds more generally, he suggests. The second-best state of affairs is not 
necessarily identical to the first in any respect.247 The idea, then, is that if our ideal 
or unrealistic theory calls for something (a state of affairs, a set of institutions, a 
set of principles) that has several features, but the constraints of the world 
prevent all of these features from being achieved together, the second-best 
alternative (or the best given the constraints) is not necessarily going to be just 
the one that is closest to the first-best in the greatest number of these features. If 
one feature is absent, it is not necessarily best to realise the others. The 
alternative that changes the least features of the ideal may actually be worse by 
the lights that led us to choose the first-best than one that changes more. Thus, if 
we take the best principles given some reasonably unrealistic FC as an ideal, it 
will not necessarily be the case that the best principles or outcomes given a more 
realistic FC will resemble them. Thus, if an unrealistic FC allows facts to change 
that it is very implausible to think could change, the thought goes, a theory 
constrained only by this unrealistic FC will not be much use as a target or 
standard for guiding action, since there is no guarantee that what we should do 
given a more realistic FC will resemble the target. Thus, it is not obvious how 
knowing what the target is could help us in judging principles or policies in the 
real world.  
Goodin gives the analogy of a choice of car. Suppose my ideal car would have 
three features: it would be silver, new and a Rolls Royce. Suppose now that such a 
car is unavailable, but two others are. One is a week-old black Jaguar and the 
other is a new, silver Toyota. The latter has two of the three features of my ideal 
car, while the former has none. However, it is likely that I would in fact prefer the 
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Jaguar and not the Toyota.248 Since unrealistic theory involves assuming away 
certain constraints that will constrain our actions in the real world, these latter 
are bound to be constrained by things that did not constrain the unrealistic 
theory. Thus, it may often not be feasible, given more realistic FCs, to do what all 
of the principles relative to unrealistic FCs would require us to do. The TSB tells 
us that when one of the features of a recommendation is not present (or one of the 
principles is not satisfied), it is not necessarily better for the other features to be 
realised (or the other principles satisfied). This appears to show that unrealistic 
theory will not necessarily be a useful guide to what the best alternative is given 
more realistic constraints. This, then, suggests that identifying a target may in 
fact not be action guiding at all. (That is, when the target itself cannot be realised, 
it may not provide guidance for our all-things-considered choice of action.) 
I think that the problem of second best is a problem for certain sorts of unrealistic 
theory that needs to be taken very seriously. However, I think that only certain 
sorts of unrealistic theory are vulnerable to this problem at all.249 Once we 
distinguish different types of moral and political theory that might be done 
unconstrained by realistic feasibility constraints, we see that the problem of 
second best is not generally a problem for unrealistic moral and political theory. 
Several writers have made versions of this point, and in this section, I develop, 
and extend to the domain of deontological principles, a defence of a kind of 
unrealistic theory similar to those given by, for instance, Adam Swift, Zofia 
Stemplowska and Andrew Mason.250  
If we conceive of unrealistic theory as doing something similar to choosing one’s 
ideal car, then we come up against the problem of second best. My ideal car is a 
(possibly non-existent) car that is the best car I could imagine. The task of 
identifying one’s ideal car is essentially a task of design. One designs a car, exactly 
the way one would like it to be. If we think of unrealistic theory as just like this, 
except for society instead of for a car, then the TSB poses a problem exactly 
analogously to how it does in the case of the car. Call this unrealistic institutional 
design.251 In unrealistic institutional design we specify, as exactly as possible, how 
society should be, given an unrealistic feasibility constraint (i.e., given that 
                                                          
248 Goodin (1995) 53 and Goodin (2012a) 157 
249 Wiens (2016) notices that certain interpretations of the application of the TSB do not 
pose a threat to the view of ideal theory as a target. 
250 Swift (2008); Stemplowska (2008); Mason (2004). 
251 This term is potentially misleading since, as well as institutions, this type of theory 
could involve designing policies or specific actions. For this reason, Robeyns (2008) 
prefers the term ‘action design’. I keep the term ‘institutional design’ simply because it 
seems to be more widely used. 
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many/most/all options are feasible), designing the institutions that would create 
the best society possible. This ideal society then, like the ideal car, will have a 
number of attributes. Common sense might say that in order to achieve the best 
society we can within certain non-ideal constraints, we should create a society 
that instantiates as many as possible of the attributes of the ideal society to as 
great an extent as possible. However, what David Wiens calls an ‘anti-
approximation warning’, which follows from the TSB, seems to hold in this 
case.252 We cannot assume at all that the best thing to do, given the 
unachievability of the ideal society, is to create a society that instantiates more 
rather than less of the attributes of that ideal society. If this is the case, then this 
sort of ideal theory seems to give us very little guidance as to what to do in a 
world in which the fully ideal society is not achievable.  
However, this is not the only sort of moral or political theory that might be worth 
pursuing unconstrained by realistic feasibility constraints. Hamlin and 
Stemplowska distinguish what they call ‘theory of ideals’ from ideal and non-ideal 
theory.253 The purpose of theory of ideals, according to them, is to ‘identify, 
elucidate and clarify the nature of an ideal or ideals’. This includes both an 
element ‘devoted to the identification and explication of individual ideals or 
principles’ and another ‘devoted to the issues arising from the multiplicity of 
ideals or principles (issues of commensurability, priority, trade-off, etc.)’.254 They 
describe this form of theory asking us to imagine a graph plotting the realization 
of two (or more) values or principles against each other. The task of the theory of 
ideals then involves both specifying the axes (that is, identifying what the values 
and principles are) and then identifying the shape and position of the indifference 
curves (that is, identifying between which bundles of realization of different 
values and principles we are indifferent). Thus, on a simple model with only two 
values, say equality and security, this would involve analysing what these values 
are or what they involve and deciding how they should be balanced when there is 
a limit to how much we can achieve of each. The task of theory of ideals, then, is 
roughly to identify the ideals that we aim to realise when designing institutions 
(as well as how they should interact with each other).  
                                                          
252 Wiens (143). Wiens notes that the TSB need not pose a problem for ideal theory in 
general; it does not clearly show that we should not necessarily aim to satisfy ideal 
principles in the actual world. But he argues that it does show that, since we cannot 
assume we ought to approximate an ideal, we cannot assume that ‘a political ideal presents 
an appropriate target for real-world reform efforts’ (143). This complaint, though, as we 
will see, is only relevant when the ‘ideal’ is conceived of in certain ways. 
253 Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) 
254 Ibid. 53 
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Hamlin and Stemplowska present the theory of ideals as concerned only with that 
part of morality to which optimising considerations apply. I think, though, that 
there is a part of moral theory that includes something like theory of ideals 
alongside a deontic component. Theory of ideals is not subject to feasibility 
constraints in the same way that all-things-considered directive principles, or 
institutional design, are, since its aim is to identify what our ideals and values are, 
what they consist in, rather than what we ought to do. I think, though, that the 
task of identifying ideals and values is part of a wider form of theory which 
includes the task of identifying a certain kind of deontic principle that is similarly 
not subject to feasibility constraints (call these the pro tanto requirements). Let us 
call ‘theory of principles’ the more general task that involves identifying not just 
ideals, but considerations that have moral weight more generally, which, as I will 
now suggest, can include pro tanto requirements and permissions. 
As we saw above, there is a sense in which Professor Procrastinate ought to accept 
the assignment even though he will not complete it: he ought to [accept and 
complete] it. This seems to be a pro tanto ought. The fact that he ought to [accept 
and complete] does not figure in what he ought to do all things considered, but it 
nevertheless remains true that it is something that he ought to do. Wiens explains 
this by suggesting that such nonconcessive requirements are specified relative to 
a set of possible worlds that includes both worlds at which the requirement is not 
met and worlds at which it is. A requirement specified relative to a set of worlds 
holds at all of the worlds in this set, he suggests, even those at which it will not be 
met. It follows that requirements specified relative to the set of all worlds or other 
expansive sets of worlds that include the actual world are requirements that hold 
for us. It seems like these will just apply to us pro tanto. (There is some sense in 
which such pro tanto requirements are not really requirements: in some sense we 
are not required to follow them; it may be the case that you ought not do what you 
ought pro tanto to do. Nevertheless, regardless of the felicitousness of the term 
‘requirement’, there seems to remain some sense in which these are moral ‘oughts’ 
that apply to us. I merely suggest that the domain of moral principles that have 
application is not exhausted by those we ought all-things-considered to follow; 
how exactly we should understand these pro tanto ‘oughts’ is a difficult question.) 
This picture is supported by consideration of ordinary pro tanto ‘oughts’. 
Suppose, for example, that you have made a promise to a friend to meet at 3 but 
on your way, you come across a stranger in danger of death who urgently needs 
your help to get to hospital; if you take this person to hospital you will be late to 
meet your friend. In a sense, it remains the case that you ought to meet your friend 
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at 3: this is a pro tanto ‘ought’. But the pro tanto ‘ought’ is defeated by the 
stranger’s need for your help. Relative to a set of possibilities that includes a 
world at which you both take the stranger to hospital and meet your friend at 3 
you ought to do both. Given that a feasibility constraint that determines such a 
set of worlds also includes the actual world in the set, this pro tanto ‘ought’ holds 
at the actual world (as we ordinarily judge). Relative to a set of possibilities that 
does not include a world where you do both, though, it is not the case that you 
ought to meet your friend at 3. This gives us the all-things-considered claim that 
you ought not to meet your friend at 3.   
In the same way, then, in which Procrastinate ought to accept and complete his 
assignment, we ought to do that which is required of us given various unrealistic 
feasibility constraints. That is, we ought to do these things pro tanto. The most 
expansive feasibility constraint holds fixed no facts, so on this sharpening 
anything is feasible for me that I bring about in the right way at some possible 
world identical to the actual world up until the present moment. This set of 
worlds obviously includes the actual world, and so principles specified relative to 
it hold for us (pro tanto). There is thus a domain of pro tanto requirements and 
permissions that are specified relative to the most expansive feasibility constraint, 
and to various other unrealistic feasibility constraints. I think that the task of 
identifying these pro tanto principles is a part of the task of identifying the moral 
considerations that should have weight in our actual all-things-considered 
decisions about what to do in just the same way as the identification of ideals and 
values is a part of this task. When we decide what to do, numerous considerations 
enter into the decision including both ideals whose realisation we seek to 
maximise (insofar as allowed by the countervailing importance of maximising 
other values and of respecting pro tanto requirements) and pro tanto 
requirements and permissions that we seek to respect (insofar as allowed by other 
countervailing requirements and by the importance of certain values).   
Now, this task, the identification of ideals and pro tanto requirements, which I am 
calling ‘theory of principles’, is not constrained by feasibility considerations.255 It 
is thus in some sense ‘unrealistic’. It might seem, then, that it is subject to 
something like the problem of second best. There is no reason to suppose, the 
thought would go, that the pro tanto principles bear any resemblance to the all-
things-considered principles (or that the ideals as specified by theory of principles 
                                                          
255 Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) make this point. Gheaus (2013) also argues that justice 
(the identification of which will be part of theory of ideals, and consequently, theory of 
principles) is not constrained by feasibility. Mason (2004) makes a similar point. 
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bear any resemblance to what maximisation of the ideals would require of us in 
the actual world). It would thus seem like the task of theory of principles is of no 
action-guiding use. However, this is to miss out a crucial part of the theory of 
principles. As noted above, Hamlin and Stemplowska describe ‘theory of ideals’ as 
involving two components, one of which is ‘devoted to the issues arising from the 
multiplicity of ideals or principles’. For them, this involves something like 
identifying indifference curves, i.e., identifying between what bundles of different 
values we should be indifferent. When we generalise to theory of principles, the 
task cannot easily be described as the identification of indifference principles, but 
there is still an analogous task concerning the interactions between different 
principles and ideals.  
Part of the task of theory of principles is to identify balancing principles that tell 
us how to balance the various pro tanto requirements and ideals against each 
other. As Hamlin and Stemplowska describe theory of ideals, it will tell us what 
we ought to do in a concrete factual situation by telling us simply to realise the 
highest indifference curve possible within the relevant feasibility constraint. 
Something similar should be true for theory of principles: balancing principles 
should tell us how to weigh ideals and pro tanto requirements against each other 
given a feasibility constraint.256 Thus, in principle, if this task were complete, 
theory of principles should tell us how to balance these various considerations for 
any given factual context and for any given feasibility constraint. This is not to 
deny that the task is so complex that it is unlikely ever to be complete. That it is a 
complex and difficult task (and unlikely ever to be complete) is no reason to 
suppose that insofar as it can be done it is not worth doing. Nor is it even to claim 
that there are complete balancing principles.257 It could well be that there are 
some intractable conflicts or incommensurabilities between values. This would 
mean that this task could not be complete in the relevant sense; there would be no 
set of pro tanto requirements, ideals and balancing principles that always gives a 
determinate answer to the question what to do. Nevertheless, identifying the pro 
tanto requirements, ideals and balancing principles that it is possible to identify 
would tell us what moral considerations apply in which situations and how to 
balance them insofar as they can be balanced.  
It should thus be clear, I think, that the problem of second best does not prevent 
this form of unrealistic theory from being useful for action guidance. The anti-
                                                          
256 Cf. Mason (2004) 265 
257 Galston (2010) appears to offer this as an objection to ‘ideal theory’ (407), but for the 
reasons adduced here, I cannot see that it poses a general problem at all if ideal theory is 
understood as theory of principles.  
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approximation warning just does not apply here: the point of this sort of 
unrealistic theory is not to identify some model that we ought to approximate as 
much as possible. It is rather to identify the values, ideals and pro tanto 
requirements that are of moral importance.258 To know what we ought to do in a 
given factual situation, it will presumably be useful to know what considerations 
have moral weight: what has value worth realising and what pro tanto 
requirements we are under. It is thus not in general the case that unrealistic 
theory cannot be worthwhile or useful. I will return below to what this means for 
state legitimacy more specifically. 
4. Unrealistic theory: all-things-considered principles 
The argument in the previous section relied on a somewhat speculative picture of 
moral principles in order to argue that a certain kind of unrealistic theory is useful 
for action guidance. I have not offered a full argument for this picture, and you 
may not want to accept it. I will now, though, argue that another kind of 
unrealistic moral and political theory can be worthwhile, and this argument will 
not depend on the above picture of moral principles. In the above I distinguished 
theory of principles from institutional design and argued that the former is not 
subject to the problem of second best. The latter, though, along with the 
identification of all-things-considered directive principles (from now on, for the 
sake of brevity, I will use ‘institutional design’ to refer to the conjunction of these 
two things), telling us concretely what to do here and now, does seem vulnerable 
to the problem of second best. In carrying out institutional design, the results we 
get will depend on what FC we take as a constraint. If we vary the constraint, 
different institutions or actions will come out as morally best or morally required. 
Of course, not all of these possible sets of institutions and actions can be those 
that we actually ought all-things-considered to implement. If it were not for the 
theory of second best, it could appear that what we ought to do is simply carry 
out institutional design constrained only by a highly unrealistic FC and then 
attempt to approximate the resulting institutions and actions as best we can. 
However, the theory of second best tells us that if we do not succeed in fully 
implementing the unrealistic institutional design, the best approximation we do 
manage to achieve may actually be worse than other available alternatives. It 
might seem, then, that when we attempt to identify all-things-considered 
principles for action and institutional design we should always do so within a 
                                                          
258 Goodin seems, in fact, to realise that the problem of second best only has application 
for something like institutional design and not for theory of principles (see Goodin (1995) 
n. 45). 
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quite realistic feasibility constraint. However, I think that despite the theory of 
second best, relatively unrealistic institutional design or all-things-considered 
principles can be useful for action guidance. Identifying what we ought to do (or 
what we would be required to do) relative to unrealistic FCs can be helpful in 
identifying what we ought to do relative to more realistic ones.  
As we saw above, it is a consequence of my account of feasibility that there is no 
single sharpening of feasibility that is obviously the one relative to which all-
things-considered principles are to be identified. It is an open question exactly how 
realistic we ought to be when deciding what to do, or how to structure our 
institutions. In addition, it is not apparent how one would go about attempting to 
answer this question. Indeed, I suspect that there is no single general answer. But, 
if we cannot easily say which FC constrains the answer to any given all-things-
considered practical question, can we say anything about which FCs it can be 
useful to take as constraints on institutional design? If, contra the theory of second 
best, approximating to an unrealistic institutional design were always better than 
alternatives, it would clearly be useful to carry out unrealistic institutional design 
even though its outputs are not themselves the actions and institutions we ought 
all-things-considered to implement. Even though this is not the case, it is clearly 
possible for institutional design to be useful even if its outputs are not themselves 
what we ought to implement. 
Given that it is not obvious which FC constrains all-things-considered principles, 
we seem to face a dilemma when deciding what to do, or what institutions to 
create, all-things-considered. On the one hand, we could just focus on doing what 
we ought to do given a relatively realistic FC. Since we want to guide action in 
the short-term, where relatively little is changeable, this might seem to be what 
we should do. On the other hand, however, we want to be more demanding than 
this. We cannot be exclusively restricted to short-term (realistic) FCs, since this 
is to ignore what Gilabert calls ‘dynamic duties’.259 We may have a dynamic duty 
to do x if it is not now possible to do x, but it would be possible to do x if we did y 
and we can now do y. If x is something we should do and it is worth the cost of 
doing y, then we should do y. Because of this, Gilabert thinks, political philosophy 
should adopt a ‘transitional standpoint’, which ‘focuses on the identification of 
dynamic trajectories of political action, which set into motion a sequence of 
political reforms passing through successive thresholds of feasibility’.260 Thus, we 
                                                          
259 Gilabert (2011, 59ff) and (2012, 47ff) 
260 Gilabert (2008) 411. Stemplowska (2008) and Simmons (2010) also underline the 
importance of transition.  
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might prefer to design institutions on a more unrealistic FC in order to avoid 
excessive conservatism and to get the best institutions allowing for some greater 
changes to be made.261 However, the theory of second best shows us that focusing 
on a more distant goal in this way may, if we fail to achieve that goal, lead us to 
do things that are not in fact the best things we could have done. Thus, on the one 
hand, pursuing what is desirable given realistic FCs may prevent us from doing 
better relative to less restrictive FCs. On the other hand, focusing on more 
unrealistic FCs might lead us to end up with worse outcomes than we could have 
had. 
I think that the obvious way around this dilemma is to be pluralistic in our 
theorising.262 The best way to avoid unnecessary conservatism and excessive 
optimism is to identify what the all-things-considered principles for action (or 
institutional design) would be relative to a variety of different more and less 
realistic FCs. If there were no constraints on the time we had to devote to 
theorising, we would identify what these principles would be relative to each and 
every FC. We would then attempt to assess the plausibility of our achieving what 
is required of us on these various FCs. With this knowledge, we can weigh up the 
potential short-term losses that would come from aiming for something we 
cannot in fact achieve (weighted according to how plausible it is that we will meet 
the unrealistic requirement) with the long-term gains that would come from 
achieving the unrealistic target (similarly weighted). We obviously do not have 
the capacity to carry out this sort of theory relative to every single FC, since the 
number of FCs is, if not infinite, at least massive. But in general, having an idea of 
what we ought to do given a variety of FCs of varying degrees of realisticness 
will help us to weigh up short-term loss against long-term gain and come to some 
sort of intuitive judgment about what we actually ought to do, which feasibility 
constraint we ought to take as operative for a given practical decision.263 
Sometimes we ought not to do what would be required on a realistic FC because 
of what not doing so might make possible in the long term, while equally 
sometimes we ought to do something that makes impossible the best outcome in 
the long term (what would be required given an unrealistic FC) because of the 
                                                          
261 Valentini notes that the more realistic the FC, ‘the more [the theory] will appear to 
offer an uncritical defence of the status quo’ (2012b) 659.  
262 Valentini (2012b) makes the related point that the appropriate level of ‘realisticness’ 
will depend on the purpose of one’s theorising. 
263 Carens (1996) and Valentini (2012b) have both argued that theory at various points 
along an ‘ideal/non-ideal’ scale can be worthwhile. As Carens says, ‘there is no single 
correct starting point for reflection, no single correct set of presuppositions about what is 
possible ... The assumptions we adopt should depend in part on the purposes of our 
inquiry’ (169). 
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badness or impermissibility of what would be required in the short term to realise 
the long-term best outcome.  
Thus, it seems that identifying principles for action or institutional design relative 
to reasonably unrealistic feasibility constraints can be useful and even important. 
Doing so is important to avoid undue conservatism, and a helpful part of 
determining exactly how conservative we ought to be. In addition, if we discover 
that something is required or permitted given a more expansive FC that is 
different to what is required or permitted given a restrictive, realistic FC, this 
shows us that it is worth considering what we can do to make it possible to realise 
the former principle. In other words, we learn that it is worth investigating what 
can be done to push us onto a more unrealistic feasibility constraint (so to speak). 
More unrealistic feasibility constraints give us more options; that is, they make 
more things come out as feasible. Thus, realising the principles that hold relative 
to more unrealistic FCs is in some sense better, more ideal. Thus, if something is 
required on a more unrealistic FC, we have a reason to see if something can be 
done to meet that requirement.   
5. Unrealistic anarchism 
Where has all this got us? I have just argued that it can be worthwhile doing 
moral or political theory constrained only by unrealistic feasibility constraints: 
either to identify the ideals and pro tanto requirements that have moral weight or 
simply to avoid undue conservatism when deciding what concretely to do. What 
does this mean for the legitimacy of existing states? My thesis has argued that 
plausible arguments for the legitimacy of existing states require feasibility 
premises. As we saw above, this has the consequence, given my account of 
feasibility, that we cannot simply take state legitimacy for granted: some 
argument is needed to show that the sharpening of ‘feasibility’ relative to which 
the relevant all-things-considered principles are specified is one on which the 
feasibility premises needed to establish state legitimacy are true. However, I said, 
since we are left with uncertainty about which set of principles (those specified 
relative to which feasibility constraint) are those that tell us what we ought, all 
things considered, to do, we could instead ask which sets of principles it is 
worthwhile identifying. The conclusion in this chapter was that it is not only 
realistic principles (those constrained by restrictive feasibility constraints) whose 
identification can be useful for action guidance.  
It was part of the claim of the first part of my thesis that successful arguments for 
state legitimacy depend on feasibility premises that will not be true on all possible 
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sharpenings of feasibility. Thus, there is a certain level of unrealisticness at which 
it ceases to be the case that legitimacy could be established for existing states. I 
have argued that, in general, unrealistic theory can be useful for action guidance. 
But what practically do we learn when we learn that the principles specified 
relative to some (at least somewhat) unrealistic FCs do not (or would not) give 
states the sort of general and exclusive permission to enforce that they claim? 
As we saw above, there are two kinds of unrealistic theory, and the conclusion 
that arguments for state legitimacy depend on feasibility premises is relevant to 
both kinds of theory. First, I take it that when we learn that this sort of 
permission to enforce cannot be established for any state a priori, we learn that 
the general and exclusive permission to enforce (for states that meet certain 
conditions) is not a part of the domain of theory of principles (it is not a part of 
the domain of pro tanto requirements specified relative to the most expansive 
feasibility constraints).264 What use is this knowledge? There are several answers 
to this question. The first is not straightforwardly a way in which this knowledge 
is useful for action guidance, but there may be an indirect way in which the use it 
alludes to is relevant to decisions about what to do. The knowledge that the more 
fundamental moral considerations that apply to us do not include a general and 
exclusive permission to enforce for any existing states is relevant to how we 
ought to think about and treat our states’ enforcement. We should not think of 
our states’ general and exclusive enforcement as something good in itself, and to 
be welcomed (as, for example, Pettit wants to say it is).265 It may be that in some 
sense it is good and to be welcomed, as something that makes possible something 
good, but at best, contra Pettit, it is a necessary evil, a remedy for unfortunate 
circumstances. We should think of (and treat) the state’s exclusive enforcement as 
only justified insofar as there is some other value that cannot be realised without 
it, or some other moral requirement that cannot be met without it.  
That the state’s general and exclusive permission to enforce does not show up at 
the level of theory of principles shows us that this is something where we should 
do better if we can. If we were not subject to certain feasibility constraints, we 
would not be permitted to have a state with general and exclusive enforcement 
                                                          
264 It does not quite follow from the fact that legitimacy cannot be established a priori that 
such a permission cannot form a part of the domain of theory of principles, since it could 
be that some a posteriori facts that are not to do with feasibility would suffice to establish 
it, and then it could still form a part of the domain of theory of principles in worlds at 
which the relevant a posteriori facts hold. However, my arguments seemed to show not 
only that legitimacy cannot be established a priori, but that the kind of a posteriori 
premises necessary to establish it include feasibility premises. 
265 Pettit (2012) 181 
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power. Thus, if it were possible to remove these feasibility constraints, that would 
be something that we should do. From this, two things follow. First, it follows 
that this is a matter where we fall short of the ideal. Unfortunate circumstances 
make it infeasible to do better, perhaps, but what we learn is precisely that this is 
unfortunate.  
Robert Jubb argues forcefully that one reason full-compliance theory is worth 
doing is because it shows us when and to what extent partial-compliance theory is 
tragic: 
The reason that we should do ideal theory in the sense of full-compliance theory 
is because, without doing it, we will often not be able to understand if and to 
what extent non-ideal theory is tragic. In not understanding that tragedy, we 
will tend to make mistakes about what is actually desirable in the circumstances 
of tragedy. One of the important normative features of those circumstances is 
their tragedy, and being unable to grasp that feature will tend to generate 
mistakes about how to respond to it. Unless we know how people are being 
mistreated, then we are likely to continue to mistreat them and fail to take the 
steps we are obliged to in order to rectify their mistreatment.266 
I think this point generalises to unrealistic theory more widely. When we learn 
that our state’s enforcement violates a pro tanto moral requirement, we learn that, 
if it is permissible all things considered, this is a tragic fact. (When we break a pro 
tanto moral requirement because it is impossible to meet it alongside some other 
weightier requirement, there may be no all-things-considered question about 
whether it is the right thing to do, but there is still a moral loss.) It then becomes 
important to think about why, if at all, it is permitted, and exactly when it is 
permitted. What, if any, are the feasibility constraints that make generalised state 
enforcement permissible, and when do they apply?  
The second thing that follows from the fact that states’ general and exclusive 
enforcement is not permitted by theory of principles is that if there is something 
we can do to make the ideal possible, we should. It is thus a consequence of this 
‘unrealistic anarchism’ that it is worth devoting some thought to what might be 
done to make it possible to meet the pro tanto requirements that generate a 
complaint against state enforcement concurrently with the pro tanto 
requirements that in certain circumstances make state enforcement permissible 
(in other words, what might be done to make it possible to achieve a morally 
acceptable anarchy). If we ought to avoid generalised state enforcement where 
compatible with meeting other pro tanto requirements, then it is worth exploring 
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whether there is a feasible way of doing so.267 It could be that there are certain 
domains in which we could more easily do without the state’s generalised 
enforcement. We ought to avoid violating the pro tanto requirement ordinarily 
violated by state enforcement in as many domains as possible without 
jeopardising other pro tanto requirements.  
One further way in which the knowledge that a state’s legitimacy is not a part of 
the domain of theory of principles might be useful is as a form of inspiration. 
Knowledge of the more fundamental moral requirements and ideals can have a 
role inspiring our short-term action. This knowledge might inspire us, for 
instance, to do our best to meet other moral requirements or realise other values 
without state enforcement. Further, it might inspire us to treat our states with 
suspicion and to be vigilant as to whether their exclusive and general enforcement 
really is necessary to meet some moral requirement and to resist, for example, if 
the state fails to meet the moral requirement that might make its enforcement 
permissible. We may be inspired to treat the state’s exclusive enforcement as 
something only to be accepted insofar as necessary for some purpose (the realisation 
of some ideal or the meeting of some moral requirement).  
There was a second form of unrealistic theory that I discussed above: unrealistic 
institutional design. I argued that such theory can be practically useful as a 
contribution to the process of determining what we ought, all things considered, 
to do, achieving a balance between undue conservatism and excessive optimism. 
When we identify that states lack an exclusive and general permission to enforce 
given a number of more expansive feasibility constraints (and so, that given those 
constraints, we ought not to have a state with generalised enforcement power), 
we learn something that we can factor into deciding what to do in the way 
described above. Thus, even if we reject the picture of theory of principles 
suggested above, this conclusion has practical implications for our all-things-
                                                          
267 There are, of course, constraints on our time and, as Robert Goodin (2012b) argues, 
sometimes it is necessary to take certain things as settled. To be able to make plans and 
have goals, and to render our behaviour predictable for others, we need to take certain 
matters as fixed. Sometimes we need to just accept certain moral failings. However, as 
Goodin agrees, we should not accept everything as settled: we need to strive as well. Indeed, 
it seems to me that we ought to strive to do better morally as far as is possible without 
radically threatening our ability to plan our lives. Goodin offers no recipes for 
determining when we ought to strive and when settle, but it could be that state 
enforcement is one of those things that we should take as fixed. There may be more 
urgent matters, and for certain purposes it is perfectly acceptable to take state 
enforcement as fixed. However, since it is of great significance to our lives, it does seem 
that it could be worth investigating whether there are ways to meet weighty moral 
requirements and realise weighty values without it. Even if it turns out not to be possible 
to do without it altogether, there may be certain domains in which we can.     
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considered action. These implications are broadly similar to those of the theory of 
principles conclusion above, although thinking in terms of institutional design 
puts the emphasis slightly differently. We learn that if there is something we can 
do (that is not too costly in other terms) to push us onto the more expansive 
feasibility constraints where a morally acceptable stateless world is feasible, then 
we should. This knowledge may again act as an inspiration.  
When we learn that given a more expansive feasibility constraint, we ought to 
structure our societies without the state’s exclusive and general enforcement, we 
learn that this is something that needs to be weighed up against what the costs of 
making this possible, or working towards a world where it is possible, would be. 
Knowing that in some sense a world without such enforcement is desirable should 
factor into our all-things-considered decisions. When it is possible to work 
towards such a world without excessive costs, we should do so. Like the theory of 
principles conclusion, this has the implication that it becomes a worthwhile task 
identifying what the feasibility constraints are that make such a world impossible 
(or impossible in a desirable way). What exactly would we have to do to get there 
(in a desirable way)? This may be a task more for social science than for 
normative philosophy, but the normative conclusion has the consequence that this 
social scientific task is an important one.     
What exactly all of this implies for how we should act here and now will of course 
depend on what the moral requirements or ideals are that make state enforcement 
permissible (as the only feasible way of realising/meeting these 
ideals/requirements). It could be thought that the ‘here and now’ 
recommendations that will follow from my thesis will be in line with something 
like the Nozickian libertarian call for a minimal state that enforces property rights 
and basic rights against aggression, but does not engage in redistributive taxation 
or other state activities. What my thesis shows (if right) is that exclusive state 
enforcement is only justifiable insofar as necessary for meeting some important 
moral requirement, or for realising some important goal. It might seem to follow 
from this that we should minimise state enforcement. If we then were to argue that 
it is not feasible to achieve, say, rights-respect or rights-security without 
exclusive state enforcement, we then might be tempted to conclude that it is 
permissible all-things-considered for states to enforce libertarian basic rights, but 
nothing else. This is something like the Nozickian minimal state. It should be 
clear, though, that this need not be the case. We only get to this sort of libertarian 
minimal state from my conclusions if we make certain assumptions. 
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We get there if, but only if, we assume that people have strong property rights in 
external objects whose protection is of significant moral importance, sufficient to 
overcome the presumption against exclusive state enforcement. We would need to 
assume first that the sort of value or moral requirement that might necessitate 
state enforcement is the security of individuals’ rights and not, say, distributive 
justice (of a patterned, or end-state, kind). If exclusive state enforcement is 
justified because it is the only feasible way of protecting rights, then it is plausible 
that states’ enforcement will only be justified when it is necessary for rights 
protection. Further, it needs to be assumed that people can have strong property 
rights in external objects. Without this, even if we thought security was 
important and what justifies state enforcement, we might be able to get to the 
idea that we should seek a minimal state, but we would have no reason to think 
that this minimal state must be one that allows ‘capitalist acts between consenting 
adults’, one, in other words, that protects property rights and does not engage in 
redistributive taxation. We only have a reason to include ‘capitalist acts’ in the 
realm of the basic freedoms that minimal states have a justification for protecting 
if we think people have strong property rights. 
A society’s system of property rights is one aspect among others of the way social 
cooperation is structured that needs to be determined in some way collectively. 
The collective rules for social cooperation that a society settles on need not be 
enforced. But if it is in some sense infeasible for these rules to be observed without 
enforcement, this could be enough to warrant state enforcement of these rules if 
they are of sufficient value. However, if we think we ought to minimise state 
enforcement, the question still remains what we ought to minimise it to. The 
answer to this latter question will be a matter of which social rules we consider to 
be most morally important, which aspects of living together we consider worth 
the violation of the presumption against state enforcement. There is no ex ante 
reason to suppose that this must include strong property rights and the 
protection of ‘capitalist acts’. We could instead think, for instance, that the 
minimal social rules we should enforce should include rules that ensure 
distributive justice, a basic economic minimum, or even full economic equality.268 
                                                          
268 The ‘left-libertarians’ make the related point that full private property rights are not 
essential to a libertarian commitment to self-ownership. (See Vallentyne and Steiner 
(2000).) But, though the above is targeted at right-libertarianism which defends a minimal 
state limited to enforcing property rights and little else, my thesis need not lead us to left-
libertarianism either, for similar reasons. If we do not share the left-libertarian belief in 
the importance of ‘self-ownership rights’, we need not take such rights as a part of the 
minimal domain of rules to which we ought to limit state enforcement. Self-ownership 
rights could be protected by collective rules for social cooperation, but they need not be: 
whether they should be is again a substantive moral question. 
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The collective social rules need not include strong property rights to external 
objects: they could instead, for instance, allow for exclusive property rights only 
insofar as consistent with some principle of egalitarian justice. We are only forced 
to go for a Nozickian minimal state if we think there are grounds for strong 
natural property rights.   
However, the thought that my thesis calls for a minimal state is not entirely 
wrong. I think my thesis does suggest that we should, within some constraints, 
minimise state enforcement. But this leaves open what we should minimise it to 
(i.e., within what constraints we should minimise it). Since my thesis seems to 
show that state enforcement can only be justified insofar as it is the only feasible 
way (on some sharpening of ‘feasible’) of meeting some moral requirement or 
achieving some valuable goal, it does seem to follow that we should try and 
minimise state enforcement within constraints placed by weightier moral 
considerations. 269 What these constraints are, what we ought to minimise state 
enforcement to, will depend on your moral view, your theory of justice and so on. 
If we thought that the moral requirement that could justify state enforcement was 
not a requirement to protect individuals’ rights, but rather some sort of 
requirement for egalitarian justice, we would get a very different picture of the 
sort of ‘minimal state’ we ought to strive for: one, presumably, that maintains 
egalitarian justice and little else, and that does so with a minimum of enforcement. 
It might seem, then, that this makes my conclusion somewhat unhelpful, even 
redundant for practical purposes. This, though, would be wrong. My thesis does 
not offer a full set of instructions for what sort of state enforcement we ought, 
here and now, to support, or to resist. But it does, if I am right, offer a significant 
contribution to this task. What it claims to show is that we should minimise state 
enforcement, as far as we can without compromising weightier moral values or 
requirements. We ought to do what is possible to reduce state enforcement in line 
with our other moral commitments: we should not, contra Pettit and the 
Kantians, treat it as a good and welcome thing. According to the a priori view of 
state legitimacy, state enforcement (of certain kinds) will always be a good and 
morally essential thing; we ought not to seek to do without it, since otherwise 
there can be no right, or no freedom. It is a consequence of my view, however, 
                                                          
269 The lesson of the theory of second best is that it does not follow from the fact that the 
ideal society would be one with no state enforcement that we ought to minimise state 
enforcement tout court. But it does follow from the fact that state enforcement violates a 
pro tanto requirement that we ought to avoid it whenever that requirement is not 
defeated by weightier considerations: in other words, we ought to minimise it within the 
constraints imposed by those considerations. 
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that the possibility (and the feasibility) of doing without the state, in as many 
domains as we can, is one worth exploring.  
6. Conclusion 
The two primary parts of my thesis, the argument that state legitimacy cannot be 
established a priori (and can only be established with the aid of feasibility 
considerations) and the multivocal account of feasibility, when combined lead to 
two headline conclusions. The first is that we cannot be confident that state 
legitimacy is on safe ground; it is not something that should be simply taken for 
granted. This is because we lack an argument that the sharpening of feasibility 
that constrains morality (or the relevant domain of morality) is one on which the 
necessary feasibility premises are true. The second is that, even if it turns out that 
what we are permitted to do all things considered is constrained by a reasonably 
realistic feasibility constraint, and so that some states do have a general and 
exclusive permission to enforce all things considered, it is still the case that these 
states would lack legitimacy given more unrealistic feasibility constraints and that 
their legitimacy is not a part of the domain of theory of principles. As I have 
argued in this final section, this is something that is worth knowing. 
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